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ABSTRACT 
WIPAWIN PROMBOON: Capital Flows, Institutions, and Financial Fragility 
(Under the direction of Gregory W. Brown) 
This dissertation studies the mechanism through which international capital flows are 
transmitted from the banking sector to the real sector in a bank-based open economy when moral 
hazard problems are present.  It also examines the role of the quality of institutions and domestic 
policies in reducing moral hazard problems and in determining the net benefit of international capital 
flows to a country.  A general equilibrium model, incorporating moral hazard problems at the bank, 
corporate and international levels, is developed to explain this mechanism.  In this unifying model, 
the three layers of moral hazard problems and international capital flows reinforce one another to 
amplify the boom-bust cycle of an economy, as seen in several crisis countries.  The model predicts 
that an economy will never reach a steady state when banks can accumulate losses and finance those 
losses through foreign borrowing.  This prediction underlines the role of international capital flows 
and the moral hazard problems at the bank and international levels in destabilizing an economy.  The 
results from the parameter estimation and the hypothesis testing using Thailand data suggest that 
there have been structural changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies after the Asian 
financial crisis and these changes help alleviate the moral hazard problems at all levels in Thailand.  
Based on the simulation exercises, the improvement in banking supervision and foreign investors’ 
risk estimation helps substantially reduce the bailout costs and the output losses during the recession.  
In contrast, the reduction in government subsidies or tax incentives hurts, rather than helps, the 
economy since the cost from the overall output decline outweighs the benefit from the lower bailout 
costs. 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I am grateful to my advisor, Gregory W. Brown, for his valuable guidance, support, and 
encouragement.  I would also like to thank my committee members, Jennifer Conrad, Christian 
Lundblad, Robert Connolly, and Larry Chavis, for their inspirations and suggestions.  I owe very 
special thanks to Stanley W. Black and Eric Ghysels for their useful advice.  Helpful comments and 
suggestions from Pab Jotikasthira, Anusha Chari, Sergiy Peredriy, Bumjean Sohn, and Jason C. Jones 
are much appreciated.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents, brothers, and friends for their 
encouragement and support. 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………….………..vii 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….…................viii 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………..……1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW..……………………………………………….....................8 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE KEY MODEL  
ASSUMPTIONS………………………………………………………………….….12 
IV. MODEL………………………………………………………………………….…..15 
4.1 Structure of the Model…………………………………………………………...17 
4.2 Sudden Stop Financial Crisis………………………………….………………....31 
4.3 Analysis of the Model………………………………………………………........34 
V. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL………………………………………………….38 
5.1 Parameters of Interest………………………………………………………........40 
5.2 Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………........42 
5.3 Thailand……………………………………………………………………........44 
VI. DATA……………………………………………………………………………….49 
VII. METHODOLOGY...……………………………………………………..................53 
7.1 Model Modifications……………………………………………………………53 
7.2 Calibration and Estimation……………………………………………………...56 
7.3 GMM and Hypothesis Testing Methodology……………………………….......57 
 v
VIII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS……………………………………………………………59 
8.1 Main Results……………………………………………………………..……...59 
8.2 Sensitivity and Stability Analysis….………………………………………..…..62 
IX. SIMULATION………………………………………………………………………69 
9.1 Costs and Benefits of International Capital Flows………………………………69 
9.2 Conjectures about the Results………………………………………………...…70 
9.3 Scenarios………………………………………………………………………...72 
9.4 Assumptions…………………………………………………………………….73 
9.5 Simulation Results………………………………………………………………74 
9.6 Sensitivity Analysis……………………………………………………………..78 
X. MISSING COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL AND AREAS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH …………………………………………………………….88 
XI. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..91 
APPENDIX A: Equilibrium Conditions ………………………………………………..................94 
APPENDIX B: Parameters and Variables……………………………………………………........98 
APPENDIX C: Steady State Solutions……………….……………………………………….......100 
APPENDIX D: Linear Approximations and Solutions for Linearized Difference Equations........103 
APPENDIX E: Equilibrium Conditions in the Form of First Difference Equations……………..107 
APPENDIX F: Descriptions and Data Sources of Variables Used as Instruments..……...……...109 
APPENDIX G: Steps to Calculate Partial-Sample GMM Estimators and Wald Statistics………110 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………….......130 
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
  1. Descriptions and Data Sources of Variables..………………………………………..115 
  2. Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample Period…………………………………...119 
  3. Summary Statistics for Each Sub-Period……………………………..………….......120 
  4. Preliminary Correlation Analysis…………………………………………………….122 
  5. Correlations between Selected Macroeconomic Variables and 
     Relevant Interest Rates………………..………………………………………….......123 
  6. Exogenously-Determined Parameters………………………….…………………….124 
  7. Parameter Estimates from Partial-Sample GMM Estimation……...…………….......125 
  8. Wald Statistics for Structural Break Tests………………..………………………….126 
  9. Simulation Scenarios……………………………...…….………………………........127 
 10. Direct and Indirect Costs in Comparison with the Actual Data………………..……128 
 11. Direct, Indirect, and Total Costs Relative to the Base Scenario.………………........129 
 vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Time-Series Patterns of Variables………………………………..……………..……..113 
 
 viii
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent globalization of economic activity and financial markets triggered financial 
liberalization in many countries, exposing them to increasing volume of, and higher uncertainty from, 
international capital flows.  This fundamentally altered historic relationships between international 
transactions and activities of local financial intermediaries.  While international capital flows are an 
important source of capital for a country’s real investment, financial risks induced by large short-term 
international capital flows, or so-called ‘hot money’, can potentially have an adverse effect on 
financial system stability.  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that financial crises spill over to the real 
economy and in some cases result in severe macroeconomic dislocation.  However, other research 
instead suggests that financial crises are the result of fundamental macroeconomic conditions.   
A dramatic example of this debate surrounds the “financial crisis” in East Asia during the late 1990s.  
A number of papers (e.g., Furman, Stiglitz, Bosworth & Radelet, 1998; Radelet, Sachs, Cooper & 
Bosworth, 1998) highlight the major role of international capital flows in determining the financial 
instability and resulting contagion.  In contrast, some research suggests that the Asian crisis resulted 
principally from weak fundamentals due to regulatory inadequacy in the banking sector (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999) and moral hazard problems induced by explicit or implicit guarantees from the local 
government or international organizations (Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1999a).   
These two views, although different, are not mutually exclusive.  As some prior research 
suggests (e.g., Henry & Lorentzen, 2003), it is not just the quantity of capital that matters, but also 
how the capital is utilized.  In countries where moral hazard problems are severe, more available 
capital as a result of financial liberalization may be utilized for bad investments or risky projects.  In 
 
addition, regulatory and institutional capacity to deal with such moral hazard problems may not be 
able to keep pace with rapid changes in financial markets.  The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the 
U.S. (with major adverse consequences for banks and financial markets around the world) and the 
Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s highlight the role of international capital flows via the 
banking sector and moral hazard problems in determining macroeconomic stability of an open 
economy.   
From a policy perspective, more available foreign capital poses a significant risk for a 
country which liberalizes financial markets too quickly or too broadly without adequate preparation in 
terms of regulations and institutions (Stiglitz, 1999, 2002; Rodrik, 1998).  To the contrary, 
excessively slow financial market liberalization could lead to low and inefficient investment, 
suboptimal risk-sharing (exacerbated home-bias), and relatively slow economic growth as implied by 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005).  All these debates motivate two important research questions:  
(1) What is the net effect of international capital flows on a country? (2) Are institutions as important 
as suggested by other research or are they a proxy for other factors?   
Given the clear importance of these issues, a number of researchers have studied the 
determinants as well as the costs and benefits of international capital flows to a country.  Many of 
them focused only on the costs (e.g., Hutchison & Noy, 2006; Boyer, Kumagai, & Yuan, 2006) or the 
benefits of financial liberalization (e.g., Bekaert et al., 2005; Henry, 2000a, 2000b).  Also, the 
empirical results regarding the benefits of capital flows are mixed.  Hence, the issue of whether 
international capital flows are truly destabilizing remains unresolved.  In addition, most of those 
studies are cross-country.  Thus, they cannot account for all types of heterogeneities across countries 
nor can they analyze the factors driving the costs and benefits of international capital flows, such as 
the quality of institutions, for each country in detail.  The issue of whether the quality of institutions 
matters therefore has not been thoroughly explored at the detailed country level.  Looking at an 
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economy that has made institutional changes and estimating the impact is a way to investigate both if 
institutions really matter, and if so, how much.   
This dissertation aims to (1) study the transmission mechanism of international capital flows 
via the banking sector to the real sector of an open economy when moral hazard problems are present 
in a unified structural framework and (2) examine the role of the quality of institutions and domestic 
policies in reducing moral hazard problems and determining the net benefit of international capital 
flows to a country in the long run.  The focus of this paper is primarily on small open economies for 
the following reasons.  First, those countries experienced an influx of international capital flows after 
their financial liberalizations and many went through financial crises with sudden reversals of capital 
flows.  Hence, they are good subjects for examining both the costs and benefits of international 
capital flows.  Second, several of them, especially those that experienced crises, have undergone 
major reforms and significant changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies after the 
crises.  Such reforms can then be used to examine the effects of changes in the quality of institutions 
and domestic policies on those countries. 
To address the first objective, a theoretical model under the general equilibrium framework is 
developed to explain the interactions between international capital flows and each sector of a small 
open economy during both non-crisis and crisis periods when moral hazard problems are present.  
This model incorporates several important facets of the real and financial economy, allowing shocks 
to the banking sector to be transmitted to the real sector, and vice versa, via the interest rate 
mechanism.  It also addresses several aspects of moral hazard problems, rather than focusing on only 
one of them as many other moral hazard models have done (e.g., Corsetti, Pesenti, & Roubini, 1999b; 
Dekle & Kletzer, 2005).  The unifying property of this model allows interactions between different 
aspects of moral hazard problems as they could be reinforcing or offsetting one another.  This 
property also makes the model more consistent with what has been observed, as there exist multiple 
types of moral hazard problems, although in different degrees, in most countries.  Hence, compared 
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with other moral hazard models, this model is more versatile and so is applicable to a broader set of 
countries.   
The main assumptions of the model are based on key observations of countries experiencing 
crises over the past two decades.  First, an economy is largely reliant on the banking sector, which has 
access to large sources of international funds.  Second, due to poor quality institutions and domestic 
policies, there are three layers of moral hazard problems in the country before a crisis (i.e., moral 
hazard problems at the corporate, bank, and international levels).1  Third, a sudden stop of 
international capital flows is triggered when the expected level of contingent government liabilities 
(the amount of banks’ cumulative losses) exceeds the level of the country’s international reserves.   
In this model, the three layers of moral hazard problems, together with international capital flows, 
reinforce one another to amplify the boom-bust cycle of the economy.   
First, at the corporate level, expected government subsidies or tax incentives increase firms’ 
expected profits, inducing firms to invest more and borrow more from banks than they should without 
the government subsidies or tax incentives.  In the model, a firm’s optimal level of capital stock is 
increasing with the level of government subsidies or tax incentives.   
Second, at the bank level, when a future government bailout is expected and banking 
supervision is inadequate, banks are willing to lend excessively to the corporate sector as long as they 
can obtain enough funding from depositors (the household sector) and foreign creditors.  In addition, 
banks have an incentive to pay out their profits from performing loans as dividends to their 
shareholders, rather than maintaining such profits as provisions against their losses from non-
performing loans (NPLs).  Hence, NPL losses are accumulated on the banks’ accounts, and banks 
have to finance those losses through additional foreign borrowing.  In this model, the level of NPL 
losses that banks can accumulate in each period is determined by their loan loss provisioning ratio.   
                                                
1As mentioned in Corsetti et al. (1999a), the role of moral hazard at the onset of the Asian crisis has been 
stressed by a number of authors, e.g., Krugman (1998a), Greenspan (1998), and Fischer (1998b). 
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Third, at the international level, with a presumption that government guarantees exist and the 
government is committed to a stable exchange rate, foreign creditors are willing to lend excessively to 
the domestic banking sector as long as the expected level of the government’s contingent liabilities is 
below the level of the country’s international reserves.  They also underestimate the risks from their 
lending to the domestic banking sector and do not charge interest rates high enough to compensate for 
their risks, because they believe that the government will bail out those banks if things go wrong.  In 
addition, they do not expect exchange rates to be responsive to changes in interest rate differentials 
since they believe that the government will attempt to maintain a stable exchange rate.  In this model, 
foreign investors’ perceptions of risks and their expectations of exchange rate movements are 
reflected in the determination of a domestic interest rate and an exchange rate.  Particularly, the 
banks’ cost of foreign borrowing is modeled to be increasing with the aggregate level of banks’ net 
foreign borrowing.  Although extending more credit to the banking sector in another country exposes 
foreign investors to higher risks, they may not fully take into account those risks when determining 
the rate of return if they believe that government guarantees exist.  The sensitivity of the banks’ 
foreign borrowing rate to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing thus reflects the level of 
risks that foreign investors perceive and factor into their required rate of return.  The higher this 
sensitivity, the more expensive it is for banks to increase their foreign borrowing.  The exchange rate 
in this model is determined by an interest rate differential and an expected exchange rate deviation 
from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relation according to a modified UIP.  When the 
expected exchange rate deviation from the UIP is equal to zero, the exchange rate is solely 
determined by the interest rate differential and is not influenced by the government.   
Although moral hazard problems at all levels play a role in magnifying the boom-bust cycle 
of an economy, the analysis of the model suggests that the moral hazard problems at the bank and 
international levels are primarily the factors causing an economy to move away from its equilibrium 
and triggering a sudden stop and a crisis.  When banks can accumulate NPL losses (the moral hazard 
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problem at the bank level) and can obtain additional foreign borrowing to finance those losses (the 
moral hazard problem at the international level), the economy will never be at a steady state, as NPL 
losses and foreign debt continue to increase.  Once the level of banks’ cumulative NPL losses exceeds 
the level of the country’s international reserves, a sudden stop will surely occur. 
 To address the second objective, the model parameters measuring the severity of moral 
hazard problems are used as proxies for the quality of institutions and domestic policies.  A crisis 
country typically has gone through major institutional reforms after a crisis.  Hence, its quality of 
institutions and domestic policies may be significantly changed, and its moral hazard problems may 
have been reduced.  If this hypothesis is true, the parameters measuring moral hazard problems 
should indicate a lower degree of moral hazard problems after a crisis.  In addition, since the moral 
hazard problems, together with international capital flows, amplify the boom-bust cycle of an 
economy, the lower degree of moral hazard problems may result in lower cost or higher benefit of 
international capital flows to a country.  
 To examine the above hypotheses, the parameters determining moral hazard problems at all 
levels are estimated for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods using the equilibrium conditions from 
the model and the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to fit the data of a small open 
economy which has experienced a crisis.  The chosen country is Thailand since it exhibits 
characteristics consistent with the key assumptions of the model. It is also not an extreme example, 
considering its rankings among all other emerging countries in terms of its degree of openness, 
economic performance, and quality of institutions.  The hypothesis tests for the differences in 
parameter values before and after the crisis are conducted to examine if there have been significant 
changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies leading to a lower degree of moral hazard 
problems after the crisis.  Simulation exercises are also undertaken to assess the impact of changes in 
the quality of institutions and domestic policies on the net benefit of international capital flows.  Both 
direct costs (bailout costs) and indirect costs (output losses) of a crisis with a sudden stop of capital 
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flows are estimated using the simulated data under different moral hazard scenarios.  The results from 
the hypothesis testing and the simulation exercises suggest that the moral hazard problems at all 
levels are less severe after the crisis and the changes in the quality of institutions and domestic 
policies with regard to banking supervision and foreign investors’ perceptions of risks help 
significantly reduce the bailout costs and the output losses.  In contrast, the reduction in the 
government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector hurts, rather than benefits, the country, 
as the cost from the lower output outweighs the benefit from the lower bailout costs.   
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II discusses the related 
literature.  Chapter III presents the empirical evidence supporting the key assumptions of the model.  
Chapter IV develops the theoretical model.  Chapter V discusses the application of the model.  
Chapter VI describes the data and summary statistics.  The methodology and estimation results are 
explained in Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, respectively.  Chapter IX presents the simulation results.  
Chapter X discusses missing components of the model and areas for future research.  Chapter XI 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relationships between international capital flows and macroeconomic conditions have 
been widely studied in the international economics literature.  Early literature examined the 
relationships between capital flows and the saving-investment gap.  Fleming-Mundell and Obstfeld-
Rogoff models provide basic theoretical frameworks for analyzing such relationships.  Kraay and 
Ventura (2000, 2002) and Ventura (2003) incorporate investment risk into consumers’ portfolio 
composition decisions, which thus determine the domestic capital stock and the net foreign asset 
position of a country.  Motivated by concerns over financial instability caused by international capital 
flows, a number of researchers examine the mechanisms through which international capital flows 
create sudden stops and crises (e.g., Calvo, 1998; Rodrik & Velasco, 1999).  Chari and Kehoe (2003) 
develop a model of herd behavior where informational frictions together with weak fundamentals lead 
to volatile capital flows (resembling hot money) and in turn cause a financial crisis.  Inspired by the 
market microstructure literature on the relationships between foreign exchange (FX) order flows and 
FX rates,2 more recent works examine the two-way causal relationships between international capital 
flows and macroeconomic as well as financial market indicators.  Hau and Rey (2006) develop  
a model in which exchange rates, stock prices, and capital flows are jointly determined under 
incomplete foreign exchange risk trading.  Empirical work in this line of research includes Hau and 
Rey (2004), Siourounis (2003), Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), Froot and Ramadorai (2001, 
2005) and Powell, Ratha, and Mohapatra (2002).  Similar to this literature, this dissertation 
                                                
2Vitale (2007) surveys the market microstructure approach to exchange rate determination. 
 
emphasizes the role of the banking sector and moral hazard problems in determining the net benefit of 
international capital flows to a country. 
This dissertation is also related to the literature on currency and financial crises. 3  The first 
generation of crisis models was pioneered by Krugman (1979).  In this type of model, unsustainable 
fiscal policy causes the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime and a crisis.  The second generation 
of crisis models was initiated by Obstfeld (1986).  In these models, doubts about the government 
ability to maintain its fixed exchange rate bring about multiple equilibria, and speculative attacks 
occur as a result of self-fulfilling expectations, not because of irresponsible policies.  The third 
generation of crisis models examines the role of the banking sector in initiating or amplifying the 
severity of a crisis (e.g., Disyatat, 2004; Zhou, 2008).  The three main versions of the third generation 
models as suggested by Krugman (2001) are bank run, balance-sheet effect and moral hazard models. 
In the bank run models (e.g., Chang & Velasco, 2000, 2001), the focus is on a bank’s maturity 
mismatch, and a bank run occurs based on self-fulfilling expectations that the bank may not be able to 
pay depositors who come to withdraw their money later.  In the balance-sheet effect models (e.g., 
Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 2001a), banks and firms have an incentive to expose themselves to 
greater FX risk in the presence of government guarantees.   
The model presented in this paper is mostly related to a moral hazard story.  The basic feature 
of moral hazard models (as seen in many papers, e.g., Dooley, 2000; McKinnon & Pill, 1996) is the 
role of expected government guarantees in causing international investors to lend a large amount of 
money to another country, leading to excessive risk-taking behavior of agents in that country.  Apart 
from the moral hazard problem at the international level, there are many other levels of moral hazard 
problems.  With regard to the moral hazard problem at the corporate level, Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini (1999b) develop a model in which there are expectations that the government will provide 
financial support to firms if they are in a bad state.  Such expectations increase firms’ expected profits 
                                                
3Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008), Krugman (2001), and Tinnakorn (2006) provide a review of crisis 
models. 
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and cause firms to overinvest.  Firms can easily get funds from overly optimistic elite consumers, 
who have access to international funds and expect a government bailout when firms are in a bad state.  
Since firms do not receive transfers from the government right away, elite consumers have to finance 
their losses or cash shortfalls through foreign borrowing.  Once their cumulative losses exceed the 
level of the country’s international reserves, a sudden stop of capital flows occurs.  With regard to the 
moral hazard problem at the bank level, Dekle and Kletzer (2005) develop a model in which banking 
supervision is inadequate and there is a widely held perception that government guarantees exist.  
Hence, banks have an incentive to pay dividends from their performing loan profits, rather than 
maintain them as provisions against their non-performing loan (NPL) losses.  Banks therefore 
accumulate NPL losses, which later become contingent government liabilities.  Once the level of 
banks’ cumulative NPL losses exceeds a certain threshold, the government intervenes, and banks can 
no longer accumulate losses.  However, in their model, banks receive funds only from domestic 
depositors; hence, there is no role for international capital flows.  This dissertation addresses several 
aspects of moral hazard problems, rather than focusing on only one of them.  Particularly, the model 
developed in this dissertation incorporates (1) expected government subsidies or tax incentives to the 
corporate sector which lead to overinvestment, similar to what we have seen in the paper by Corsetti 
et al. (1999b),4 (2) lax banking supervision which leads to an accumulation of banks’ NPL losses, as 
seen in the paper by Dekle and Kletzer (2005), and (3) expected government guarantees and the 
government’s commitment to a stable exchange rate which cause foreign investors not only to lend  
a large amount of money to domestic banks, but also to underestimate their risks associated with 
lending to banks in another country.  Hence, this model is more applicable to countries with multiple 
moral hazard problems.  In addition, unlike many other theoretical papers, model parameters are 
estimated, rather than calibrated, in the empirical analysis.   
                                                
4In this model, expected government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector are modeled differently.  
Unlike the model by Corsetti et al. (1999b), subsidies from the government to the corporate sector in this model 
are contemporaneously provided to all firms in each period, rather than provided only to low-type firms and 
accumulated as the government’s expected contingent liabilities. 
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 Regarding the costs and benefits of international capital flows, a large number of researchers 
explore the fundamental issue of whether foreign capital flows are destabilizing or benefiting  
a country or both.  Quinn (1997) and Bekaert et al. (2005) find that countries with greater openness to 
capital mobility experience higher growth than countries with restrictions on capital mobility while 
Rodrik (1998) finds no such association.  To the contrary, Hutchison and Noy (2006) find that 
sudden-stop crises--currency/balance of payment crises with reversals in capital flows--have a large 
negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth (over that found in other crises without reversals in 
capital flows).   
Interestingly, the benefits of financial liberalization might not be as strong as expected due to 
agency problems arising when rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own 
interests at the expense of outside investors (Stulz, 2005) and inadequacy of laws and supporting 
institutions (Henry & Lorentzen, 2003).  However, this issue has not been thoroughly explored at the 
detailed country level.  This dissertation adds to this line of research by further examining the role of 
the quality of institutions and domestic policies in reducing moral hazard problems and in 
determining the net benefit of international capital flows to a country.  Particularly, the parameter 
values associated with the severity of moral hazard problems are estimated and used to assess the 
effect of changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies on the costs and benefits of 
international capital flows in the simulation exercises.   
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
The main assumptions of the model developed in the next chapter are based on key 
observations of countries which have experienced financial crises.  Over the past couple decades,  
a number of crises have occurred around the world, e.g., Mexican Peso crisis during 1994-1995, 
Asian financial crisis during 1997-1998, Russian financial crisis in 1998, Argentine economic crisis 
during 1999-2002.  The most recent global financial crisis resulted from the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the U.S. and has had a large adverse impact on financial markets and economies around the world.  
For example, the Icelandic financial crisis has resulted in the collapse of all three major banks in 
Iceland.  Those crises share several similarities.  
First, international capital flows played a key role in fueling a boom, and in many of those 
countries the banking sector played an important role in channeling funds to the real sector.  At the 
end of 1997, bank loans accounted for 77% of the total external finance for Thailand, 68% for 
Indonesia, 52% for the Philippines, and 65% for South Korea while in the U.S. bank loans 
represented only 23% of the total external finance.5  Also a large fraction of foreign borrowing was 
intermediated by the domestic banking system.  Based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
data on foreign liabilities of domestic banks and non-banks towards BIS reporting banks, in mid 
1997, the ratio of foreign borrowing intermediated by the domestic banking sector was 77% for 
Malaysia and Korea, 69% for the Philippines, 86% for Thailand, and 78% for China (Corsetti et al., 
1999a).   
                                                
5These ratios are calculated using the figures from Expert Group on the Challenges of the Asian Economy and 
Financial Markets (2001), which are based on International Financial Statistics data of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF-IFS). 
 
Second, there were typically structural and policy distortions before each crisis, which caused 
the private sector (or the public sector in the case of Mexico, Russia and Argentina) of a crisis country 
to excessively accumulate debt and then trigger a financial crisis.  Particularly there was a widely held 
perception that explicit and/or implicit government guarantees or subsidies for corporate and financial 
investment existed, causing firms to overinvest, banks to lend excessively to risky borrowers, and 
foreign capital to flow into a country.  Furthermore, several of the crisis countries adopted rigid 
exchange rate regimes, for example, pegged exchange rates in Thailand, Argentina, and Mexico and 
managed float regimes in Korea, Indonesia, and Russia.  Worsening the situation, banking 
supervision was typically quite lax before a crisis.  Hence, several banks, such as commercial banks 
in many Asian countries and Iceland as well as investment banks in the U.S., had an incentive to take 
excessive risks to enhance returns. 
Third, a sudden stop of capital flows and a run occurred when the expected level of  
a country’s debt (either public or private debt) was so high that investors did not believe that the 
government would be able to fulfill its financial obligations.  In fact, there were several signs of  
a country’s vulnerability to a crisis and a sudden reversal of capital flows in those crisis countries.  
Many of them had current account imbalances before a crisis and thus were susceptible to a sudden 
reversal of capital flows, especially when such imbalances were financed by short-term flows or by 
instruments indexed to other currencies.  For example, Thailand experienced a current account deficit 
for over a decade, and by 1996 only 16% of its current account deficit was financed by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Corsetti et al., 1999a) while Mexico financed its current account deficit of 7% of 
GDP by debt instrument denominated in pesos but indexed to dollars.  In addition, there was  
a lending boom prior to a crisis.  In countries experiencing the Asian financial crisis, the ratio of 
private sector lending to GDP exhibited an increasing trend.  The growth rate during 1990-1996 of 
private sector lending to GDP ratio was highest in the Philippines (151%), Thailand (58%), and 
Malaysia (31%) (Corsetti et al., 1999a).  In the U.S., the home ownership rate increased from 64% in 
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1994 to 69.2% in 2004, and subprime lending was a major contributor to this increase.  In several 
crisis countries, asset quality was in doubt.  The non-performing loans to total loans ratio in 1996 was 
estimated to be 13% for Thailand and Indonesia, 8% for Korea, 10% for Malaysia, and 14% for the 
Philippines (Corsetti et al., 1999a).  Moreover, there was a serious mismatch between foreign 
liabilities and foreign assets in many crisis countries.  The ratio of foreign liabilities to foreign assets 
relative to BIS reporting banks exceeded 100% in countries experiencing the Asian financial crisis 
during 1993-1997 (Corsetti et al., 1999a).   
Based on the above key observations, the model in Chapter IV is developed using the 
following assumptions: (1) the banking sector plays a key role in channeling international capital 
flows to the corporate sector, (2) moral hazard problems at the corporate, bank, and international 
levels are present in an economy, and (3) a sudden stop of capital flows occurs when the expected 
level of the country’s debt is greater than the level of the country’s liquid assets. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODEL 
This chapter presents a general equilibrium model of a bank-based, small open economy with 
moral hazard problems.  The focus of this model is primarily on small open economies since those 
countries experienced an influx of international capital flows after their financial liberalizations and 
many of them underwent financial crises with sudden reversals of capital flows.  Hence, they are 
good subjects for examining both the costs and benefits of international capital flows.  Moreover, 
several of them have gone through major institutional reforms after the crises.  Such reforms can then 
be used to examine the impacts of changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies on those 
countries.  Although the model in this chapter is developed for a small open economy, it can be 
extended for a large open economy by endogenizing the world interest rate.   
This model is developed with the aim of explaining the relationship between international 
capital flows via the banking sector and the real economy, the occurrence of a financial crisis, and 
how moral hazard problems amplify the impact of international capital flows on a country.  The 
model incorporates several important aspects of the real and financial economy, allowing shocks to 
one sector to be transmitted to the others through interest rates.  It also combines and extends the 
crisis models by Corsetti et al. (1999b) and Dekle and Kletzer (2005) to simultaneously address the 
three levels of moral hazard problems (i.e., the corporate, bank and international levels), which are 
normally observed in a crisis country.  The unifying property of this model allows interactions 
between different levels of moral hazard problems as they could be reinforcing or offsetting one 
another.   
 
Following the idea of Corsetti et al. (1999b), the moral hazard problem at the corporate level 
results from expected government subsidies or tax incentives, which increase firms’ expected profits 
and induce firms to overinvest.  There are different ways to model this level of moral hazard problem.  
First, it can be assumed that there is an anticipation of a future corporate bailout only to firms that are 
in a bad state (low-type firms) so that they can at least break even and survive, as seen in the model 
by Corsetti et al. (1999b).  Hence, the expected number of non-performing companies is zero.  In their 
model, firms’ losses are also not contemporaneously offset by government transfers.  Therefore, elite 
consumers (fund providers of firms) have to cover their losses and cash shortfalls through further 
foreign borrowing.  The expected government transfers to subsidize firms’ losses are thus 
accumulated as the government’s expected contingent liabilities.  Second, it can be assumed that there 
is an expectation of government subsidies or tax incentives to all firms, but transfers are not 
contemporaneously made in each period.  Thus, firms have to finance their cash shortfalls, if any, 
through additional bank borrowing or securities issuance, and the expected transfers from the 
government to firms are accumulated as the government’s expected liabilities.  Third, government 
subsidies or tax incentives can be assumed to be contemporaneously provided to firms in each period.  
Hence, there is no accumulation of the expected government transfers to firms.   
In this model, government subsidies or tax incentives are contemporaneously provided to 
firms in each period according to the third approach for the following reasons.  First, in several 
countries, government subsidies or tax incentives are provided to firms on a period-by-period basis.  
Second, unlike Corsetti et al. (1999b), which focus on the moral hazard problem at the corporate 
level, the banking sector is explicitly incorporated, and its role as the main foreign borrower and 
major loan provider for the corporate sector is emphasized in this model.  If the moral hazard problem 
at the corporate level is modeled according to the first approach, banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs) 
are expected to be zero since the government will finally bail out those low-type, unprofitable firms.  
In reality, this is not the case as banks’ accumulation of NPL losses plays a key role in triggering and 
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aggravating a crisis.  Following the idea of Dekle and Kletzer (2005), the moral hazard problem at the 
bank level is added.  That is, given an expected government bailout and inadequate bank monitoring, 
banks have an incentive to accumulate losses from NPLs.  Besides, banks in this model can borrow 
from abroad, unlike those in the model of Dekle and Kletzer (2005).  Hence, they will finance their 
losses or cash shortfalls through additional foreign borrowing.   
In addition, the moral hazard problems at the international level are explicitly modeled here 
through the determination of an interest rate for banks’ foreign borrowing and an exchange rate.  
Presumptions by foreign investors that government guarantees for corporate and financial investment 
exist and that the government is committed to a stable exchange rate causes them to underestimate the 
risks associated with their lending to the domestic banking sector.  Foreign investors therefore do not 
charge an interest rate high enough to compensate for their risks.  Moreover, an exchange rate is 
expected to deviate more from the conventional uncovered interest rate parity when a country adopts 
a pegged exchange rate regime since investors anticipate that the government will try to maintain  
a constant exchange rate, regardless of the level of an interest rate differential.  Furthermore, a sudden 
stop of capital flows and a financial crisis can occur in this model when the level of the country’s 
international reserves (a proxy for liquid assets) is below the level of cumulative losses in the banking 
sector (the expected level of contingent government liabilities).6
4.1 Structure of the Model 
 The model considers a bank-based, small open economy with four major sectors:  
(1) a corporate sector, (2) a banking sector, (3) a household sector, and (4) a public sector 
(government), which combines fiscal and monetary authorities. 
                                                
6Similar to Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000, 2001b), this emphasizes the role of prospective 
government deficit in causing a crisis. 
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4.1.1 Corporate Sector 
There are N firms in each period t.  Each firm j is owned by households in a well-diversified 
portfolio and pays out all its net profits as dividends to its existing shareholders.  Each firm j 
specializes in the production of traded goods y and has the following production function. 
α1
t
α
t1t1t lkAy
−
++ =      (F1) 
Where yt+1  = Firm j’s output for period t+1, 
            kt  = Firm j’s physical capital at the end of period t, 
           At+1  = Production technology factor for period t+1, which is assumed  
                              to be random and subject to firm type, 
            l t  = Firm j’s employed labor at the end of period t, 
            α  = Income share of capital (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). 
At the beginning of period t+1 (at the end of period t), each firm j invests IJt =  kt - kt-1+d kt-1 
to produce traded goods yt+1 and to finance its capital depreciation.  The fraction (1-cap) of its new 
investment (i.e., kt -kt-1) is financed through bank debt (0 ≤ cap ≤ 1) while the remaining portion is 
financed through newly-issued preferred stocks or bonds, which are sold to the household sector.  
Each firm j uses its own profits to finance capital depreciation (d kt-1), where d is the capital 
depreciation rate and 0 ≤ d ≤ 1.  Banks, new bondholders, and new shareholders demand the same 
rate of return of rlt from a firm.  It is assumed that labor is inelastically supplied, and each firm j pays 
wages at a rate Wt per one unit of labor. 
There are 2 types of firms in each period t+1.  Ex ante each firm does not know its type 
(At+1).  The fraction (1-NPLt) of the firms is high-type with production technology A+ut+1, and the 
remaining fraction NPLt is low-type with production technology A-wt+1.  Those low-type firms are 
not able to pay interest on debt.  Assume that (1- NPLt)ut+1 – (NPLt)wt+1 = 0,  A > ut+1 > wt+1 > 0 and  
0 ≤ NPLt ≤ 1.  Hence,  and .   A)(AE 1tt =+ α1tαt1tt lAk][yE −+ =
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In addition, firms may have to pay taxes to the government.  To promote investment, the 
government may provide subsidies or tax incentives to firms.  The expected value of net transfers 
to/from the government is equal to , where n could either be positive (subsidies) 
or negative (taxes). 
α1
t
α
t1tt lnk)(sE
−
+ =
Assuming that firm j’s expected profits are based on its long-run average amount of 
employed labor, at the beginning of period t+1 (at the end of period t), each firm j chooses the level of 
capital stock (kt) to maximize its expected profits for period t+1 (π Ft+1). 
π Ft+1 = Expected[Output + Subsidies(– Taxes) – Wages –Interest payments 
                            – Capital depreciation expenses] 
         = [ ]ttltt1t1tjt kdkrlWsyE ⋅−−−+ ++      
         = tt
l
ttt
α1α
t
α1α
t kdkr)NPL(1lWlnklAk ⋅−⋅−−−+ −−               (F2), 
subject to   
1t1tt
j
t kd)k(kI −− ⋅+−=  (Total investment = New investment + Capital depreciation)  (F3), 
tkcapek
j
tt ⋅+=  (Uses of capital = Sources of capital  
     = Bank debt + Newly-issued bonds or stocks)          (F4), 
where α1αt1t
j
t lAk][yE
−
+ =  = Firm j’s expected output for period t+1, 
α1α
t1t
j
t lnk][sE
−
+ =  = Firm j’s expected subsidies or taxes for period t+1, 
lW]l[WE tt
j
t =  = Firm j’s expected wages paid to its labor in period t+1, 
t
l
ttt
l
t
j
t kr)NPL(1]k[rE ⋅−=  = Firm j’s expected interest payments for period t+1, 
tt
j
t kd]k[dE ⋅=⋅  = Firm j’s expected capital depreciation expenses in period t+1, 
kt = Firm j’s level of capital stock at the end of period t, 
ejt  = (1-cap) kt = Firm j’s bank debt at the end of period t, 
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tkcap ⋅ = Firm j’s cumulative amount of newly-issued bonds or stocks  
                             at the end of period t, 
Wt = Wage rate used for period t+1, 
l = Long-run average amount of employed labor, 
rlt = Rate of return required by banks and new bond/shareholders for period t+1, 
Ijt = Firm j’s investment, 
A = Average production technology factor, 
n = Firm j’s additional revenue or cost factor due to government subsidies or taxes, 
d = Capital depreciation rate (0 ≤ d ≤1), 
cap = Fraction of firm j’s investment financed by capital markets, 
NPLt = Fraction of low-type firms at the end of period t. 
Based on the above setup, the optimal level of capital stock (by rearranging the first order condition 
with respect to k t) of each firm equals  
α1
1
l
tt
t d)rNPL(1
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+=       (F5). 
The optimal level of capital stock is increasing with parameter n, which measures the level of 
government subsidies (or taxes if negative).  The higher the level of government subsidies or tax 
incentives (or lower taxes), the higher the firm’s expected profits and the greater the incentive for the 
firm to overinvest.  Hence, parameter n can be used as a measure of the degree of overinvestment or 
the moral hazard problem at the corporate level.  However, since the output is increasing with the 
level of capital stock ( ), the higher degree of overinvestment, as a result of the 
higher level of government subsidies or tax incentives, also brings about higher output.  It can also be 
seen that the optimal level of capital stock is decreasing with the rate of return demanded by banks 
α1
t
α
t1t1t lkAy
−
++ =
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and bond/shareholders (rlt).  Hence, the interest rate plays a key role in influencing the firm’s 
investment decision in this model. 
4.1.2 Banking Sector 
Suppose that there are M identical banks.  Each bank i receives deposits (ait) in local currency 
(LC) real terms from households and borrows (bit) in foreign currency (FC) nominal terms from 
foreign creditors.  It pays a real deposit rate of rt to depositors and a nominal foreign borrowing rate 
of ibt to foreign creditors.   
The weighted average cost of funds for each bank (rct) = 
i
t
t
ti
t
i
t
t
tb
t
i
tt
b
P
ε
a
b
P
ε
iar
+
+
.   
Each bank i lends its money in LC real terms (eit) to the corporate sector and charges a lending rate of 
rlt.  Only high-type firms (the fraction 1-NPLt of the firms) can pay interest on bank debt in each 
period t.  In addition, each bank has operating expenses of ot,, which are assumed to be mainly 
employee salaries.  Assume that ot = ξ eit, where ξ is the operating expense factor and ξ ≥ 0. 
In this model, the bank’s nominal foreign borrowing rate (ibt) is a function of the world 
nominal interest rate and the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing, i.e., 
    ( )bbψiψi t1wt0bt ˆ−+=                 (B1), 
  Where  wti = World nominal interest rate for period t+1, 
   bt  = Aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing at the end of period t, 
   ψ0 = Interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate, 
   ψ1 = Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net 
        foreign borrowing, 
   b  = Perceived optimal level of aggregate banks’ net foreign borrowing. ˆ
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The benefits of modeling the foreign borrowing rate this way are twofold.  First, parameter ψ1, which 
is expected to be greater than or equal to zero, reflects how much higher the rate of return foreign 
creditors need to compensate for their higher risks from a greater amount of lending to the banking 
sector in another country.  Hence, parameter ψ1 can be used as a measure of the degree of  
a moral hazard problem at the international level.  When this moral hazard problem is severe, foreign 
creditors underestimate the risks from their lending to the banking sector and do not fully incorporate 
those risks into their required rate of return, and thus the value of parameter ψ1 is low.  As mentioned 
earlier, this could happen when foreign creditors believe that government guarantees exist.7  There 
could be an extreme case in which foreign creditors strongly believe that the government guarantees 
will cover the whole amount of credit they have granted to the banking sector in another country.  
They therefore do not take into account the higher risks from the greater amount of their lending to 
the banking sector in such a country and demand the same low rate of return, regardless of the level 
of banks’ net foreign borrowing.  Parameter ψ1 in this extreme case will be equal or close to zero.  
Second, this is one way to induce stationarity to a small open economy model according to Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003).  Particularly, when ψ1 is greater than zero, domestic interest rates serve as an 
adjustment and transmission mechanism through which any shock affecting the level of banks’ net 
foreign borrowing will have an impact on firms’ investment decision and households’ saving 
decision. 
Each bank i is owned by households in a well-diversified portfolio and may choose to pay 
dividends to its shareholders in each period t.  When banks are not adequately monitored and when 
there is a widely held perception that government guarantees exist, it is optimal for banks to maintain 
minimal loan loss reserves and to pay out their profits from performing loans (PLs) (or high-type 
                                                
7An alternative story as proposed by Giannetti (2007) could be an information asymmetry problem.  In this 
model, foreign creditors do not know the quality of bank assets.  Hence, they initially lend to banks at a low 
interest rate.  This enables insolvent banks to accumulate bad loans. In equilibrium, when a substantial amount 
of losses have been accumulated, solvent banks do not find it any longer optimal to issue debt at the interest 
rates that would compensate investors for risks.  Foreign investors anticipate this and stop lending to banks. 
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firms) as dividends (Xit) to their shareholders.  This creates another layer of moral hazard at the bank 
level.  Assume that each bank maintains the fraction υ (0 ≤ υ ≤ 1) of its profits from PLs as provisions 
against its losses from non-performing loans (NPLs).  Dividends paid by each bank i are thus equal to 
the fraction (1-υ) of its profits from PLs, i.e.,  
 Xit = (1 - υ) (Profits from PLs) 
      = (1 - υ) (The total amount of PLs) (Profit per one unit of PL) 
                     (B2). ]ξ)(r[r)eNPLυ)(1(1 c 1t
l
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Since the losses from NPLs are not contemporaneously offset by government transfers, each bank 
may not have sufficient cash to both finance its NPL losses and pay dividends.  It therefore has  
to cover its losses or cash shortfalls through additional foreign borrowing.  Let Fit be the level of  
bank i’s cumulative NPL losses or cash shortfalls, which evolves as 
i
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t X)Fr(1F ++= −−                  (B3). 
Given the fact that several emerging countries adopted rigid exchange rate regimes before 
their crises, it is reasonable to first assume that each bank i expects the government to maintain  
a stable exchange rate and thus does not hedge the foreign exchange (FX) risk associated with its 
foreign borrowing.8  Thus, in each period t, bank i will incur FX profits or losses from its net foreign 
borrowing of the amount 
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Let AFXit be the level of bank i’s cumulative FX profits or losses, which evolves as 
i
t
i
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i
t FX)AFXr(1AFX ++= −−                 (B5). 
                                                
8The model can be extended by relaxing this assumption.  By doing so, a bank’s FX hedging will influence the 
bank’s decision on interest rates and will affect the level of the bank’s cumulative FX profits or losses. 
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Since there is a widely held perception that government guarantees exist and that the 
government is committed to a stable exchange rate, principal and interest of banks’ foreign debt are 
assumed to be rolled over by foreign creditors every period as long as the level of the country’s 
international reserves is higher than the expected level of contingent government liabilities. 
Based on information at the end of period t, each bank i chooses the deposit amount (ait), the 
foreign borrowing amount (bit), and the lending amount (eit) to maximize its expected profits for 
period t+1 (π Bt+1).  
 π Bt+1 = Interest received from PLs – Interest paid to depositors  
                         – Interest paid to foreign creditors – Operating expenses 
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  (Δ Lending from the end of t-1 to the end of t = Δ Deposits+ Δ Net foreign borrowing 
+ Actual net income for period t – Dividends paid to shareholders)           (B7), 
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  (Lending at the end of t = Deposits + Net foreign borrowing  
            – Cumulative FX profits or losses – Cumulative NPL losses or cash shortfalls)   (B8), 
where eit = Bank i's lending to the corporate sector at the end of period t, 
 ai t = Bank i's deposits at the end of period t, 
 bi t = Bank i’s net foreign borrowing at the end of period t, 
 NPLt = Fraction of low-type firms  
                      = NPLs to total loans ratio at the end of period t, 
 rl t  = Real lending rate for period t+1, 
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 r t  = Real deposit rate for period t+1, 
 ( )bbψiψi t1wt0bt ˆ−+= = Nominal foreign borrowing rate for period t+1, 
  = Bank i’s operating expenses for period t+1 (ξ = operating expense factor), itξe
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
t
P
ε  = Real exchange rate at the end of period t 
          = Nominal exchange rate divided by price level, 
 Xit = Dividends paid by bank i to its shareholders in period t (equation B2), 
Fit = Bank i's cumulative NPL losses at the end of period t (equation B3), 
 FXit = Bank i's FX profits or losses in period t (equation B4), 
 AFXit = Bank i's cumulative FX profits or losses at the end of period t (equation B5). 
By rearranging the first order conditions with respect to ait and bit, the optimal lending rate equals  
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and the optimal deposit rate is equal to the optimal foreign borrowing rate, i.e.,  
( )bbψiψrir t1wt0ctbtt ˆ−+===                 (B10). 
Equations (B9) and (B10) suggest that in equilibrium each bank determines the deposit rate to be 
equal to the foreign borrowing rate required by foreign creditors and sets the lending rate just to make 
enough profits from PLs to cover losses from NPLs.  Also, the domestic interest rates, both the 
lending and deposit rates, are increasing with the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing and 
thus serve as an adjustment mechanism in this model.  Hence, if ψ1 is sufficiently high, the domestic 
interest rates will significantly increase during a boom, when the level of investment and banks’ 
foreign borrowing is high, thereby causing firms to lower their investment and inducing households 
to deposit more money in banks.   
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Note that in equilibrium each bank sets its interest rates just to earn enough profits from PLs 
to cover losses from NPLs.  Hence, its profits from PLs are exactly equal to its losses from NPLs.  By 
paying dividends to its shareholders when its expected profits are zero, in each period t, each bank 
accumulates NPL losses on its account of the amount equal to the dividends paid to its shareholders, 
i.e.,  
 Xit = (1 - υ) (Profits from PLs) = (1 - υ) (Losses from NPLs) 
      = (1 - υ) (The total amount of NPLs) (Loss per one unit of NPL) 
     =           (B11). ξ)(r)eυ)(NPL(1 c 1t
i
1t1t +− −−−
According to equation (B11), parameter υ, i.e., the loan loss provisioning ratio, determines the level 
of dividends each bank pays to its shareholders as well as the amount of NPL losses each bank 
accumulates in each period.  Thus, parameter υ can be used as a measure of the degree of the moral 
hazard at the bank level.  The lower the value of υ, the higher the dividends each bank pays to its 
shareholders, the higher the level of the bank’s cumulative NPL losses, and the more severe the moral 
hazard problem at the bank level. 
4.1.3 Household Sector 
Assume that all households are identical.  They work in corporations or banks and have 
preferences over consumption and money holdings.  They hold the entire stock of domestic money 
balances and own both firms and banks in a well-diversified portfolio.  Other than using their money 
for consumption and money holdings, households invest part of their savings,  where  
0 ≤ cap ≤ 1, in newly-issued corporate bonds or stocks, which give them a rate of return of rlt, and 
deposit the rest in banks, which give them a rate of return of rt (≤ rlt).  Hence, in each period t, 
households receive income from the corporate sector in the form of wages, bond or stock returns from 
previous period’s investment, and dividends.  They also receive income from the banking sector in 
the form of salaries, interest on deposits, and dividends.  All household income, except interest on 
)K(Kcap 1tt −−⋅
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deposits, is taxable.  Using the most updated information they receive in period t, households decide 
on how to spend their income.  Particularly they choose the paths of consumption (Cs), money 
holdings (Ms), and deposits (as) to maximize their expected utility,  
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  (Δ Deposit balances = Non-taxable income + Taxable income – Consumption  
        –Δ Money balances in real terms – Investment in newly-issued corporate bonds or stocks)   (H2), 
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      (Transversality condition)               (H3), 
     where   Cs = Aggregate consumption in period s, 
      Ms = Aggregate demand for money holdings (monetary aggregate or money balances)  
                           at the end of period s, 
     a s  = Aggregate supply of household deposits with banks at the end of period s, 
     rs-1 a s-1  = Interest on deposits for period s which are assumed to be tax exempted, 
     η  = Personal income tax rate, 
     Ys+ Ss– d Ks-1–rs-1 (1-cap)Ks-1 + Xs = Total taxable income from the corporate sector in  
the form of  wages, bond or stock returns, and dividends as well as from the banking  
sector in the form of salaries and dividends for period s,9
      = Investment in newly-issued corporate bonds or stocks in period s, )K(Kcap 1ss −−⋅
                                                
9Sum of wages, bond or stock returns, and dividends paid by the corporate sector to the household sector  
     = Ys + Ss – d Ks-1 – (1-NPLs-1) rls-1 (1-cap)Ks-1 
Banks’ operating expenses are mainly employee salaries paid to the household sector = ξ es-1= ξ (1-cap)K s-1 
Total dividends paid by the banking sector = Xs  
Hence, total taxable income= Ys+ Ss– d Ks-1– (rs-1+ ξ)(1-cap)K s-1+ ξ(1-cap)K s-1+ Xs = Ys+ Ss– d Ks-1–rs-1(1-cap)K s-1+Xs. 
     [since rls-1 = (rs-1 + ξ) /(1 – NPL s-1) according to equations (B9) and (B10)] 
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     Ps = Domestic price level at the end of period s, 
      χ = Preference for money holdings relative to consumption, 
     δ = Time preference factor. 
According to the first order conditions with respect to as and Ms,  
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the growth rate of consumption (Cs+1/Cs) is increasing with the domestic real deposit rate (rs).   
In addition, the real money balances (Ms/Ps) are increasing with consumption (Cs), but decreasing 
with the domestic nominal deposit rate (is).  This implies that, when the domestic real deposit rate 
increases, households consume less today relative to the next period and maintain lower money 
balances.  They instead deposit more money in banks to earn the higher rate of return.  Hence, the 
domestic deposit rate plays a key role in influencing households’ decisions on consumption, money 
holdings, as well as the amount of their deposits with banks. 
4.1.4 Public Sector 
The public sector comprises fiscal and monetary authorities.  It manages the stock of 
international reserves and implements fiscal and monetary policies.  The domestic public sector can 
borrow from and lend in domestic and international financial markets at a rate of rt and never defaults 
on its domestic and foreign liabilities.  Assuming that fiscal policies are exogenous10 and the 
following modified uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds,  
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where  Pε = Expected exchange rate deviation from conventional UIP, 
                                                
10Personal income tax rate (η) and government subsidies or taxes to the corporate sector are fixed, and 
government spending is exogenous. 
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iwt= World nominal interest rate for period t+1, 
it = Domestic nominal deposit rate for period t+1 = , 1)r)(1π(1 tt −++
εt = Nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per one unit of foreign currency)  
       at the end of period t. 
According to equation (MU), when Pε= 0, the exchange rate is entirely determined by the 
interest rate differential, i.e., the UIP exactly holds.  Hence, parameter Pε measures the expectations of 
market participants on how much the exchange rate will deviate from the conventional UIP, another 
moral hazard problem at the international level.  When Pε > 0 (Pε < 0), it is expected that the local 
currency will be worth more (less) than the value based on the conventional UIP.  The expected 
exchange rate deviation from the conventional UIP (i.e., the absolute value of Pε) should be higher in 
countries adopting rigid exchange rate regimes since their exchange rates will be less responsive to 
interest rate differentials than those in countries adopting more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
The public sector can choose to target either the nominal exchange rate (ε) or the inflation 
rate (π) to maintain the consolidated public sector budget identity, 
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    (Δ International reserves = Tax revenues + Δ Monetary aggregate in real terms  
                + Interest on international reserves at the end of the previous period  
                 - Government spending - Government subsidies or taxes to the corporate sector)         (G1), 
      where  Rt = Country’s international reserves at the end of period t, 
     Tt = Revenue from personal income taxes in period t = η(Yt+St- d Kt-1- rt-1(1-cap)Kt-1+ Xt), 
     St  = Government subsidies or taxes to the corporate sector in period t = nKt-1αLt-11- α, 
     Gt = Government spending in period t, 
     rt-1 = Government borrowing and lending rate = Domestic real deposit rate for period t. 
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For the analyses in the following sections, assume that the government of this economy chooses to 
target the inflation rate.  Hence, the inflation rate is exogenous, and the exchange rate is endogenously 
determined by the model according to equation (MU). 
4.1.5 National Account  
By combining the budget constraints of the four sectors, the economy’s resource constraint 
follows 
1t1tttttt )NFAr(1NFAGCIY −−+−+++=          (N1), 
where  It = (Kt- Kt-1) + d Kt-1 ,         
NFAt = [ tt
t
t bR
P
ε − ] = Net foreign assets of the public and private sectors      (N2). 
4.1.6 Market Clearing Conditions 
 In normal times, the markets in this model clear as follows. 
 Deposits: Banks set the deposit rate and are willing to accept deposits as supplied by the 
household sector.  Therefore, the deposit amount (at) is determined by the supply side. 
 Money: Monetary aggregate (Mt) is determined by the demand for money holdings by 
households, which in fact can be influenced by the government’s action through the exchange rate or 
the inflation rate.   
 Foreign borrowing: Foreign creditors set the foreign borrowing rate.  As long as the level of 
the country’s international reserves exceeds the expected level of the government’s contingent 
liabilities, foreign creditors are willing to supply loans as demanded by the domestic banking sector.  
Thus, the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (bt) is determined by the demand side.   
 Bank lending to the corporate sector: Banks set the lending rate to cover their costs from 
granting loans to the corporate sector.  As long as they can obtain enough funding from depositors 
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and foreign creditors, banks are willing to extend credit as demanded by the corporate sector.  Hence, 
the amount of bank lending to the corporate sector (et) is determined by the demand side.  
 In good times, firms are able to obtain funds as much as they want to finance their 
investment.  Clearly, international capital flows via the banking sector serve as an additional source of 
financing for firms’ investment, leading to higher investment and output during a boom.  However, 
with moral hazard problems, more available capital facilitates excessive borrowing and risk-taking 
behavior of several agents in the economy.  With government subsidies or tax incentives, firms invest 
more than they optimally do without the government subsidies or tax incentives.  When banking 
supervision is lax and a future government bailout is expected, banks are willing to lend excessively 
to firms as long as they can obtain enough funding from depositors and foreign creditors.  Banks also 
have an incentive to maintain minimal loan loss provisions.  With expected government guarantees 
and stable exchange rates, foreign creditors are willing to lend excessively to the domestic banking 
sector as long as the expected level of contingent government liabilities does not exceed the level of 
the country’s international reserves.  All these factors not only amplify a boom, but also increase the 
country’s vulnerability to a sudden stop of capital flows and a crisis. 
4.2 Sudden Stop Financial Crisis 
This section explains how a ‘sudden stop’ of international capital flows causes a financial 
crisis which then spills over to the real economy. 
4.2.1 The Occurrence of a Crisis 
Two key ingredients that cause a sudden stop are banks’ accumulation of NPL losses (the 
moral hazard problem at the bank level) and banks’ ability to obtain additional foreign borrowing to 
meet their cash constraints (the moral hazard problem at the international level).  First, banks have  
an incentive to maintain minimal provisions (υ <1) and accumulate NPL losses on the banks’ 
accounts (Ft) when a future government bailout is expected and banking supervision is inadequate.  
Second, since the losses from NPLs are not contemporaneously offset by government transfers, banks 
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have to cover their cash shortfalls through additional foreign borrowing.  Given a presumption that 
government guarantees exist and the government is committed to a stable exchange rate, foreign 
creditors continue to allow banks to borrow in excess of the banks’ credit net of deposits as long as 
foreign creditors believe that the government can fulfill its future debt obligations.  In other words, 
banks are able to obtain funds from foreign creditors as they demand as long as the level of the 
country’s liquid collateral (the level of international reserves at the beginning of period t ( 1t
t
t R
P
ε
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ )) 
remains above the fraction β of the banks’ cumulative NPL losses (Ft).   
When the level of international reserves reaches the threshold βF, foreign creditors stop 
rolling over the outstanding stock of credit and do not further extend credit to the domestic banking 
sector.  A sudden stop financial crisis starts in period tc the first time the following sudden stop 
condition holds. 
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−    ,0 ≤ β ≤ 1          (SS1). 
It can be seen that when banks cannot accumulate NPL losses (when F equals zero), either because 
banking supervision is effective (no moral hazard problem at the bank level) or banks cannot borrow 
from abroad in excess of their credit net of deposits (no moral hazard problem at the international 
level), a sudden stop condition (SS1) will never hold and a crisis will never occur.   
 Note that although the moral hazard problem at the corporate level is not one of the major 
factors causing a sudden stop, it could amplify the effect of capital flows.  Particularly, government 
subsidies or tax incentives increase firms’ expected profits, causing firms to overinvest and borrow 
excessively from banks.  Overinvestment and excessive bank lending magnify a boom as well as 
increase crisis costs when a bust comes. 
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4.2.2 The Effect of a Crisis 
 When there is a sudden stop, foreign creditors stop rolling over the outstanding stock of credit 
and do not further extend credit to the domestic banking sector, causing a reduction in bank lending to 
the corporate sector and an economic contraction as follows. 
Foreign borrowing: During a sudden stop, banks can borrow from abroad only up to the 
point where the level of the country’s international reserves can cover the fraction β of their 
cumulative NPL losses, i.e., 
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A discrepancy between the demand for and the supply of foreign borrowing or a credit cut by foreign 
creditors is equal to ⎟⎟⎠
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.  Notice that the higher the fraction of banks’ cumulative NPL 
losses which are expected by foreign creditors to be covered by the country’s international reserves 
(β), the higher the credit cut by foreign creditors. 
 Government bailouts: When there is a sudden stop of capital flows, the government will step 
in and rescue banks.  During such a period, there will be transfers of banks’ cumulative NPL losses to 
the government of the amount ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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, where 1φ0 ≤≤ , to partially or fully subsidize 
banks’ cash shortfalls as a result of the credit cut by foreign creditors.   
It is also assumed that a bailout plan by the government will start a certain number of periods 
after the first sudden stop.  From the start to the end of the bailout plan (bailout period), there will be 
a series of transfers of the remaining banks’ NPL losses (Ft) to the government to clean up the 
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banking system.  Banks’ bad assets, Ft, will thus be replaced with good assets, GAt.  All the transfers 
of bad assets to the government will be booked as government liabilities (Lft), and the government 
will have to find ways to gradually finance such liabilities through fiscal or monetary tools. 
Bank lending to the corporate sector: If banks only receive partial subsidies from the 
government ( ) during a sudden stop, banks have to call their loans and reduce their lending to the 
corporate sector by the amount 
1φ <
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 to meet their cash constraints.  Hence, the level 
of bank lending to the corporate sector is also determined by the supply side.  Firms will therefore 
receive less credit than what they demand and will have to reduce their investment, causing  
a reduction in the level of capital stock and output during a sudden stop period.   
The costs of a crisis created by international capital flows and moral hazard problems could 
be substantial.  Two types of costs are considered in this model: (1) direct costs (or bailout costs), 
which includes transfers from the government to the banking sector to subsidize banks’ cash 
shortfalls during sudden stops and transfers of the remaining banks’ NPL losses to the government to 
clean up the banking system during the bailout period, and (2) indirect costs (or output losses), as 
credit cuts by foreign creditors during sudden stops lead to reductions in bank lending to the corporate 
sector, investment and thus output.  The analysis and the assessment of the direct and indirect costs 
through the simulation exercises will be discussed in Chapter IX. 
4.3 Analysis of the Model 
The equilibrium conditions derived in sections 4.1 and 4.2 for a bank-based, small open 
economy based on decentralized (not first best) decision making by each sector are summarized in 
Appendix A.  Appendix B provides the list and descriptions of all parameters and variables.  Given 
the parameter values (α, A, n, cap, d, Ψ0, Ψ1, , ξ, δ, χ, η, Pε, υ, β, φ), the initial values (K0, b0, C0, 
ε0/P0, R0, F0, AFX0), and the paths for exogenous variables (iwt, πt, Lt, NPLt, Gt), all the endogenous 
bˆ
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variables (Yt, Kt, It, et, bt, at, Ct, Mt/Pt, εt/Pt, rt, rlt, it, St, Xt, Ft, FXt, AFXt, Lf t, Rt, GA t, Transfer t) can 
be derived using the system of equations in Appendix A.   
 In this model, an economy is defined to be at a steady state (at an equilibrium point) when 
there is no change in any of the endogenous variables.  Appendix C presents the steady state solutions 
for all variables.  These steady state conditions can only be achieved when there is no change in any 
of the exogenous variables and when banks maintain a 100% loan loss provisioning ratio (υ).  If the 
loan loss provisioning ratio is less than 100%, there will be an accumulation of banks’ NPL losses 
(Ft), which needs to be financed through additional foreign borrowing (bt).  Ft and bt will continue to 
increase, and the steady state will never be reached.  This issue is further examined using the dynamic 
analysis. 
 The dynamic of the economy can be analyzed using two first difference equations, i.e., the 
change in household consumption (Ct -Ct-1) and the change in banks’ net foreign borrowing (bt -bt-1), 
after combining thirteen equilibrium conditions in Appendix A. 
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 Suppose that everything else is at the steady state level.  If banks maintain a loan loss 
provisioning ratio of less than 100% at time t (i.e., banks still pay part of their profits from PLs as 
dividends to their shareholders), the term ηXt on the right hand side of equation (DIF2_1) is positive, 
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while the sum of all other terms is zero, causing the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing 
(bt) to increase and move away from its steady state level.11  If banks still continue paying dividends 
to their shareholders in the following periods, the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing as 
well as the level of banks’ cumulative NPL losses (Ft) will continue to increase.  At some point, the 
sudden stop condition, t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− , will be hit.  Once the sudden stop condition is reached, 
foreign creditors will cut their lending to the banking sector by ⎟⎟⎠
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, causing the level of 
banks’ net foreign borrowing to decrease by the same amount (equation (DIF2_2)).  After the first 
sudden stop, if banks still continue to maintain the loan loss provisioning ratio of less than 100%, 
banks’ NPL losses will be accumulated again.  The level of banks’ net foreign borrowing will 
therefore increase to finance those losses, and a sudden stop will occur again in the future.  Hence, 
there is no stable path leading to a steady state when the banks’ loan loss provisioning ratio is less 
than 100%. 
 If banks maintain a loan loss provisioning ratio at 100% at all times, a sudden stop will never 
occur and equations (DIF2_1) and (DIF2_2) collapse to one equation,  
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Since equations (DIF1) and (DIF2_3) are continuous and differentiable, both of them can be analyzed 
using their linear approximations around the steady state values of bt and Ct.  Appendix D presents the 
linear approximations around the steady state values of bt and Ct, the phase diagram, and the solutions 
for linearized difference equations (DIF1) and (DIF2_3).  The phase diagram suggests that there are 
                                                
11An increase in bt will cause the domestic real deposit rate (rt) to rise through the interest rate adjustment 
mechanism, ( )bbψiψr t1wt0t ˆ−+= .  The change in the domestic real deposit rate causes investment, consumption, 
monetary aggregate, as well as all other endogenous variables to move away from their steady state values. 
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stable paths leading to a steady state (e.g., PQ and RQ) as well as unstable paths leading to  
an explosion in this economy.  This equilibrium is thus a saddle point where it is stable in some 
directions, but unstable in others.  The general solutions to linearized equations (DIF1) and (DIF2_3) 
include both stable and unstable paths.  However, the unstable paths, the ones in which the eigenvalue 
is greater than 1, can be ruled out by imposing an additional condition so that the term containing the 
unstable eigenvalue is equal to zero.   
 In sum, the steady state and dynamic analyses of this model suggest that, when banks can 
accumulate NPL losses (i.e., maintain a loan loss provisioning ratio of less than 100%) and borrow 
from abroad to finance those losses, a sudden stop will surely occur at some point, and there is no 
stable path leading to a steady state.  In contrast, when banks maintain the loan loss provisioning ratio 
at 100% at all times, a sudden stop will never occur, and there are some stable paths leading to the 
equilibrium point.  These analyses therefore highlight the role of the moral hazard problems at the 
bank level (when banks can accumulate NPL losses) and at the international level (when banks can 
obtain funds from abroad to finance their cash shortfalls) in causing instability in an economy. 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
 The model developed in Chapter IV demonstrates a mechanism through which international 
capital flows are transmitted from the banking sector to the corporate sector.  Moreover, it shows how 
moral hazard problems at all levels, together with international capital flows, fuel a boom as well as 
cause instability in an economy.  In fact, structural and policy distortions are the root causes of those 
moral hazard problems.  With regard to the moral hazard problem at the bank level, banks can 
maintain minimal loan loss provisions and accumulate non-performing loan losses largely due to 
ineffective banking supervision.  Regarding the moral hazard problem at the corporate level, firms’ 
overinvestment is mainly driven by government policies aiming to promote investment.  With regard 
to the moral hazard problems at the international level, foreign creditors lend excessively to the 
domestic banking sector without demanding rates of return high enough to compensate for their risks 
because they believe that government guarantees exist.  In addition, foreign creditors expect exchange 
rates to move less with interest rate differentials since they believe that the government is committed 
to a stable exchange rate.  Hence, changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies can 
potentially help reduce moral hazard problems and increase the net benefit of international capital 
flows to a country. 
 The following sections apply the model developed in Chapter IV to a bank-based, small open 
economy, which has experienced a financial crisis and undergone major institutional reforms, to 
examine two major issues.  
 
(1) Have there been changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies, leading 
to significant reductions in moral hazard problems after a crisis? 
(2) What are the impacts of such changes on the net benefit of international capital 
flows? 12 
The chosen country is Thailand since it is a good example of a bank-based, small open 
economy, which has experienced both a boom (in the early 1990s) and a bust (the crisis during 1997-
1998).  It has gone through major institutional reforms (e.g., the establishment of a deposit insurance 
agency to replace the blanket guarantee, the enforcement of the New Financial Institutions Act, the 
banking supervisory policy upgrade, and the change in investment promotion policies), which 
potentially help reduce moral hazard problems.  Thailand is also a good representative of emerging 
countries.  Based on the measures of the degree of openness used by Bekaert et al. (2005) and 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) (e.g., official equity market openness year, market 
segmentation measure (LEGO)), Thailand ranks mostly in the middle among all countries as well as 
among all the emerging countries in the sample.  The rankings of Thailand for most of the economic 
performance and quality of institution measures used by Bekaert et al. (2005) are also in line with 
other countries.  The only exceptions are real GDP growth and judicial efficiency, in which Thailand 
ranks third among 95 countries and 46th among 47 countries, respectively.  Hence, Thailand is not an 
outliner, and it is a good example of a bank-based, small open economy, to which the model can be 
applied.  The facts about Thailand are further discussed in section 5.3. 
To investigate the first issue, the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems 
for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods are estimated using the equilibrium conditions in 
Appendix A and the GMM approach to fit Thailand data.  Section 5.1 explains the parameters of 
interest.  In addition, the hypothesis tests on the estimated parameter values for the pre- and post-
                                                
12Not every crisis country has gone through major institutional reforms.  However, these hypotheses are still 
useful as they can be used to test whether there have been no significant changes in the quality of institutions 
and domestic policies in those crisis countries. 
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crisis periods are conducted.  If the quality of institutions and domestic policies has been significantly 
altered and the moral hazard problems have been reduced, the values of the parameters measuring the 
severity of moral hazard problems for the post-crisis period should be significantly different from 
those for the pre-crisis period.  In particular, those parameter values should indicate a lower degree of 
moral hazard problems after a crisis.  Section 5.2 describes the hypotheses with regard to those 
parameters.  The details about the data, methodology, as well as estimation and hypothesis testing 
results are presented in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII, respectively 
 To examine the second issue, the simulation exercises are undertaken to assess the impact of 
changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies, as measured by changes in the moral 
hazard parameters, on the costs and benefits of capital flows to a country like Thailand under different 
scenarios.  Particularly, the direct costs (i.e., bailout costs) and the indirect costs (i.e., output losses) 
of capital flows under each scenario are analyzed relative to the base scenario to assess the impact of 
changes in one or more moral hazard parameters on those costs.  The details about the simulation 
exercises and the results are presented in Chapter IX. 
5.1 Parameters of Interest 
 Since the root cause of the moral hazard problems is the poor quality institutions and 
domestic policies, the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems can be used as 
proxies for the quality of institutions and domestic policies.   
 (1) Loan loss provisioning ratio (υ)  
      With lax banking supervision and an expected future government bailout, banks have  
an incentive to pay dividends from their profits from performing loans (PLs) to their shareholders, 
maintain minimal loan loss provisions against their losses from non-performing loans (NPLs), and 
accumulate losses from NPLs.  Parameter υ, which measures the level of banks’ loan loss provisions, 
determines the level of NPL losses that banks can accumulate in each period.  Thus, it indicates the 
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degree of the moral hazard problem at the bank level and can be used as a proxy for the quality of 
institutions and policies with respect to banking supervision.   
 (2) Firms’ additional revenue or cost factor due to government subsidies or taxes (n). 
     As a way to promote investment in a country, the government provides subsidies or tax 
incentives to firms.  These incentives increase firms’ expected profits and induce firms to invest more 
than they optimally do without the government subsidies or tax incentives, leading to overinvestment.  
Parameter n, which indicates the level of government subsidies or tax incentives and the degree of 
overinvestment, measures the degree of the moral hazard problem at the corporate level and can be 
used as a proxy for the quality of institutions and policies with regard to corporate investment. 
(3) Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (Ψ1)  
     With presumptions that government guarantees exist, foreign creditors are willing to lend 
to banks in another country as much as the banks need.  Foreign creditors also underestimate the risks 
associated with their lending to the banking sector in another country.  Particularly, although 
extending more credit to the banking sector in another country exposes foreign creditors to higher 
risks, they may not fully take into account those risks when determining their rates of return if they 
believe that government guarantees exist.  Parameter ψ1, which measures the interest rate sensitivity 
to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing, reflects the level of risks that foreign investors 
perceive and factor into their required rates of return.  Hence, parameter Ψ1 measures the degree of a 
moral hazard problem at the international level and the quality of institutions and policies relating to 
foreign investors’ estimation of risks. 
(4) Expected exchange rate deviation from the conventional uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) (Pε)  
    In countries with pegged or rigid exchange rate regimes, foreign investors expect the 
governments of those countries to be committed to stable exchange rates and to intervene in the 
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foreign exchange (FX) markets, when there are market forces driving changes in the exchange rates, 
such as interest rate differentials.  Hence, the exchange rates are expected to be less responsive to the 
interest rate differentials and to deviate more from the conventional uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) in such countries.  Parameter Pε, which measures the expected exchange rate deviation from the 
conventional UIP, serves as a measure of another moral hazard problem at the international level and 
a proxy for the quality of institutions and policies with regard to exchange rates. 
5.2 Hypotheses 
 As the degree of moral hazard problems is largely determined by the quality of institutions 
and domestic policies, changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies can potentially help 
reduce moral hazard problems and increase the net benefit of international capital flows.  The 
following hypotheses are formed to test whether there have been changes in the quality of institutions 
and domestic policies in a crisis country, leading to significant reductions in moral hazard problems 
after a crisis. 
5.2.1 Moral Hazard Problem at the Bank Level 
 Hypothesis 1: Before a crisis, banking supervision policies, such as loan classification and 
loan loss provisioning rules, were typically quite lax and bank monitoring was inadequate.  Banks 
therefore had an incentive to maintain minimal loan loss provisions and to accumulate losses from 
NPLs, expecting to receive a future government bailout if something bad happened.  After a crisis, 
banking supervision policies in several crisis countries have been upgraded to international standards 
and become more stringent, resulting in more effective banking supervision.  If more effective 
banking supervision leads to a significantly higher level of banks’ loan loss provisions, parameter ν, 
which indicates the banks’ loan loss provisioning ratio, should be higher and the moral hazard 
problem at the bank level should be less severe after a crisis.  The specific predictions for the null 
hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (HA) are 
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afterbefore1
O νν:H = , 
afterbefore1
A νν:H < . 
5.2.2. Moral Hazard Problem at the Corporate Level 
 Hypothesis 2: Firms optimally choose the level of capital stock to maximize their expected 
profits.  However, when firms receive government subsidies or tax privileges, their expected profits 
are higher, and firms will invest more than when there are no such incentives.  This leads to 
overinvestment and excessive corporate borrowing, which amplify the boom-bust cycle of  
an economy.  After a crisis, a number of countries have tightened their fiscal policies and have 
revised their investment promotion policies.  If such revisions lead to a significant reduction in 
government subsidies or tax incentives provided to firms, the value of parameter n, which indicates 
the level of government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector, should be lower after  
a crisis.  The specific predictions for H0 and HA are 
afterbefore2
O nn:H = , 
afterbefore2
A nn:H > . 
5.2.3 Moral Hazard Problems at the International Level 
 Hypothesis 3: Before a crisis, there was a widely held perception that government guarantees 
for corporate and financial investment existed.  Foreign creditors therefore underestimated the risks 
associated with their lending to banks in a crisis country and did not demand rates of return high 
enough to compensate for their risks.  After a crisis, several crisis countries have had a plan to replace 
the blanket guarantee with a limited guarantee, for example, through the establishment of a deposit 
insurance agency.  If a crisis and a plan to replace the blanket guarantee with a limited guarantee 
cause foreign creditors to significantly adjust their risk perceptions and demand much higher interest 
rates to compensate for their higher risks when banks borrow more from them, parameter ψ1, which 
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measures the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing, should be 
higher after a crisis.  The specific predictions for H0 and HA are 
after
1
before
1
3
O ψψ:H = , 
after
1
before
1
3
A ψψ:H < . 
 Hypothesis 4: Many crisis countries adopted rigid exchange rate regimes before a crisis.  
Under rigid exchange rate regimes, foreign investors believe that the governments of such countries 
are committed to stable exchange rates and will intervene in the FX markets if there are interest rate 
differentials which may cause changes in the exchange rates.  In other words, they expect the 
exchange rates in countries adopting rigid exchange rate regimes to respond less to interest rate 
differentials and deviate more from the conventional UIP than do those in countries adopting more 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  After a crisis, several crisis countries have switched to more flexible 
exchange rate regimes.  If the changes in exchange rate regimes cause foreign investors to 
significantly adjust their expectations about the exchange rates, the absolute value of parameter Pε, 
which measures the expected exchange rate deviation from the conventional UIP, should be higher 
before a crisis than after a crisis.  The specific predictions for H0 and HA are 
afterbefore4
O PP:H εε = , 
afterbefore4
A PP:H εε > . 
5.3 Thailand 
 Thailand is a small open country, which experienced a boom in the late 1980s through the 
mid 1990s and then a bust in the late 1990s along with much of Southeast Asia.  Thailand’s economy 
grew at an average annual rate of 9% during 1987–1996 (Alba, Hernandez & Klingebiel, 1999).  The 
real GDP growth rate dropped to -1.4% in 1997 and -10.6% in 1998.  Subsequently, the economy has 
had uninterrupted growth at an average rate of 4.5% per annum since 1999.  The seasonally-adjusted 
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(SA) GDP at 1988 prices and the SA GDP at current market prices for 2007 are estimated to be  
4.3 trillion baht (around 122 billion USD) and 8.5 trillion baht (around 243 billion USD), 
respectively.13  Market capitalization of publicly traded equities at the end of 2007 was 6.6 trillion 
baht (around 190 billion USD) or about 78% of GDP.14
 Thailand is also largely a bank-based economy.  The ratio of bank lending to total external 
finance during 1993–2007 was between 35% and 78% with an average at 52% (Akrasanee, 2008).  
Based on a survey by the Bank of Thailand in 2002, loans from financial institutions accounted for 
more than 90% of firms’ external funds.  Hence, the banking sector has been playing a major role in 
channeling funds to the corporate sector in Thailand. 
 As documented by Alba et al. (1999), in the late 1980s through early 1990s, the Thai 
government embarked on a program to further liberalize the current and capital account as well as the 
financial sector, but continued to keep its exchange rate pegged to a basket of currencies.   
For instance, the authorities improved tax treatment and reduced tax impediments to portfolio inflows 
during 1986–1992, the ceilings on bank deposit and lending rates were removed during 1989–1992, 
and current account transactions were free of foreign exchange restrictions by the end of 1994.   
The most important change was the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facility 
(BIBF) in 1993 as a means to promote Thailand as a regional financial center.  BIBFs benefited from 
several tax and regulatory advantages.  For example, the corporate income tax for BIBFs was 10% 
rather than 30%, and short-term BIBF monetary instruments, unlike other deposit-type instruments, 
were not subject to the 7% cash reserve requirements.  In addition, there have been investment 
promotion privileges from the Board of Investment (BOI) both in terms of tax and non-tax incentives 
(e.g., exemption of import duty and value added tax (VAT) on machinery and raw materials, 
                                                
13 GDP data are obtained from the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). 
14 Stock market capitalization data are obtained from the Thai Bond Market Association (ThaiBMA). 
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corporate income tax exemption, and permission to bring in foreign workers, own land and take or 
remit foreign currency abroad). 
 Financial liberalization together with the pace of economic growth, stable exchange rates, and 
attractive interest rate differentials resulted in a surge in private capital inflows to Thailand in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s.  As documented by Alba et al. (1999), during 1988–1996, Thailand 
received the cumulative amount of capital inflows of 100.3 billion USD (55% of 1996 GDP or 9.4% 
of GDP on average per annum).  As most of the inflows were in the form of loans, the ratio of foreign 
debt to total debt of Thailand increased from 59.1% in 1988 to 94.1% at the end of 1997 (Alba et al., 
1999).  Moreover, there was a rapid build-up of private short-term debt.  The Bank of Thailand 
estimated that short-term external debt increased from 10 billion USD (12% of GDP) in 1990 to  
41 billion USD (24% of GDP) in 1995 (Alba et al., 1999).  During this period, financial institutions 
played a key and increasing role in transmitting capital inflows.  The share of bank foreign borrowing 
in the total inflows rose from 10% during 1988-1992 to 60% during 1993-1996, and the increase in 
short-term debt of 30 billion USD during 1990-95 was attributed almost entirely to banks (Alba et al., 
1999).  In contrast, the net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) were relatively stable since FDI 
investors aimed for longer-run returns and were attracted by special privileges from the government’s 
Board of Investment and long-term macroeconomic outlook (Siamwalla, Vajragupta & Vichyanond, 
1999).   
 The influx of capital flows to Thailand was accompanied with a lending boom, excessive 
spending or investment, and a declining quality of bank assets.  Credit outstanding grew on average at 
a rate of 22% per annum in real terms during 1988-1995 (Alba et al., 1999).  The loan to deposit ratio 
of commercial banks rose from 96% in 1988 to 112% in 1995, suggesting that banks substituted 
riskier loan assets for lower risk assets (e.g., cash and government bonds) (Alba et al., 1999).  The 
situation was aggravated by an increasing tendency for bank loans to be granted based on collateral 
value more than cash flow.  Moreover, banking supervision was not quite up to international 
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standards at that time.  For example, bank loans were not considered impaired until being delinquent 
for 6 months, as opposed to 3 months which is the standard international practice.  The on-site 
supervision also focused on transaction testing rather than major risk assessment.   
 The deteriorating economic conditions started to manifest on both macro and micro sides in 
1996, and the crisis hit the country in 1997.  On the macro side, Thailand’s current account deficit 
rose to 8% of GDP during 1995-1996 (Siamwalla et al., 1999).  On the micro side, there was a sign of 
ailing financial institutions (Siamwalla et al., 1999).  Bangkok Bank of Commerce was seized by the 
Bank of Thailand in May 1996, followed by 10 finance companies being ordered to raise capital in 
March 1997 and the operations of 16 insolvent finance companies being suspended in June 1997.  In 
early 1997, there was a wide anticipation of baht devaluation, leading to large capital outflows 
(mostly from the financial sector) (Siamwalla et al., 1999).  Such huge capital outflows caused a rapid 
depletion of the country’s international reserves.  The Thai government inevitably had to float the 
baht on July 2, 1997.  This incidence was followed by the suspension of additional 42 finance 
companies’ operations on August 5, 1997.   
 Thailand requested IMF assistance and attempted to regain public confidence as well as to 
improve the quality of institutions and domestic policies in medium and long terms through several 
reform measures.  Immediate measures include the closure of 56 finance companies, the blanket 
guarantee for financial institutions’ depositors and creditors to stop the run, and the financial 
restructuring package to facilitate recapitalization in the banking sector.  Examples of medium-term 
measures include the establishment of a credit bureau and upgrading supervisory policies to 
international standards.  Starting from the accounting period ending on December 31, 1998, financial 
institutions are required to classify and set provisions for their assets according to the borrowers’ 
financial condition and debt repayment ability as well as the length of non-payments.  Under the new 
rules, a loan which is 3 months overdue must be classified as substandard and subject to 20% loan 
loss provision at the minimum.  Since 1999, the supervision and examination of financial institutions 
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by the Bank of Thailand have focused on risk management of financial institutions, rather than 
transaction testing.  Furthermore, there are a number of longer-term measures, such as the New 
Financial Institutions Act to provide a more effective framework for safeguarding the country’s 
financial stability, the improvement of accounting standards and guidelines, and the establishment of 
a deposit insurance agency to replace the blanket guarantee with a limited guarantee.15  In addition, 
the Board of Investment revised Thailand investment policies to relieve the fiscal burden of the 
government after the crisis.  Several tax privileges have been reduced, and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of tax privileges have been enhanced.  For instance, tax privileges are granted to 
projects that benefit the economy, and good governance is used for managing and supervising the 
application of tax and duty privileges.  In addition, the priority of those privileges is given to the 
regions with low income and inadequate investment, small and medium enterprises, and five main 
sectors (i.e., agriculture and agricultural products, projects related to technological and human 
resource development, public utilities and infrastructure, environmental protection and conservation, 
and targeted industries).  Those reform measures may help reduce the moral hazard problems at the 
bank, international, and corporate levels and enhance the benefits of international capital flows to 
Thailand. 
Based on the above facts, Thailand exhibits characteristics consistent with the key 
assumptions of the model.  It is therefore a good example of a bank-based, small open economy, to 
which the model can be applied to study the relationships between international capital flows and 
each sector of the economy, as well as to assess the impact of changes in the quality of institutions 
and domestic policies on the costs and benefits of international capital flows. 
                                                
15This discussion draws from information provided in the Bank of Thailand’s Supervision Report 2000. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA 
The parameter values characterizing the model are calibrated and estimated using the 
equilibrium conditions in Appendix A to fit Thailand data.  The data used are of monthly frequency 
from January 1993 to June 2007, covering the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.  When actual 
monthly data are not available (which is the case for output, investment, and consumption), relevant 
monthly indices (manufacturing production index, private investment index, and private consumption 
index) are used to approximate actual monthly data.  In addition, when the data are not available for 
the whole sample period, the series are extended using predicted values based on appropriate 
explanatory variables.  Table 1 describes how each variable is obtained or computed.   
Monthly data on real sector indices are obtained from the Bank of Thailand (BOT) while real 
sector data with lower frequencies are derived from the Office of National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB).  These data are in real terms at 1988 prices and are seasonally-
adjusted (SA).  In the model, there is only traded output.  To make sure that the output and the private 
investment data represent as closely as possible the traded output and the private investment in traded 
sectors, respectively, the output from the banking and real estate sectors is excluded from the total 
output, and the net private capital stock of the banking and real estate sectors is subtracted from the 
total net private capital stock.  The employed labor, international reserves, and bank data are obtained 
from the BOT.  Since the employed labor data are of mixed frequencies (semiannual from 1993 to 
1997, quarterly from 1998 to 2000, and monthly from 2001 on), linear interpolation is used to derive  
a series of monthly employed labor for the whole sample period.  In addition, the monetary aggregate 
and interest rate data are derived from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International 
 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  The exchange rate, inflation rate, and price level data are obtained from 
Datastream.   
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the level variables in panel A and the change 
variables in panel B for the whole sample period.  The average annual traded output (total GDP minus 
GDP from financial intermediations and real estate, renting and business activities) in real terms (real 
output) is 2.93 trillion baht (around 83 billion USD) while the average annual private investment in 
traded sectors (total private investment excluding investment in the banking, insurance, and real estate 
sectors) in real terms (real investment) is 592 billion baht (around 17 billion USD).  Banks’ foreign 
borrowing is on average 8.9 billion USD.  As expected, time variations in most level variables are 
small.  The exceptions are the banks’ net foreign borrowing and the domestic real deposit rate, which 
have relatively high standard deviations compared to their means.  In addition, the banks’ net foreign 
borrowing is highly right-skewed; thus, its mean (8.9 billion USD) is much higher than its median 
(1.9 billion USD).  According to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit roots tests, all change 
variables are stationary whereas all level variables are not.  Therefore, the parameter estimation in the 
following chapters will be based on change variables, and the equilibrium conditions in Appendix A 
will be rearranged in the form of first difference equations. 
Hypothesizing that the variables behave differently before and after the crisis due to the crisis 
and the reforms, the sample is divided into 3 sub-periods, using June 1997 (the month in which the 
operations of 16 insolvent finance companies were suspended) and December 2000 (the end of the 
financial restructuring plan) as the breakpoints.  The three sub-periods are (1) pre-crisis period from 
January 1993 to May 1997, (2) crisis (and reform) period from June 1997 to December 2000, and  
(3) post-crisis period from January 2001 to June 2007.   
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the level variables in panel A and the change 
variables in panel B for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.  Figure 1 plots time-series 
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patterns of the level variables over time.  As seen in Table 3 and Figure 1, the domestic 
macroeconomic and financial variables reflect the economic conditions of Thailand reasonably well.  
All of them move in an adverse direction during the crisis.  The levels of real output, real 
consumption, and the real monetary aggregate exhibit an increasing trend from the pre-crisis to post-
crisis periods.  Such a positive trend is nevertheless disrupted during the crisis.  The average changes 
in those variables are the lowest in the crisis period.  Moreover, the data reveal the investment boom 
and an influx of capital flows to the banking sector in the pre-crisis period.  The average real 
investment and banks’ net foreign borrowing are the highest in the pre-crisis period at 846 billion 
baht (around 24 billion USD) and 28.8 billion USD, respectively.  The boom is however followed by 
a big drop in real investment during the crisis and a declining trend for banks’ net foreign borrowing 
since the crisis.  Average real investment is much lower at 377 billion baht (around 11 billion USD) 
during the crisis and average banks’ net foreign borrowing goes down to 16.1 billion USD during the 
crisis and then to -8.6 billion USD after the crisis.  Other variables also reflect weak economic 
conditions during the crisis.  Banks’ non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL ratio), domestic 
interest rates, and inflation rate rise dramatically.  In addition, the data show that international 
reserves were depleted extremely quickly after the central bank’s attempt to defend the baht in early 
1997, and the real value of the local currency against foreign currency depreciated substantially after 
the government decided to switch from a pegged exchange rate to a managed float regime in July 
1997.  
The above univariate analysis suggests that there have been two structural changes in 
Thailand during the sample period, i.e., the boom before the crisis, the bust during the crisis, and the 
improvement after the crisis.  Hence, the parameters of interest should be estimated for each of these 
sub-periods.  Also those time-series data are not stationary in levels; thus, the equations to be fitted 
need to be rearranged in first difference form to ensure stationarity.  In addition, there have been  
co-movements among those variables before, during, and after the crisis, and the interest rates are 
 51
more volatile than the variables depending on them.  A preliminary analysis of the co-movements 
among variables is thus conducted by looking at the correlations between the left-hand side (LHS) 
and the right-hand side (RHS) variables in the structural equations in Appendix A.  Table 4 restates 
the equilibrium conditions and reports the correlations between the LHS and the RHS variables.  
Most of the correlations (in bold font) are of expected sign and of significant magnitude while only 
some are not.  One reason for not getting the expected sign and significant magnitude could be that 
those RHS variables, except iw, are endogenous and are related to the LHS variables not only via a 
single equation in the system, but also through their relationships with other variables in other 
equations as well.  Another possible explanation is that there were some structural changes (e.g., the 
crisis and the reforms), which may alter the sign or reduce the magnitude of the correlations between 
the variables.  Despite these possible explanations, it is still puzzling why the correlation between the 
real investment (It) and the change in the real deposit rate (rt-rt-1) and the correlation between the 
growth rate of real consumption (Ct/Ct-1) and the lagged real deposit rate (rt-1) are not of the expected 
sign.  This issue will be further examined in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER VII 
METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter describes the methodology used to calibrate and estimate parameters and to test 
the hypotheses with regard to structural changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies.  
The model derived in Chapter IV is slightly modified to simplify the estimation and to ensure 
stationarity.  The parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems, which are proxies for 
the quality of institutions and domestic policies, are then estimated for each sub-period using the 
partial-sample generalized method of moments (GMM) approach.  All other parameters are either 
obtained from related studies or calibrated using long-run data relations.  The hypotheses, as outlined 
in section 5.2, are tested using the Wald-type structural break tests with known breakpoints by 
Andrews and Fair (1988) under the GMM framework. 
7.1 Model Modifications 
7.1.1 Moving Average of Interest Rates 
 According to the equilibrium conditions (A2), (A8) and (A9) in Appendix A, the real net 
capital stock (whose change determines the level of real investment), the growth rate of real 
consumption, and the real monetary aggregate are supposed to move closely with the domestic 
interest rate.  However, the univariate analysis in Chapter VI suggests that those variables are much 
less volatile than the domestic interest rate.  In addition, the correlation between the real investment 
and the change in the real deposit rate and the correlation between the growth rate of real 
consumption and the lagged real deposit rate are not strong and not of the expected sign.  A possible 
explanation could be that in reality firms and households smooth their investment, consumption, and 
money holding decisions over the business cycle, weakening the contemporaneous relationships 
 
between those variables and the relevant interest rates.  This seems to suggest that it is more 
appropriate to use moving averages of interest rates over the business cycle, rather than one-period 
interest rates, in the equilibrium conditions (A2), (A8) and (A9).  In computing the moving averages 
of interest rates, the business cycle is assumed to be 11 years, as it is suggested by Clement Juglar that 
the fixed investment cycle is between 7 and 11 years.  Table 5 compares the correlations between the 
selected macroeconomic variables (i.e., real net capital stock, real investment, growth rate of real 
consumption, and real monetary aggregate) and the relevant interest rates when using one-period 
interest rates versus eleven-year moving averages of interest rates.  The results show that the 
correlations when using the eleven-year moving averages of interest rates are of the expected sign, 
and the magnitudes are much higher.  These results suggest that using the eleven-year moving 
averages of interest rates in the equilibrium conditions (A2), (A8) and (A9) significantly increases the 
fit of the model to the actual data.  
7.1.2 Adjustment in Investment Equation  
 There are real-world frictions or factors that are not considered by the model.  Figure 1C 
shows that real investment is very persistent.  Empirically, the persistence of investment (e.g., due to 
large-scale long-term projects) suggests a need to include lagged investment as an additional 
explanatory variable for current investment and modify the equilibrium condition (A3) as follows.   
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Parameters Inv0 and Inv1 indicate how much current investment is determined by the model and how 
much by previous period’s investment, respectively.   
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 This modification will however affect the magnitude of the impact of a sudden stop on bank 
lending to the corporate sector and on firms’ investment predicted by the model.  Particularly,  
when banks face a credit cut by foreign creditors of the amount ( )( )( )/βR/PεF 1tttDt −− , bank lending and 
firms’ investment will decline by ( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ)(1inv 1tttDt0 −−− , rather than by 
( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ)(1 1tttDt −−− .  Similarly, transfers that banks receive from the government to finance 
their cash shortfalls during a sudden stop will be { } ( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ)(1inv1 1tttDt0 −−−− , rather than 
( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ 1tttDt −− . 
7.1.3 Exogenous Public Sector Policies 
 Due to the limitation of the data regarding the details of the government finance account,  
assumptions have to be made to ensure that the budget constraint of the public sector holds.  Because 
the focus of this research is not primarily on the public sector, it is assumed for the empirical analysis 
that public sector policies and related variables, i.e., international reserves (R) and inflation rate (π), 
are exogenous.  In addition, it is assumed that the bailout period, in which there will be a series of 
transfers of the remaining banks’ non-performing loan (NPL) losses to the government to clean up the 
banking system, starts one year after the first sudden stop. 
7.1.4 First Difference Equations to Ensure Stationarity 
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots suggest that all the observed 
endogenous variables are not stationary.  Consequently, the estimation is based on change variables, 
and the equilibrium conditions (after the modifications in this section) are rearranged in the form  
of first difference equations.  Appendix E presents the equilibrium conditions for the observed 
endogenous variables in first difference form, after the modifications according to sections  
7.1.1–7.1.3.
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7.2 Calibration and Estimation 
 The parameters of interest (υ, n, Ψ1, Pε), along with the related parameters which are 
anticipated to change after the crisis (Ψ0, Inv0, Inv1), are estimated for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis periods using the partial-sample GMM approach while all other parameter values are specified 
exogenously (i.e., obtained from related studies or calibrated using long-run data relations).  Table 6 
lists exogenously-determined parameters and describes how each of these parameters is obtained.  
 Given the exogenously-determined parameter values and the assumption that X0 = F0 = FX0 = 
AFX0 = 0, the parameter values (υ, n, Ψ0, Ψ1, Pε, Inv0, Inv1) for each sub-period are estimated to fit 
the following first difference equations. 
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Note that only equations (E2), (E4), (E5), and (E8) in Appendix E are relevant.  All other equations 
are determined by exogenously-determined parameters; therefore, there are no parameter values to be 
estimated from those equations. 
 To address the endogeneity problem and to increase the number of moment conditions for 
better identification, several global financial market and economic indicators as well as their own 
lagged variables are utilized as instruments.  These include the change in the world interest rate, the 
change in the world inflation rate, the percentage change in the world industrial production index, and 
the log return on the spot JPY/USD exchange rate.  Appendix F provides the descriptions and the 
sources of variables used as instruments.  These variables are considered good instruments, since they 
are not likely to be impacted by changes in economic and financial market conditions of a small open 
economy and hence are not determined by any of the endogenous variables in the model.  
Furthermore, theoretically and conceptually they can help explain variations in endogenous variables 
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of the model.  For example, changes in the world financial market conditions (as reflected by the 
change in the world interest rate, the change in the world inflation rate, and the log return on the spot 
JPY/USD exchange rate) will surely have an impact on changes in the exchange rate, the interest rate, 
and the capital flows of a small open economy.  In addition, a slowdown of the world economy (as 
reflected by a decline in the world industrial production index) may also attract world capital flows 
into a small open economy, leading to an increase in domestic industrial production.   
7.3 GMM and Hypothesis Testing Methodology 
 The hypotheses of structural changes in the quality of the institutions and domestic policies,  
as measured by changes in the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems, can be 
tested using F-statistics with two known breakpoints (since there are three sub-periods: pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis periods).  In fact, there are several versions of F-tests for a structural break with 
a known breakpoint.16  As mentioned by Andrews and Fair (1988), the F-test discussed by Chow 
(1960) is typically used for linear regression models while the extensions of Chow’s F-test by Lo and 
Newey (1985) or Hodoshima (1986) can be used for linear simultaneous equations models.  Since the 
model developed in this dissertation is in the form of non-linear simultaneous equations, the F-test for 
non-linear simultaneous equations models by Andrews and Fair (1988), with the applications for 
GMM discussed by Andrews (1993), is more appropriate.  Three types of F-tests are proposed by 
Andrews and Fair (1988): Wald-type (using parameter estimates based on the alternative hypothesis), 
LM-type (using parameter estimates based on the null hypothesis), and LR-type (using parameter 
estimates based on both the alternative and the null hypotheses).  Since parameter values are 
estimated under the alternative hypothesis that they are different across sub-periods, it seems most 
appropriate to use Wald-type statistics for hypothesis testing.  However, the F-test by Andrews and 
                                                
16Based on the literature review by Stock and Watson (1996), Hansen (2000, 2001), and Cai (2007), other types 
of structural break tests include (1) F-tests with an unknown breakpoint, e.g., Quandt (1960), Andrews (1993), 
Andrews and Ploberger (1994), (2) OLS-based CUSUM and MOSUM tests, e.g., Brown, Durbin, and Evans 
(1975), Ploberger and Kramer (1992), and (3) Tests based on maximum likelihood scores against the alternative 
hypothesis that the coefficients follow a random walk (stochastic trends),e.g., Nyblom (1985), and (4) Tests for 
linear models with more than one breakpoints, e.g., Bai and various co-authors. 
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Fair (1988) was originally developed for one known breakpoint.  This test therefore needs to be 
slightly modified to accommodate two known breakpoints.  The steps to calculate GMM estimators 
for each sub-period (partial sample GMM estimators) and Wald statistics with two known breakpoints 
following the idea of Andrews and Fair (1988) and Andrews (1993) are outlined in Appendix G. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 This chapter analyzes the results from the partial-sample GMM estimation using Thailand 
data for the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems (υ, n, Ψ1, Pε) as described in 
section 5.1 in Chapter V and the related parameters (Ψ0, Inv0, Inv1) for the pre-crisis, crisis, and  
post-crisis periods.  The Wald statistics for the structural break tests are also examined to see if the 
changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies as part of the reform plan lead to 
significant reductions in moral hazard problems after the crisis. 
8.1 Main Results 
 Partial-sample GMM estimators of parameters (υ, n, Ψ0, Ψ1, Pε, Inv0, Inv1), along with their 
approximate standard errors, t-statistics, and p-values, are reported in Table 7.  Almost all of the 
parameter estimates are significantly different from zero.  The exceptions are the estimated values of 
the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate (ψ0) for the crisis and post-crisis periods, the 
interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) for the pre-crisis 
period, the expected exchange rate deviation from the conventional uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) (Pε) for the post-crisis period, and the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ) for the crisis period.   
The estimate of υ for the crisis period is set to zero, the lower bound of allowed parameter values.  
The estimate of υ for the post-crisis period is set to the upper bound value of one.  In addition, the  
J-statistic for the test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that the null hypothesis that the moment 
conditions included in the GMM estimation are zero cannot be rejected.   
 
 In general, the values of the parameters of interest are significantly different across  
sub-periods.  Table 8 reports the Wald statistics and the p-values for the structural break tests.17  
Recall that υ, the loan loss provisioning ratio, can be interpreted as a measure of the moral hazard 
problem at the bank level.  The estimated values are 52%, 0%, and 100% for the pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis periods, respectively.  The value of 52% indicates that banks did not maintain sufficient 
provisions to cover their non-performing loan (NPL) losses before the crisis, and the under-
provisioning problem became more severe during the crisis.  However, after the crisis, the estimation 
indicates that banks have maintained 100% loan loss provisions for their NPL losses.  Such a change 
can be largely explained by the stricter loan loss provisioning rules and improved banking supervision 
standard, which were part of the financial system reforms in Thailand.  The estimated values of 
parameter n, which indicates the level of government subsidies (or taxes if negative) to the corporate 
sector as well as the degree of the moral hazard problem at the corporate level, exhibit a downward 
trend, from -3.8 before the crisis, to -13.0 during the crisis, and -29.0 after the crisis, and such 
differences are statistically significant.  This trend is consistent with the fact that the Board of 
Investment of Thailand changed the investment promotion policies by giving lower tax incentives to 
firms and imposing more stringent criteria for firms eligible for tax privileges after the crisis.   
 Recall that one of the moral hazard problems at the international level is captured by 
parameter ψ1 (a measure of the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing in 10 trillion USD unit).  The estimated value is not different from zero before the crisis 
whereas it is estimated to be 0.84 during the crisis and 1.46 after the crisis.  On the other hand, 
parameter ψ0 (a measure of the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate) is estimated to be 
1.18 before the crisis while it is not significantly different from zero during and after the crisis.  The 
differences in the estimated values of ψ0 and ψ1 for the pre- and post-crisis periods are significant at 
1% and 10% confidence level, respectively.  These results suggest that the foreign borrowing rate, 
                                                
17The structural break tests for parameter υ cannot be conducted since the values of υ for the crisis and post-
crisis periods are at the boundaries of the parameter value range. 
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which previously moved with the world interest rate before the crisis, is largely determined by the 
aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing since the crisis.  This shift likely reflects a change in 
foreign creditors’ perceptions of risks associated with their lending to the banking sector in Thailand 
after witnessing the crisis and acknowledging the plan by the government to replace the blanket 
guarantee with a limited guarantee.  Particularly, an increase in the aggregate level of banks’ net 
foreign borrowing of 10 billion USD is expected to be accompanied by a rise in the foreign borrowing 
rate of 1.0% per annum during the crisis and 1.8% per annum after the crisis to compensate for 
foreign creditors’ higher risks from the greater amount of their lending to the banking sector in 
Thailand.   
 The estimated values of parameter Pε also reflect the changes in the expected exchange rate 
deviation from the conventional UIP by market participants.  Pε before the crisis (0.0044) is positive 
and larger in magnitude than Pε after the crisis (which is not significantly different from zero).  This 
suggests that the expected exchange rate deviation from the UIP is much smaller after 2000.  This is 
intuitive, since Thailand switched from a pegged exchange rate to a managed float regime with 
significantly less market intervention by the government.  However, Pε during the crisis is highly 
negative at -0.0095, indicating that market participants expected the exchange rate to depreciate more 
than the level suggested by the UIP relationship.  This potentially worsened the situation during the 
crisis.  Parameters Inv0 and Inv1, which measure how much actual investment is determined by 
contemporary investment suggested by the model and how much by lagged investment, are in general 
not significantly different across sub-periods.  Only the difference between Inv0 for the crisis and 
post-crisis periods is significant at 10% confidence level.  These results suggest that the relationship 
between lagged and current investment is stable as would be the case if a simple mechanical 
relationship (such as that dictated by large long-lived projects) is mostly responsible for determining 
this parameter.   
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 In sum, the empirical results show that the values of all the parameters measuring the severity 
of moral hazard problems are significantly different across sub-periods, especially between the pre- 
and post-crisis periods.  These significant changes in the parameter values suggest that the changes in 
the quality of institutions and domestic policies in Thailand after the crisis bring about substantial 
reductions in the moral hazard problems at all levels.  At the bank level, the improved banking 
supervision and the more stringent loan loss provisioning rules lead to the higher banks’ loan loss 
provisioning ratio after the crisis.  At the corporate level, the changes in the investment promotion 
policies by the Board of Investment result in the lower level of government subsidies or tax incentives 
to firms.  At the international level, the occurrence of the crisis and the plan to replace the blanket 
guarantee with a limited guarantee (through the establishment of a deposit insurance agency) cause 
foreign creditors to change their estimations of risks stemming from their lending to the banking 
sector in Thailand.  In addition, the change from a fixed exchange rate to a managed float regime 
causes foreign investors to adjust their expectations about the exchange rate.  The improvement in the 
foreign investors’ risk estimations and expectations about the exchange rate leads to the higher 
interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing and the lower expected 
exchange rate deviation from the UIP relationship.  In the next chapter, the impact of those changes in 
the quality of institutions and domestic policies on the net benefit of international capital flows will 
be assessed using the simulation exercises. 
8.2 Sensitivity and Stability Analysis 
 The estimation results in section 8.1 depend on several exogenously-determined parameters 
and the assumption that those parameters are constant over time.  In this section, the sensitivity 
analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes in those exogenously-determined parameters 
as well as a change in the parameter measuring the households’ degree of risk aversion over time on 
the estimation results.  Other issues with regard to the partial-sample GMM estimation, i.e., 
convergence to a local minimum rather than the global one, choices of kernels and bandwidth 
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parameters for the estimation of the optimal weighting matrix, and different alternatives for 
breakpoints, are also investigated in this section.   
8.2.1 Change in Households’ Degree of Risk Aversion over Time 
 The estimation results in section 8.1 show that there have been a significant increase in the 
interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) and a reduction in 
the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate (ψ0) after the crisis.  These changes suggest that 
foreign investors demand much higher rates of return to compensate for their higher risks from  
an increase in their lending to the banking sector in Thailand.  In equilibrium, the deposit rate is set to 
be equal to the foreign borrowing rate.  Hence, the changes in parameters ψ0 and ψ1 after the crisis 
also affect the deposit rate and may also be influenced by a change in households’ saving behavior or 
degree of risk aversion.   
In this model, households choose the levels of consumption, money holdings, and deposits 
with banks to maximize their expected utility.  Although earning zero interest, money holdings are 
considered safer and more liquid than deposits with banks since the principal amount can be 
immediately accessed with certainty.  Hence, households’ demand for money holdings relative to 
depositing their money in banks reflects their degree of (liquidity) risk aversion.  In equilibrium, 
households’ money balances increase with parameter χ, and a higher level of money holdings leads to 
a lower level of deposits with banks.  Therefore, χ can be used to measure the households’ degree of 
risk aversion.  Particularly, the higher the value of χ, the greater the households’ preference for money 
holdings relative to deposits with banks, and the higher the households’ degree of risk aversion.  The 
higher households’ degree of risk aversion causes the amount of deposits with banks to go down since 
households prefer to hold money with them.  This may drive banks to increase the deposit rate to 
attract more deposits from households and may affect the estimated values of ψ0 and ψ1 derived in 
section 8.1. 
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To examine the effect of a change in households’ degree of risk aversion on the changes in 
the values of ψ0 and ψ1 after the crisis, the value of χ is estimated and allowed to be different across 
sub-periods, rather than applying the same exogenously-determined value for all sub-periods.  When 
the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems and χ are simultaneously estimated, 
the results indicate that households’ degree of risk aversion (χ) declines from 0.01 before the crisis to 
0.0053 during the crisis and 0.0042 after the crisis.  Although the value of χ is decreasing, ψ1 still 
exhibits an increasing trend, and the value of ψ0 still significantly decreases during and after the 
crisis.  These results suggest that the change in households’ degree of risk aversion over time does not 
have a significant influence on the increase in the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of 
banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) and the reduction in the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest 
rate (ψ0) after the crisis.  All other main results still hold under this specification.   
8.2.2 Changes in Exogenously-Determined Parameters 
 The estimation results in section 8.1 are based on a number of exogenously-determined 
parameters appeared in equations (E2), (E4), (E5), and (E8) in Appendix E, which are either 
calibrated using long-run data relations or obtained from other studies.  The sensitivity analysis is 
therefore conducted to examine the impact of a change in each of those parameters on the estimation 
results.   
 1) An increase in the production technology factor (A) results in higher output and thus 
causes firms to increase their investment according to the model.  Recall that current investment is a 
function of contemporary investment predicted by the model (the model prediction part), which 
increases with parameter A, and lagged investment (the lagged part).  Parameters inv0 and inv1 
indicate how much current investment is determined by the model prediction part and how much by 
the lagged part, respectively.  A rise in parameter A leads to an increase in contemporary investment 
predicted by the model.  To counter such an effect, the estimated value of the weight given to the 
model prediction part (inv0) is lower during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (when lagged 
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investment is high and when investment shows an increasing trend) to reduce the effect of the 
increase in the model prediction part.  In contrast, the estimated value of inv0 is higher during the 
crisis period (when lagged investment is low and when a trend reverses from decreasing to 
increasing) to enhance the effect of the increase in the model prediction part.  
The increase in the model prediction part of investment as a result of the increase in A also 
causes the level of banks’ net foreign borrowing to increase.  To bring the banks’ net foreign 
borrowing back to the same level, the estimated value of the parameter measuring the level of 
government subsidies or tax incentives (n) increases, resulting in higher household income 
(dividends) from the corporate sector, higher household deposits with banks and lower banks’ 
demand for foreign borrowing.  In addition, the estimated value of the banks’ loan loss provisioning 
ratio (υ) is higher, leading to lower banks’ NPL losses and lower banks’ demand for foreign 
borrowing. 
2) An increase in the income share of capital (α) affects the estimation results in the same 
way as an increase in the production technology factor (A).  However, the impact of a change in 
parameter α is expected to be larger than that of a change in parameter A due to its non-linear, 
exponential relationship with output. 
3) An increase in the capital depreciation rate (d) leads to an increase in firms’ expenses, 
causing firms to reduce their new investment.  As a result, firms’ actual profits, and thus household 
income (dividends) from the corporate sector, decline.  Hence, an increase in the capital depreciation 
rate has two contradictory effects on banks’ net foreign borrowing.  On one hand, the reduction in 
investment reduces firms’ demand for bank loans, decreasing banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  
On the other hand, the reduction in household income from the corporate sector reduces household 
deposits with banks and increases banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  The net effect of the 
increase in d on the level of banks’ net foreign borrowing seems to be in a decreasing direction.  To 
bring the banks’ demand for foreign borrowing back to the previous level, the estimated values of the 
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parameters measuring the level of government subsidies or tax incentives (n) and the loan loss 
provisioning ratio (υ) are adjusted downwards to decrease household deposits with banks and to 
increase banks’ NPL losses, respectively.   
4) An increase in the operating expense factor (ξ) leads to higher banks’ NPL losses and 
higher banks’ net foreign borrowing.  To counter such an effect, the estimated value of the loan loss 
provisioning ratio (υ) is adjusted upwards to reduce banks’ NPL losses and their demand for foreign 
borrowing. 
5) An increase in the fraction of firms’ investment financed by capital markets (cap) 
leads to lower banks’ lending to the corporate sector, thereby lowering banks’ NPL losses and 
demand for foreign borrowing.  Hence, the estimated value of the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ) is 
adjusted downwards to balance such an effect. 
6) An increase in the personal income tax rate (η) reduces household income after tax, 
leading to a reduction in deposits with banks and greater banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  The 
estimated value of the parameter measuring the level of government subsidies or tax incentives (n) 
therefore increases to bring the household income after tax and banks’ net foreign borrowing back to 
the previous levels. 
7) A decrease in the fraction of banks’ cumulative NPL losses which are expected by 
foreign creditors to be covered by the country’s international reserves (β) reduces a credit cut by 
foreign creditors, ( )( )( )/βR/PεF 1tttDt −− , and the amount of banks’ NPL losses transferred to the 
government during a sudden stop, { } ( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ)(1inv1 1tttDt0 −−−− .  Hence, the level of banks’ net 
foreign borrowing declines less (increases) during the crisis.  To counter such an effect, the estimated 
value of the loan loss provisioning ratio before the crisis (υsub1) drops to increase the level of banks’ 
cumulative NPL losses (Ft) and the credit cut by foreign creditors.  In addition, the estimated value of 
the weight given to the model prediction part of investment during the crisis (inv0,sub2) is adjusted 
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downwards to increase the amount of banks’ NPL losses transferred to the government.  These two 
adjustments cause the amount of banks’ net foreign borrowing during the crisis to go down to the 
previous level.   
8) An increase in the parameter determining the fraction of banks’ cash shortfalls 
subsidized by the government (φ) causes the amount of banks’ NPL losses transferred to the 
government during a sudden stop, { } ( )( )( )/βR/PεFφ)(1inv1 1tttDt0 −−−− , to increase.  To balance this effect, 
the estimated value of the loan loss provisioning ratio before the crisis (υsub1) rises to reduce the level 
of banks’ cumulative NPL losses (Ft).  In addition, the estimated value of the weight given to the 
model prediction part of investment during the crisis (inv0,sub2) is adjusted upwards to decrease the 
amount of banks’ NPL losses transferred to the government during a sudden stop.   
8.2.3 Different Starting Values 
 In optimization, a convergence to a local optimum rather than the global one is a potential 
problem.  To examine this issue, the estimations with 648 different combinations of extreme starting 
values are conducted, and the results are found to be robust. 
8.2.4 Different Kernels and Bandwidth Parameters 
 In an efficient GMM estimation, the optimal weighting matrix is the inverse of the covariance 
matrix of moment conditions, which is normally estimated using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) approach.  The HAC covariance matrix estimator depends on 
choices of kernels and bandwidth parameters.  The GMM estimation in section 8.1 is conducted using 
Newey-West Bartlett kernel with the bandwidth parameter of 2 (i.e., the number of lags used is 1, 
consistent with the one-lag model).  To explore if the results are robust to different choices of kernels, 
the estimations using Parzen and Quadratic Spectral kernels are carried out, and the results are mainly 
the same.  The estimations using Bartlett kernel with different bandwidth parameters (bandwidth 
parameter = 3, 4, 5) are also conducted, and the main results are still maintained.   
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8.2.5 Different Breakpoints 
 The results in section 8.1 are derived from the partial-sample GMM estimation with two 
known breakpoints.  The first and the second breakpoints used are May 1997 and December 2000 
since 16 finance companies’ operations were suspended in June 1997 (which is considered the start of 
the crisis period) and the financial restructuring plan ended in December 2000 (which is considered 
the end of the crisis and the reform period).  However, the sign of ailing financial institutions started 
to manifest in March 1997, as 10 finance companies were ordered by the Bank of Thailand to raise 
capital.  Some may also argue that the crisis started in July 1997 after the exchange rate was floated.  
To test if the results are sensitive to different first breakpoints, the estimations using February 1997, 
March 1997, April 1997, and June 1997 as the first breakpoint are run, and the main results remain 
unchanged. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SIMULATION 
 In this chapter, the parameter values derived from the calibration and estimation18 in Chapter 
VIII are used to simulate endogenous variables under different moral hazard scenarios.  The goal of 
these simulation exercises is to assess the impact of changes in the quality of institutions and 
domestic policies, as measured by changes in the degree of moral hazard problems, on the costs and 
benefits of international capital flows to an open country like Thailand.   
9.1 Costs and Benefits of International Capital Flows 
A central debate in the international finance literature is the magnitude of the benefits from 
international capital flows as they relate to capital available for real investment and higher output 
growth.  Specifically, the benefits of greater investment must be weighed against the potentially large 
costs of international capital flows if a country relying more on foreign capital becomes significantly 
vulnerable to a crisis.  A crisis not only creates large bailout costs to the government, but it also leads 
to output losses, especially when a sudden stop occurs in concurrence with a crisis.  As suggested by 
Hutchison and Noy (2005), crises with sudden stops of capital flows have a larger negative impact on 
output growth than those without sudden stops. 
In the model developed in Chapter IV, international capital flows via the banking sector serve 
as an additional source of financing for firms’ investment.  During good times (when there is no 
sudden stop), international capital flows, together with moral hazard problems at all levels, help fuel 
an economy and result in higher investment and output, which are considered the key benefits of the 
                                                
18If the estimated value of parameter is not significantly different from zero, the value of zero will be used 
instead. 
 
capital flows.  Nevertheless, the capital flows and the moral hazard problems also allow banks to 
accumulate losses (the moral hazard problem at the bank level) and excessively borrow from abroad 
(the moral hazard problems at the international level) as well as induce firms to overinvest and 
excessively borrow from banks (the moral hazard problem at the corporate level).  An increasing 
volume of those excessive risk-taking activities makes a country more vulnerable to a sudden stop 
and a crisis, which normally result in substantial costs.  Particularly, bank bailouts through transfers 
of bank losses to the government as a result of a crisis are considered the direct costs to a country.  In 
addition, output losses as a result of credit cuts by foreign creditors during sudden stops are 
considered the indirect costs.   
Hence, this model can be used to assess the effect of reductions in moral hazard problems (as 
a result of changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies) on all key benefits and costs of 
international capital flows emphasized by prior literature.  Particularly, the bailout costs (direct costs) 
and the changes in output (indirect benefits if positive or costs if negative) are estimated using the 
simulated data under different moral hazard scenarios.   
9.2 Conjectures about the Results  
Based on the mechanism of the model, the effects of changes in the quality of institutions and 
domestic policies on the direct and indirect costs of international capital flows to a country like 
Thailand can be conjectured as follows.   
 1) An increase in the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing (ψ1), due to a plan to replace the blanket guarantee with a limited guarantee, could either 
positively or negatively impact an economy, depending upon the time-series pattern of the simulated 
series of banks’ net foreign borrowing.  If the simulated changes in the aggregate level of banks’ net 
foreign borrowing are mostly negative (i.e., the banks’ net foreign borrowing is most of the time 
decreasing), an increase in ψ1 leads to a greater reduction in domestic interest rates.  The greater 
reduction in the domestic interest rates as a result of the increase in ψ1 benefits a country since it 
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results in higher output and lower bailout costs.  In contrast, if the simulated changes in the aggregate 
level of banks’ net foreign borrowing are mostly positive, an increase in ψ1 causes a larger increase in 
domestic interest rates, thereby lowering output and increasing bailout costs.  This latter case could 
happen when the simulated economy starts with a low level of wealth or output and has to borrow 
from abroad for several periods.  Since the data show that the actual changes in the aggregate level of 
banks’ net foreign borrowing for Thailand are mostly negative during the sample period, January 
1993 – June 2007, it is anticipated that the increase in ψ1 will benefit the country by raising the output 
and reducing the bailout costs.  
2) A reduction in the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate (ψ0), which occurs 
in conjunction with an increase in ψ1, could either benefit or harm a country, depending upon the 
time-series pattern of the world interest rate.  If changes in the world interest rate used in the 
simulations are mostly positive (i.e., the world interest rate is most of the time increasing), a decrease 
in ψ0 causes domestic interest rates to increase less with the world interest rate.  The lower domestic 
interest rates as a result of the decrease in ψ0 benefit a country since they result in higher output (due 
to higher investment) and lower bailout costs (due to lower banks’ NPL losses).  On the other hand, if 
changes in the world interest rate are mostly negative (i.e., the world interest rate is most of the time 
decreasing), a decrease in ψ0 causes domestic interest rates to decrease less with the world interest 
rate.  The higher domestic interest rates as a result of the decrease in ψ0 cause a reduction in output 
and an increase in bailout costs.  Since the actual changes in the world interest rate during the sample 
period are mostly positive, it is expected that the decrease in ψ0 will benefit the country by increasing 
the output and lowering the bailout costs. 
 3) An increase in the banks’ loan loss provisioning ratio (υ) as a result of improved 
banking supervision leads to a lower level of banks’ cumulative NPL losses, thereby lowering bailout 
costs.  The lower level of banks’ cumulative losses also results in a smaller credit cut by the foreign 
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creditors during a sudden stop, thereby mitigating a reduction in firms’ investment and resulting in a 
lower reduction (or an increase) in output during the crisis.   
 4) A decrease in the level of government subsidies or tax incentives (n) leads to a 
reduction in firms’ expected profits.  Therefore, firms reduce their investment, resulting in lower 
output.  This conjecture is consistent with the view by Stiglitz (2002), in which contractionary fiscal 
policies during crises, especially the Asian financial crisis, have adverse effects on crisis countries 
since they make serious recessions even deeper.  Firms also reduce their demand for bank loans, as a 
result of the decrease in n, leading to lower banks’ NPL losses and lower bailout costs. 
5) A decrease in the expected exchange rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) (Pε) as a result of an implementation of a more flexible exchange rate regime leads to  
a higher real exchange rate (local currency depreciation).  As a result, the value of the country’s 
international reserves (liquid foreign assets) in local currency increases, resulting in a smaller cut in 
credit by foreign creditors during a sudden stop.  Hence, there will be a smaller cut in investment by 
firms, leading to a lower reduction (an increase) in output, a smaller decrease (an increase) in banks’ 
lending and NPL losses, and thus an increase in bailout costs during a sudden stop.  However,  
the decrease in Pε directly affects the output and the bailout costs only when there is a sudden stop.  
Hence, the direct effects of the decrease in Pε on the total output and the total bailout costs are 
expected to be quite small. 
9.3 Scenarios 
The analysis in this section covers four groups of scenarios, as described in detail in Table 9.  
The base scenario serves as the benchmark case where the moral hazard problems at all levels are 
severe (i.e., the quality of institutions and domestic policies are still poor) as all parameter values  
(υ, n, Ψ0, Ψ1, Pε, Inv0, Inv1) are set at the pre-crisis levels.  Group A scenarios facilitate a ‘what if’ 
analysis when only one aspect of the moral hazard problems (i.e., the quality of institutions and 
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domestic policies with respect to a moral hazard problem) is adjusted to the post-crisis level.   
In Group B scenarios, it is assumed that parameter υ, which measures the moral hazard problem at the 
bank level, and another aspect of the moral hazard problems are concurrently adjusted to the post-
crisis levels.  This is to examine if there are additional benefits and costs from addressing two aspects 
of the moral hazard problems at the same time.  Scenario C1 uses different parameter values  
(as derived from the partial-sample GMM estimation) for each sub-period.  This scenario should 
therefore reflect the situation closest to what has happened in Thailand.   
9.4 Assumptions  
As the parameter values are estimated using first difference equations, the series of 
endogenous variables are also simulated (in changes) using the modified equilibrium relations in 
Appendix E.  The series of variables in levels are then computed using specified initial values. 
  For stock variables and flow variables which have their own lagged variables on the right 
hand side of the equations  (i.e., capital stock (K), investment (I), banks’ net foreign borrowing (b), 
real exchange rate (ε/P), consumption (C), and real monetary aggregate (M/P)), the actual values for 
January 1993 are used as the initial values.  Simulated values are used for flow variables which do not 
have their own lagged variables on the right hand side of the equations (i.e., output (Y)).   
For exogenous variables, the actual series of NPL ratios, inflation rates, world interest rates, 
employed labor, and international reserves are utilized, rather than simulating them using AR(1) 
processes.  This is to create the scenarios as close as possible to what has happened in Thailand 
during 1993-2007.  The eleven-year moving average of monthly interest rates (used in the equations 
of the change in M/P, the change in C, and the change in I) is computed from the sum of the past 
actual interest rates plus the simulated interest rate for the current period. 
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9.5 Simulation Results 
 Table 10 presents the magnitude of the estimated direct and indirect costs for each scenario, 
in comparison with the actual data.  The estimated direct costs (bailout costs) are the sum of banks’ 
NPL losses transferred to the government while the actual direct costs are the sum of actual 
government lending to the Financial Institutions Development Funds (FIDF).19  The estimated 
indirect costs in this table are demonstrated in terms of the average annual traded output (output) and 
the average annual output growth over February 1993 – June 2007 for comparison with commonly 
used data.  The direct costs and the average annual output are also reported as future values in June 
2007 to account for the time value of money.   
Direct Costs 
 The direct costs estimated from the model range from 0% of output in scenario A1, B1, B2 
and B3 (when there is no moral hazard problem at the bank level) to 18.02% of output or 21.56% of 
output (in future value) in scenario C1 when different parameter values for each sub-period are used.  
This range overlaps with the estimated bailout costs of over 20% of output by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1998).  However, when compared with the actual bailout costs (32.69% of output or 36.78% of 
output in future value) and the estimated costs of restructuring and recapitalizing the banking system 
(35% of GDP) by Burnside et al. (2000), the direct costs estimated from this model are much lower.  
This is largely due to the implicit assumption that the principal part of loans granted to the corporate 
sector is fully collateralized.  Hence, banks’ NPL losses estimated from the model do not include 
losses from the principal part.  In reality, although loans had been fully collateralized at the 
origination, the value of collaterals pledged against those loans dropped significantly during the crisis.  
In addition, there is no run by domestic depositors in this model.  Hence, banks in this model may 
face smaller cash shortfalls during a sudden stop than when there is also a run by domestic depositors, 
                                                
19 Data on government lending to the Financial Institutions Development Funds (FIDF) are obtained from the 
Bank of Thailand. 
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which is often observed in crisis countries including Thailand.  This could be another reason for 
obtaining the estimated direct costs lower than the actual ones. 
Scenario C1 provides the highest estimate of the direct costs, since it allows all parameters to 
be different across sub-periods and to reflect the worse-than-expected economic downturns during the 
crisis period.  Scenario A4 and the base scenario provide, although not much different, the second and 
third highest estimates.  As expected, the base case, in which all types of moral hazard problems are 
assumed to be at the pre-crisis levels, generates high direct costs.  However, scenario A4 yields the 
results not much different from the base case.  This suggests that the change in the expected exchange 
rate deviation from the UIP (the change in Pε from 0.0044 in the base case to 0 in scenario A4), which 
may result from the change in an exchange rate regime, does not help reduce the bailout costs when 
other moral hazard problems are still severe. 20   
Consistent with the analysis of the model in Chapter IV, what seems to matter most to the 
direct costs is the moral hazard problem at the bank level.  Once the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ) is 
set at 100% (scenario A1), i.e., there is no accumulation of NPL losses in banks, the direct costs are 
estimated to be zero.  The improvement in foreign investors’ estimation of risks associated with their 
lending to the banking sector in Thailand (i.e., the changes in Ψ0 from 1.18 to 0 and Ψ1 from 0 to 1.46 
in scenario A3), which makes it more expensive for banks to increase their foreign borrowing, also 
reduces the bailout costs substantially from 14.12% in the base case to 6.11% of output in future 
value.  However, the reduction in government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector  
(the change in n from -3.84 to -29.02 in scenario A2), which leads to lower investment and lower 
bank lending to the corporate sector, plays a very small role in reducing the bailout costs.  Relative to 
the base case, the direct costs in this scenario only decline by 0.17% of output in future value. 
                                                
20According to the mechanism of the model, a decrease in Pε leads to a depreciation in the real exchange rate, an 
increase in the value of international reserves in local currency, and a reduction in a credit cut by foreign 
creditors (the difference between banks’ cumulative losses and the value of international reserves) in the same 
period.  This causes investment to decline less when there is a sudden stop, resulting in higher banks’ lending to 
the corporate sector and higher banks’ cumulative NPL losses in the next period. 
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Indirect Costs or Benefits 
 As emphasized by several researchers, international capital flows, together with moral hazard 
problems, lead to an increase in investment and output, especially during a boom, as well as trigger  
a crisis.  In addition to bailout costs, a sudden stop of capital flows may cause a deeper recession or a 
substantial reduction in output during and after a crisis.  The changes in output are thus a measure of 
the indirect costs (if negative) or benefits (if positive) of international capital flows to a country. 
 In Table 10, the indirect costs or benefits are analyzed in terms of the average annual output 
and the average annual output growth rate.  The estimated average output ranges from 2.92 to 3.10 
trillion baht.  This range covers the average actual output over February 1993 – June 2007 of 2.94 
trillion baht.  However, the estimated average output growth rate is between 2.06% and 3.21% per 
annum, which is much lower than the actual output growth rate of 4.40% per annum.   
When comparing across scenarios, in almost all the scenarios, except scenarios A2 (n at the 
post-crisis level), B1 (υ and n at the post-crisis levels) and C1 (all parameters at the post-crisis levels), 
the average output is slightly higher than, and the average output growth rate is almost the same as, 
those in the base case.  On the other hand, scenarios A2, B1 and C1, in which the level of government 
subsidies (or taxes if negative) (n) is set at the post-crisis level, demonstrate the substantially lower 
average output and average output growth rate.  These results suggest that the reduction in 
government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector, which leads to lower investment and 
lower bank lending to the corporate sector, though slightly helps reduce the bailout costs, creates the 
substantial indirect costs to the country by lowering the average output and the average output growth 
rate.   
Total Costs and Benefits 
To have a complete picture of which policy combinations would benefit the country the most 
under the selected simulated scenarios, the direct and indirect costs are simultaneously analyzed.  
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Here the indirect costs are analyzed in term of the sum of the output over the sample period, rather 
than the average, so that it can be added to the direct costs (which are the sum of the bailout costs 
over the same period) to obtain the total costs.  In addition, the direct, indirect, and total costs are 
relative to those in the base case for better comparison.  Results are presented in Table 11. 
Considering the total costs among all of the group A scenarios, the results are as conjectured.  
The increase in the loan loss provisioning ratio to 100% (scenario A1) has the largest benefit since it 
directly and substantially reduces the bailout costs as well as slightly helps increase the output.  The 
improvement in foreign investors’ estimation of risks (scenario A3) also has a significant positive 
impact on both the direct and indirect costs.  Nevertheless, the reduction in government subsidies or 
tax incentives (scenario A2) hurts, rather than benefits, the country since it leads to a substantial 
decline in the output.  In addition, the reduction in the expected exchange rate deviation from the UIP 
(scenario A4) does not have a significant effect as anticipated. 
These results indicate that, in a typical bank-based open economy, the moral hazard problem 
at the bank level plays a key role in creating the bailout costs.  Hence, the first priority should be 
given to the improvement in the quality of institutions or domestic policies, which could potentially 
help reduce the moral hazard problem at the bank level, such as the improvement in banking 
supervision.  Group B scenarios combine the policies to improve banking supervision (aiming to 
resolve the moral hazard problem at the bank level) with another set of policies (aiming to reduce 
another level of the moral hazard problems) to examine whether there are additional costs or benefits 
from implementing two sets of policies together.  The simulation results for scenario B1 suggest that 
the combination of the improved banking supervision and the reduction in government subsidies or 
tax incentives hurts the economy.  Although the implementation of stricter loan loss provisioning 
rules significantly reduces the bailout costs, the reduction in government subsidies or tax incentives 
results in the substantially lower output.  On the other hand, the results for scenario B2 suggest that 
the net benefit from implementing the policies to improve banking supervision together with those to 
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improve foreign investors’ estimation of risks is larger than when each set of policies is implemented 
alone (scenario A1 or A3).  The impact of the policies to improve the expected exchange rate 
deviation from the UIP, either implemented alone (scenario A4) or with the policies to improve 
banking supervision (scenario B3), is minimal. 
In conclusion, the results from the simulation exercises suggest that the combination of the 
policies to improve banking supervision and those to improve foreign investors’ estimation of risks is 
most beneficial to a country like Thailand under the selected simulated scenarios.  In contrast, the 
policies to reduce government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate sector hurt the country by 
substantially lowering the output.  This result seems to be consistent with the view by Stiglitz (2002), 
who argues that tightening fiscal policies during crises have adverse impacts on crisis countries since 
they make serious recessions even deeper. 
9.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 The simulation exercises in section 9.5 consider only a certain number of scenarios.  In most 
of the scenarios considered, except scenario B2, the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of 
banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) is set at the pre-crisis level which is zero.  Hence, any change that 
affects banks’ net foreign borrowing does not have any impact on domestic interest rates.  When ψ1 is 
greater than zero, there might be additional effects of changes in the quality of institutions and 
domestic policies via the interest rate channel.  Therefore, it might be interesting to examine those 
additional effects when the policies to improve the moral hazard problem at each level are 
implemented under the condition that the interest rate channel is working (i.e., ψ1 is greater than 
zero).  In addition, since the results in section 9.5 are based on exogenously-determined parameters, it 
would be interesting to examine how the simulation results are impacted by a change in each of the 
exogenously-determined parameters both directly and indirectly through the interest rate mechanism. 
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This section first describes the role of the domestic interest rates as the mechanism through 
which any change affecting some parts of an economy is transmitted to the other parts.  Then it 
examines the additional effects when the policies to reduce each level of the moral hazard problems 
are implemented under the condition that the interest rate channel is working.  Finally, it explores 
how the simulation results are affected by a change in each of the exogenously-determined 
parameters both directly and indirectly via the interest rate mechanism. 
9.6.1 Interest Rate Mechanism  
 The equilibrium conditions of the model suggest that the domestic real interest rate (rt) affects 
the decisions of all agents in an economy.  Particularly, the firms’ level of capital stock (K), money 
holdings by households (M), and current consumption relative to future consumption of households 
(Ct/Ct+1) decrease with the domestic real interest rate.  In addition, dividends paid by banks to their 
shareholders (X) from performing loan (PL) profits increase with the domestic real interest rate.  
Those decisions determine the output (Y), the amount of government subsidies or taxes to the 
corporate sector (S), the amount of bank lending to the corporate sector (e), the amount of deposits 
from the household sector (a), as well as the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (b).  At 
the same time, the domestic real interest rate (r) is also determined by the aggregate level of banks’ 
net foreign borrowing (b).  Hence, any change that affects the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing (b), either directly or indirectly through the variables {K, M, C, X, Y, S, e, a}, will have 
additional impacts on the whole economy through the domestic real interest rate (r).   
How well this interest rate mechanism works however depends on the value of parameter ψ1.  
Recall that ψ1 measures the interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing.  Hence, the higher the value of ψ1, the greater the additional impacts of a change in one of 
the endogenous variables on the whole economy via the interest rate channel.  However, when ψ1 is 
zero, this channel is cut, and there is no additional effect via the interest rate channel.   
 79
9.6.2 Additional Effects When ψ1 is Greater than Zero 
 This section examines the additional effects (via the interest rate channel) of changes in the 
quality of institutions and domestic policies to mitigate moral hazard problems on the direct and 
indirect costs of international capital flows when ψ1 is greater than zero. 
 1) An increase in the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ)  
 The simulation results for scenario A1 in section 9.5 suggest that an increase in the loan loss 
provisioning ratio (υ), when ψ1 is set at the pre-crisis level (i.e., zero), benefits a country like Thailand 
by substantially lowering bailout costs and slightly increasing output.  In addition to these direct 
effects, a smaller cut in credit by foreign creditors as a result of the higher loan loss provisioning ratio 
causes banks’ net foreign borrowing (b) to decrease less during a sudden stop.  When ψ1 is greater 
than zero, the lower reduction (or the increase) in b causes the domestic real interest rate (r) to go up, 
leading to lower output and higher bailout costs.  The counter indirect effect from the increase in the 
loan loss provisioning ratio on the bailout costs is however much smaller than the positive direct 
effect.  Hence, when combined with the direct effects, the increase in the loan loss provisioning ratio 
leads to the much lower bailout costs; however, the output slightly decreases. 
In scenario B2 when the policies aiming to improve banking supervision (an increase in υ) 
and those aiming to improve foreign creditors’ estimation of risks (a reduction in ψ0 and an increase 
in ψ1) are implemented together, the country benefits more from the lower bailout costs and the 
higher output than when each set of policies is implemented alone.  This is because the positive direct 
effects from the increase in the loan loss provisioning ratio, the increase in ψ1 (when changes in b are 
mostly negative), and the decrease in ψ0 (when changes in the world interest rate are mostly positive) 
more than outweigh the negative indirect effects via the interest rate channel of the increase in the 
loan loss provisioning ratio. 
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2) A reduction in the level of government subsidies or tax incentives (n) 
 The simulation results for scenario A2 in section 9.5 indicate that a decrease in the level of 
government subsidies or tax incentives (n), when ψ1 is set at zero, leads to much lower output (due to 
lower investment) and slightly lower bailout costs (due to lower bank lending to the corporate sector).  
Apart from these direct effects, the decrease in the government subsidies or tax incentives and the 
lower output reduce firms’ profits and dividends paid by firms to households.  With lower income, 
households deposit less money in banks, resulting in higher banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  
When ψ1 is greater than zero, the higher level of banks’ net foreign borrowing causes the domestic 
real interest rate (r) to increase, leading to a further reduction in investment and output as well as an 
increase in bailout costs.  The negative indirect impact (via the increase in r) of the decrease in n on 
the bailout costs is stronger than the positive direct impact (via the reduction in investment and thus 
bank lending to the corporate sector).  Hence, when the interest rate mechanism is working (ψ1 is 
greater than zero), the decrease in the government subsidies or tax incentives leads to even greater 
negative impacts on the economy through the greater reduction in the output and the higher bailout 
costs. 
3) A decrease in the expected exchange rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate 
parity (Pε) 
A decrease in the expected exchange rate deviation from the UIP (Pε), when ψ1 is zero, has a 
minimal impact on output and bailout costs, as suggested by the results for scenario A4 in section 9.5.  
However, when the interest rate mechanism is working (when ψ1 is greater than zero), a local 
currency depreciation as a result of the lower Pε reduces the value of banks’ net foreign borrowing in 
foreign currency (b).  Hence, when the simulated changes in banks’ net foreign borrowing are mostly 
negative, the local currency depreciation causes a lower reduction in banks’ net foreign borrowing, 
leading to a lower reduction (an increase) in the domestic real interest rate.  The increase in the 
domestic real interest rate as a result of the lower Pε in this case causes lower output and higher 
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bailout costs.  On the other hand, when changes in banks’ net foreign borrowing are mostly positive, 
the local currency depreciation causes a lower rise in banks’ net foreign borrowing, leading to a 
smaller increase (a decrease) in the domestic real interest rate.  The decrease in the domestic real 
interest rate as a result of the lower Pε brings about higher output and lower bailout costs in this case.  
Therefore, when the interest rate channel is working, the decrease in Pε benefits the country only in 
the situation where the country is most of the time the net foreign borrower, i.e., when changes in 
banks’ net foreign borrowing are mostly positive.  
9.6.3 Changes in Exogenously-Determined Parameters 
 This section examines how sensitive the simulation results are to a change in each of the 
exogenously-determined parameters both in the cases where ψ1 is zero and ψ1 is greater than zero. 
 1) A decrease in households’ degree of (liquidity) risk aversion (χ) 
 A decrease in households’ degree of risk aversion (χ) causes a decline in both the level and 
the magnitude of a change in households’ demand for money holdings, which has no direct effect on 
output or bailout costs.  However, when ψ1 is greater than zero, the lower level of households’ money 
balances as a result of the decrease in χ leads to higher households’ deposits with banks and lower 
banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  The reduction in banks’ net foreign borrowing leads to  
a decrease in the domestic real interest rate, resulting in higher output and lower bailout cost.  Hence, 
the decrease in households’ degree of (liquidity) risk aversion benefits the country through the 
interest rate mechanism by increasing the total output and lowering the bailout costs. 
 2) An increase in the production technology factor (A) and a rise in the income share of 
capital (α) 
 Both an increase in the production technology factor (A) and a rise the income share of 
capital (α) result in higher output, providing a greater incentive for firms to increase their investment.  
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Banks’ lending to the corporate sector increases, as a result of the higher investment, leading to 
higher banks’ NPL losses and higher bailout costs.   
 When ψ1 is greater than zero, there are two additional effects via the interest rate mechanism.  
First, the higher output as a result of the higher A or α leads to higher firms’ profits and higher 
dividends paid by firms to households.  With higher income, households deposit more money in 
banks, reducing banks’ demand for foreign borrowing (b) and causing the domestic real interest rate 
to go down.  Hence, investment and output increase and bailout costs decrease.  Second, the higher 
investment as a result of the higher A or α causes firms to increase their demand for bank loans, 
increasing banks’ demand for foreign borrowing and driving the domestic real interest rate up.  As a 
result, output declines and bailout costs rise.  If the simulated economy starts with a high level of 
wealth or output, the increase in A or α leads to a bigger rise in output and the first additional effect 
seems to dominate the second one.  Hence, output increases and bailout costs decrease (even after 
combining with the negative direct effect from the higher bailout costs) in this case.  On the other 
hand, if the simulated economy starts with a low level of wealth or output, the increase in A or α leads 
to a smaller increase in output and the second additional effect may outweigh the first one.  In this 
case, output decreases (increases less when combined with the direct effect) and bailout costs rise. 
3) An increase in the capital depreciation rate (d)  
A higher capital depreciation rate (d) increases firms’ expenses and reduces firms’ expected 
profits, causing firms to lower their investment and their demand for bank loans.  This leads to lower 
output and lower bailout costs. 
When ψ1 is greater than zero, there are two additional effects via the interest rate channel.  
First, the increase in firms’ expenses and the decrease in firms’ output as a result of the higher capital 
depreciation rate reduce the amount of dividends paid by firms to households.  With lower income, 
households reduce their deposits with banks, causing banks to increase their demand for foreign 
borrowing (b).  The higher b causes the domestic real interest rate to go up, leading to lower output 
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and higher bailout costs.  Second, the decrease in firms’ investment and their demand for bank loans 
reduces banks’ demand for foreign borrowing, causing the domestic real interest rate to decline.  As a 
result, output increases and bailout costs decrease.  If the simulated economy starts with a high level 
of wealth or output, the increase in d leads to a larger decrease in output and the first additional effect 
is stronger than the second one.  Hence, output decreases, and bailout costs increase (decrease less 
when combined with the direct effect) in this case.  On the other hand, if the simulated economy starts 
with a low level of wealth or output, the increase in d leads to a smaller decrease in output and the 
second additional effect dominates the first one.  Therefore, output increases (decreases less when 
combined with the direct effect) and bailout costs decrease in this case. 
4) An increase in the operating expense factor (ξ) 
A rise in banks’ operating expenses (as measured by ξ) increases banks’ losses from NPLs, 
resulting in higher bailout costs.  Banks also charge higher lending rates to firms to cover their higher 
expenses, causing firms to lower their investment.  As a result, output declines.   
The increase in banks’ NPL losses as a result of the higher ξ leads to a larger credit cut by 
foreign creditors, leading to a greater reduction in banks’ net foreign borrowing during a sudden stop.  
When the interest rate mechanism is working, the greater reduction in banks’ net foreign borrowing 
causes the domestic real interest rate to sharply decline, leading to an increase (a smaller decrease 
when combined with the direct effect) in investment and output as well as a reduction in bailout costs 
(even after combining with the negative direct effect from the higher bailout costs).   
5) An increase in the fraction of firms’ investment financed by capital markets (cap) 
A greater fraction of firms’ investment financed by capital markets (cap) leads to a reduction 
in banks’ lending to the corporate sector, a decrease in banks’ NPL losses, and lower bailout costs.  
The lower level of banks’ NPL losses also causes a smaller credit cut by foreign creditors during  
a sudden stop, resulting in a lower reduction (a slight increase) in output.   
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The smaller credit cut by foreign creditors during a sudden stop as a result of the higher cap 
results in a smaller decrease (an increase) in banks’ net foreign borrowing.  When the interest rate 
mechanism is working, the increase in banks’ net foreign borrowing causes the domestic real interest 
rate to go up, leading to a decrease in output (even after combining with the positive direct effect 
from the slightly higher output) and a rise (a smaller decrease when combined with the direct effect) 
in bailout costs.  
6) An increase in the personal income tax rate (η) 
A higher personal income tax rate does not have any direct effect on output or bailout costs.  
However, such a change leads to lower household income after tax, causing households to deposit 
less money in banks.  This causes banks to increase their demand for foreign borrowing.  When ψ1 is 
greater than zero, the higher level of banks’ net foreign borrowing causes the domestic real interest 
rate to go up, resulting in higher bailout costs and lower output. 
7) An increase in the time preference factor (δ) 
An increase in the time preference factor has no direct impact on output or bailout costs.  This 
change however causes a reduction in household consumption, leading to a greater amount of 
household deposits with banks and lower banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  When the interest 
rate mechanism is working, the decrease in banks’ net foreign borrowing causes a reduction in the 
domestic real interest rate, leading to lower bailout costs and higher output. 
8) An increase in the weight given to contemporary investment predicted by the model 
(inv0) and a decrease in the weight given to lagged investment (inv1) lead to a decrease in 
investment because contemporary investment predicted by the model (the model prediction part) is 
generally lower than lagged investment (the lagged part).  The lower investment results in lower 
output and lower demand for bank loans.  Hence, this change in the relative weight between the 
model prediction part and the lagged part results in lower output as well as lower bailout costs. 
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The increase in the weight given to the model prediction part (inv0) also leads to a larger cut 
in credit by banks to firms during a sudden stop.21  The reduction in banks’ lending causes banks’ 
demand for foreign borrowing and thus the domestic real interest rate to go down.  As a result, output 
increases (decreases less when combined with the direct effect) and bailout costs decrease. 
9) A decrease in the fraction of banks’ cumulative losses which are expected by foreign 
creditors to be covered by the country’s international reserves (β) leads to a smaller cut (an 
increase) in credit by foreign creditors during a sudden stop.  As a result, there will be a smaller cut in 
banks’ lending to the corporate sector and a lower reduction in investment, leading to higher bailout 
costs and higher output.   
Additionally, when the interest rate mechanism is working, the smaller cut in credit by 
foreign creditors as a result of the decrease in β causes a smaller reduction (an increase) in banks’ net 
foreign borrowing.  Consequently, the domestic real interest rate decreases less (increases), leading to 
much higher bailout costs and lower output (even after combining with the positive direct effect from 
the higher output). 
10) An increase in the parameter determining the fraction of banks’ cash shortfalls 
subsidized by the government during a sudden stop (φ) reduces a cut in credit by banks to the 
corporate sector.  This change leads to a smaller reduction (an increase) in firms’ investment, an 
increase in output, an increase in banks’ lending, as well as a slight increase in banks’ losses 
transferred to the government during a sudden stop.  However, the remaining banks’ cumulative NPL 
losses which are transferred to the government after the sudden stop are lower.  The net effect of the 
increase in φ is thus a small reduction in bailout costs and a small increase in output. 
When the interest rate mechanism is working, there are two additional indirect effects via the 
interest rate channel.  First, the smaller cut in credit by banks to the corporate sector and the smaller 
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reduction in firms’ investment, as a result of the increase in φ, lead to a smaller reduction (an 
increase) in banks’ lending to firms and greater banks’ demand for foreign borrowing.  Hence, the 
domestic interest rate increases, leading to lower output and higher bailout costs.  Second, the smaller 
reduction (the increase) in output as a result of the increase in φ increases firms’ profits and dividends 
paid by firms to households.  Households therefore deposit more money in banks, lowering banks’ 
demand for foreign borrowing and causing the domestic real interest rate to go down.  This second 
indirect effect, in contrast to the first indirect effect, causes output to increase and bailout costs to 
decrease.  Combined with the direct effects, the net effects of the increase in φ when ψ1 is greater 
than zero seem to be an increase in both output and bailout costs.  However, the magnitudes of those 
effects are small. 
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CHAPTER X 
MISSING COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL AND  
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The model developed in this dissertation provides a unifying framework for analyzing the 
relationships between international capital flows via the banking sector and other sectors of  
an economy when moral hazard problems are present.  Although the model is rich in several 
dimensions, there are some simplifying assumptions and missing components, which could be areas 
for future research. 
(1) Fully Collateralized Loans  
 In this model, the sum of the value of bank debt and the cumulative amount of additional 
bonds or stocks issued by firms to finance new investment is always equal to the value of firms’ 
capital stock.  It is therefore implicitly assumed that the principal amount of a loan is fully 
collateralized.  In reality, this may not be the case.  Although at the origination of a loan, the collateral 
value is normally greater than the principal amount of the loan, the collateral value can shrink over 
time, especially during an economic decline or during a crisis.  Therefore, banks’ NPL losses 
suggested by the model include only the interest part, not the principal part of loans, and the bailout 
costs estimated by the model are lower than actual costs. 
(2) No Run by Domestic Depositors 
 A crisis in this model is triggered by a sudden stop of international capital flows (or a run by 
foreign creditors).  It is assumed that there is no run by domestic depositors (although a credit cut by 
foreign creditors causes the deposit rate to decrease, leading to lower household deposits with banks).  
 
Banks in this model therefore encounter smaller cash shortfalls during a sudden stop.  Hence, the 
estimated bailout costs and the reduction in bank lending to the corporate sector during a sudden stop 
suggested by the model may be smaller than what actually happens during a crisis. 
(3) Exogenous Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans Ratio  
 It is assumed in the model that the fraction of low-type firms or the non-performing loans to 
total loans ratio (NPL ratio) is exogenous.  Hence, the model allows the NPL ratio to affect 
endogenous variables in the model, but does not allow other variables to affect the NPL ratio.  
Nevertheless, the model can be extended by endogenizing the NPL ratio.  One way to do this is by 
assuming that firms are endowed with different levels of production technology (determined by 
parameter At).  For example, At may be assumed to be uniformly distributed within the range 
( A,A ).  Let Aot be the cutting point where a firm with the level of production technology equal to 
Aot will be able to produce and sell just enough output to break even.  Note that Aot can be backed out 
from the profit function of a firm, and it is endogenous.  Hence, firms having the level of production 
technology lower than Aot are not able to service debt and thus are classified as non-performing loans.  
Hence, the NPL ratio at time t can be defined as the ratio of firms having the level of production 
technology lower than Aot = AA
AAot
−
−
.  
(4) Role of Bank Foreign Exchange Hedging 
 In this model, it is assumed that banks do not hedge the foreign exchange risk associated with 
their foreign borrowing.  This assumption is reasonable for many crisis countries since rigid exchange 
rate regimes before the crises were common.  Hence, there had been a widely held perception that the 
governments of those countries were committed to stable exchange rates.  Nevertheless, this 
assumption can be relaxed by introducing additional parameters, e.g., a hedging ratio and hedging 
cost factor, at the expense of having a more complicated model.  Besides having more parameters to 
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be calibrated or estimated, the hedging cost will be an additional cost of banks’ foreign borrowing and 
will therefore play a role in determining the domestic interest rates.  
(5) Other Possible Model Extensions 
       (5.1) More active role by households:  Households only make decisions on 
consumption, money holdings, and deposits with banks.  There is no active portfolio management 
decision in this model.   
       (5.2) Incorporation of non-traded sector:  There is only one traded sector in this model.  
Hence, the one-sector model may be extended to a two-sector model by incorporating both traded and 
non-traded sectors. 
       (5.3) Currency mismatches in the corporate sector:  In this model, firms only borrow 
in local currency.  It may be interesting to extend the model by allowing firms to borrow in both local 
and foreign currencies to examine the role of currency mismatches in the corporate sector in 
triggering or exacerbating a crisis.  Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) examine the factors 
determining the use of different types of debt for East Asian non-financial firms as well as the effect 
of debt type on firms’ performance.  They find no evidence that unhedged foreign currency debt is 
associated with significantly worse performance during the Asian financial crisis.   
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation studies the transmission mechanism of international capital flows via the 
banking sector to the real sector when moral hazard problems are present.  The model developed in 
this dissertation describes a bank-based open economy much like those in Asia, Latin America, etc. 
and in particular the role of the quality of institutions and domestic policies in (i) reducing moral 
hazard problems and (ii) determining the net benefit of international capital flows to a country in the 
long run.   
The theoretical model to explain such a mechanism is developed under a general equilibrium 
framework with three main ingredients reflecting the key observations of open countries which have 
experienced crises.  First, the banking sector plays a major role in channeling international capital 
flows to the real sector.  Second, there are structural and policy distortions, resulting in three layers of 
moral hazard problems in an economy before a crisis: (1) lax loan loss provisioning rules and 
inadequate banking supervision leading to excessive lending, excessive foreign borrowing, and  
an accumulation of NPL losses at the bank level, (2) government subsidies or tax incentives leading 
to overinvestment at the corporate level, and (3) expected government guarantees and stable exchange 
rates leading to excessive lending by foreign investors to the banking sector in another country, 
foreign investors’ underestimation of risks, and a greater expected exchange rate deviation from the 
uncovered interest rate parity at the international level.  Third, a sudden stop of capital flows is 
triggered when the expected level of the government’s contingent liabilities exceeds the level of the 
country’s international reserves.   
 
The model explains what has happened in many open countries which have experienced 
crises really well.  In particular, this model shows that more available capital from international 
capital flows via the banking sector, together with the three layers of moral hazard problems, leads to 
excessive foreign borrowing and risk-taking behavior not only in the banking sector, but also in the 
real sector.  The increasing level of foreign borrowing and cumulative losses as a result of risk-taking 
activities takes the economy away from its equilibrium.  Once the level of cumulative losses reaches a 
certain threshold, foreign investors stop lending to the country and a sudden stop of capital flows 
occurs. This model therefore highlights the role of international capital flows and moral hazard 
problems in fueling an open economy during a boom as well as making a country more vulnerable to 
a sudden stop and a crisis. 
This dissertation also finds that the quality of institutions and domestic policies matters.   
In examining the role of changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies in mitigating 
moral hazard problems and in determining the net benefit of international capital flows, the 
parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems are estimated to fit Thailand data using 
the equilibrium conditions derived from the model.  These parameter values are found to be 
significantly different before and after the crisis, with the values after the crisis showing significant 
reductions in the moral hazard problems at all levels.  In addition, the results from the simulation 
exercises suggest that the policies to increase the effectiveness of banking supervision and those to 
improve foreign investors’ estimation of risks, especially when implemented together, significantly 
help increase the net benefit of international capital flows by increasing the output and reducing the 
bailout costs.  However, the policies to reduce government subsidies or tax incentives to the corporate 
sector hurt, rather than benefit, the country, as the cost from the lower output exceeds the benefit from 
the lower bailout costs. 
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In conclusion, policies to reduce a moral hazard problem in a particular sector not only have 
an immediate impact on that particular sector, but also affect other sectors as well as the whole 
economy in the long run.  Furthermore, some policy combinations are better than others in different 
situations.  Therefore, it is very important that policy makers and related authorities coordinate with 
one another to come up with the best set of policies for the whole country.  
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APPENDIX A 
Equilibrium Conditions 
Corporate Sector 
In aggregate, the total capital stock (Kt) = N kt,, the total employed labor (Lt )= N lt, the total 
demand for bank loans (et) = N ejt, the total cumulative supply of newly-issued bonds or stocks 
( ) = , and the total investment (It) = N Ijt.  The following equations summarize the 
equilibrium conditions for the corporate sector. 
tKcap ⋅ tkcapN ⋅⋅
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where         if t1t1tDtt X)Fr(1FF ++== −− t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−  and not during the bailout period, 
         ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−− −
β
R
P
εFφF 1t
t
tD
t
D
t
   if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− , 
0   from the start to the end of the bailout plan (bailout period) since there  
  will be a series of transfers of the remaining Ft to the government to clean  
  up the banking system,   
                         , ξ)(r)eυ)(NPL(1X 1t1t1tt +−= −−−
                                                
22In this setup, there is no uncertainty in aggregate output since A and α are constant and Kt and Lt are 
predetermined. 
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  if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− ,   
D
t
D
tt cap)K(1ee −==
         ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−− −
β
R
P
εFφ)(1e 1t
t
tD
t
D
t  if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− .   
Banking Sector 
In aggregate, the total supply of bank lending to the corporate sector (et) = M eit, the total 
demand for household deposits (at) = M ait, the total demand for foreign borrowing (bt) = M bit, the 
total dividends paid by banks to the household sector (Xt) = M Xit , the cumulative NPL losses (Ft)  
= M Fit, the total FX profits or losses (FXt) = M FXit , and the cumulative FX profits or losses (AFXt) 
= M AFXit.  The following equations summarize the equilibrium conditions for the banking sector. 
• Optimal real lending rate: ξ)(r
NPL1
1r t
t
l
t +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
              (A5), 
• Optimal real deposit rate:  ( )bbψiψrir t1wt0ctbtt ˆ−+===                      (A6), 
• Banks’ budget constraints: 
Flow: 
Before the start of the bailout plan 
)F(F)AFX(AFXb
P
εb
P
εaaee 1tt1tt1t
1-t
1-t
t
t
t
1tt1tt −−−−− −−−−−+−=−           (A7a_i), 
Since the start of the bailout plan 
)GA(GA)F(F)AFX(AFXb
P
εb
P
εaaee 1tt1tt1tt1t
1-t
1-t
t
t
t
1tt1tt −−−−−− −−−−−−−+−=−        (A7a_ii), 
Stock:  
Before the start of the bailout plan 
tttt
t
t
t FAFXabP
εe −−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=             (A7b_i), 
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Since the start of the bailout plan 
ttttt
t
t
t GAFAFXabP
εe −−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=           (A7b_ii), 
             where   , t1t1tt transfer)GAr(1GA ++= −−
0transfert =                          if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−  and not during the bailout period, 
                      ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−
β
R
P
εFφ 1-t
t
tD
t
 if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− , 
                                 during the bailout period, DtF
 1t1t
1t
1t
t
t
t )br(1P
ε
P
εFX −−
−
− +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= , 
  . t1t1tt FX)AFXr(1AFX ++= −−
Household Sector 
The following equations summarize the equilibrium conditions for the household sector. 
• Optimal consumption: 
1t
1t
t Cδ1
r1C −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+=              (A8), 
• Optimal real monetary aggregate: 
t
tt
t
t
i
)i(1χC
P
M +=               (A9), 
where   and )r)(1π(1)i(1 ttt ++=+ t
t
1t π1
P
P +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ + , 
• Households’ budget constraint: 
( )t1t1t1ttt1t1t1tt XerKdSYη)(1araa +−⋅−+−+=− −−−−−−  
               )K(Kcap
P
MMC D1t
D
t
t
1tt
t −
− −⋅−−−−             (A10), 
       where  . α11t
α
1tt LnKS
−
−−=
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Public Sector 
• Government’s budget constraint: 
Before the first sudden stop     
( ) tt1t
t
t
1t
t
1tt
t1t1t1ttt1tt
t
t SGR
P
εr
P
MMXerKdSYη)R(R
P
ε −−+−++−⋅−+=− −−−−−−−       (A11_i), 
During and after the first sudden stop 
( ) ))Lr(1-L (SGR
P
εr
P
MMXerKdSYη)R(R
P
ε f
1t1-t
f
ttt1t
t
t
1t
t
1tt
t1t1t1ttt1tt
t
t
−−−
−
−−−− ++−−+−++−⋅−+=−    (A11_ii). 
National Account (combination of (A4), (A7a), (A10), (A11)) 
Before the first sudden stop     
1t1t1t1t1tt1tt
t
t
tttt brRr)b(b)R(RP
εGCIY −−−−−− +−−−−+++=          (A12_i), 
During and after the first sudden stop 
))Lr(1-L (brRr)b(b)R(R
P
εGCIY f 1t1-t
f
t1t1t1t1t1tt1tt
t
t
tttt −−−−−−− +−+−−−−+++=       (A12_ii). 
Modified Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
)P)(1i(1
)i(1
ε
ε
ε
w
t
t
t
1t
++
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +  Î  
)P)(1i(1
)r(1
/Pε
/Pε
ε
w
t
t
tt
1t1t
++
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++          (A13). 
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APPENDIX B 
Parameters and Variables 
Parameters α = Income share of capital  
 A = Average production technology factor 
 n = Firms’ additional revenue or cost factor due to government subsidies 
or taxes  
 cap = Fraction of firms’ investment financed by capital markets 
(1-cap) = Fraction of firms’ investment financed by bank loans 
 d = Capital depreciation rate 
 Ψ0 = Interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate 
 Ψ1 = Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing 
 bˆ = Perceived optimal level of aggregate banks’ net foreign borrowing 
 ξ = Operating expense factor 
 υ = Loan loss provisioning ratio  
 δ = Time preference factor 
 χ = Preference for money holdings relative to consumption  
(a measure of households’ degree of (liquidity) risk aversion) 
 η = Personal income tax rate 
 Pε = Expected exchange rate deviation from conventional uncovered 
interest rate parity 
 β = Fraction of banks’ cumulative NPL losses which are expected by 
foreign creditors to be covered by the country’s international reserves 
 φ = Fraction of banks’ cash shortfalls subsidized by the government during 
a sudden stop. 
(1-φ) =Effect of a sudden stop on firms’ investment 
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 Exogenous  iw = World nominal interest rate 
Variables π = Inflation rate 
 L = Employed labor 
 NPL = Fraction of low-type firms = Banks’ non-performing loans to total 
loans ratio 
 G = Government spending  
Endogenous  Y = Output 
Variables K = Capital stock  
 I =  Investment 
 e = Bank lending to the corporate sector 
 b = Banks’ net foreign borrowing  
 a = Household deposits with banks 
 C = Consumption 
 M/P = Real monetary aggregate 
 ε/P= Real exchange rate  
 r = Domestic real deposit rate  
 rl = Domestic real lending rate 
 i = Domestic nominal deposit rate 
 S = Government subsidies or taxes to the corporate sector 
 X = Dividends paid by banks to the household sector 
 F = Banks’ cumulative NPL losses 
 FX = Banks’ FX profits or losses 
 AFX = Banks’ cumulative FX profits or losses 
 Lf = Government liabilities as a result of bank bailouts 
 R = International reserves 
 GA = Good assets 
 Transfer = Transfer of banks’ NPL losses to the government 
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APPENDIX C 
Steady State Solutions  
(C1) At a steady state, the loan loss provisioning ratio υ  must be 100% and hence, 0X = , 0F = , 
0AG = , and 0Lf = . 
(C2) Assume that the steady state values for exogenous variables are the long-run averages. 
(C2.1) )(iaverage = i wt
w , 
(C2.2) )(πaverage = π t , 
(C2.3) )(Laverage = L t , 
(C2.4) )(NPLaverage = LPN t , 
(C2.5) )(Gaverage = G t . 
(C3) At a steady state, the exchange rate and the price level grow at the same rate π . 
)π(1
P
P
ε
ε
1t
t
1t
t +==
−−
  Î 1
P
P
ε
ε
1t
t
1t
t
=
−
− . 
(C4) Based on (C3), the real exchange rate (εt/Pt) is constant at a steady state.  Assume that 
)/P(εaverage = P/ε tt . 
 1
P
ε
P
ε
1t
1t
t
t
=
−
−
 Î P
ε
P
ε
P
ε
1t
1t
t
t ==
−
− .  Hence, 0XF =  and 0XFA = . 
(C5) Based on (C4),  
)P)(1i(1
)r(11
P
ε
P
ε
ε
w
1t
1t
1t
1t
t
t
++
+==
−
−
−
−
Î 1)P)(1i(1r εw −++= . 
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(C6)  C
δ1
r1C ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
+=    Î rδ = . 
(C7) )bb(ψiψr 1
w
0
ˆ−+=   Î
1
w
0
ψ
iψrbb −+= ˆ . 
(C8)  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
+=
LPN1
ξrr l .    
(C9) 1)r)(1π(1i −++= . 
(C10)  
α1
1
dξr
n)α(ALK
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+= . 
(C11)  
α1
1
dξr
n)α(ALcap)(1Kcap)(1e
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+−=−= . 
(C12) 
α1
α
α1α
dξr
n)α(ALALKAY
−− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+== .              
(C13) 
α1
α
α1α
dξr
n)α(ALnLKnS
−− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+== . 
(C14) 
1)π)(1r(1
)π)(1r(1Cχ
P
M
−++
++= . 
(C15)  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
+−+++−−
−−−
=−
b
P
εr
P
M
π1
π
CKη)d(1Xη)SYη)((1
Kcap)(1rη)KK(
P
ε
1bb  
  Î
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
++
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−+−+−
=
1)π)(1r(1
π)r(1
χ1
b
P
εrKrcap)η(1KdSYη)(1
C . 
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(C16) ( ) )KKcap(
P
M
π1
πCKcap)(1rKdSYη)(1araa −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−−−−⋅−+−+=−    
 Î 
( )
r
Kcap)(1rKdSYη)(1
1)π)(1r(1
π)r(1
χ1C
a
−−⋅−+−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
++
=    
 Î b
P
εKcap)(1a ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−= . 
(C17) [ ] SGR
P
εr
P
M
π1
πKcap)(1rKdSYη)RR(
P
ε −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++−−⋅−+=−     
[ ] R
P
εrKcap)(1rKdSYηSG
1)π)(1r(1
)π)(1r(1Cχ
π1
π ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⋅−+−+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+  
 Î
[ ]
r
P
ε
1)π)(1r(1
π)r(1CχKcap)(1rKdSYηSG
R
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
+−−−⋅−+−+
= . 
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APPENDIX D 
Linear Approximations and Solutions for Linearized Difference Equations 
Linear approximations around the steady state values of b and C 
Change in C equation: 
bb
δ1
CψCC 1t1tt −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+=− −−                  (D1). 
Change in b equation: 
bb1
C1
B1CC
C1
Abb 1t1t1tt −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −′−
′++−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
′−
′=− −−−              (D2), 
 where  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
++=′
1)πδ)(1(1
πδ)χ(11
P
ε
1A ,      
[ ]
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅⋅+
−++
+++−+++++
++⋅−
⋅⋅⋅−−+⋅++⋅−
⋅⋅−+
++⋅−
⋅−⋅⋅+⋅−⋅−++⋅−
⋅
=′
P
ε
δb
P
ε
δ1
ψδb
P
ε
ψ
1)πδ)(1(1
)πδ)(1(1ψCχ
1)πδ)(1(1
πψCχ
δ1
ψC
d)ξ(δα)(1
ψKdη)(1)SY(
d)ξ(δα)(1
ψαη)(1
d)ξ(δα)(1
ψKcap)(1δη
ψKcap)(1η
d)ξ(δα)(1
ψK
P
ε
1B
1
1
2
111
11
1
1
1
,   
[ ] ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−++
++−−++
++++⋅−
⋅−=′ 2
2
111
1)πδ)(1(1
)πδ)(1(1ψCχ
1)πδ)(1(1
)π(1ψCχ
d)ξ(δα)(1
ψK
P
ε
1C .   
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Linearized difference equations (D1) and (D2) can be written in the matrix form as follows. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
−
−
bb
CC
ab
c0
bb
CC
1t
1t
1tt
1tt                  (D3), 
where   a = ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −′−
′+ 1
C1
B1
, b = ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
′−
′
C1
A
,  and c = ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+ δ1
Cψ
. 
Since A΄ > 0, (1-C΄) > 0 and (1+B΄) > (1-C΄), a, b, and c in equation (D3) are all positive.  By setting 
equation (D1) (or ) and equation (D2) (or 1tt CC −− 1tt bb −− ) to zero, we have  
Locus ΔC = 0:   bb 1t =−                 (D4), 
Locus Δb = 0:   0
a
b
CC
bb
1t
1t <−=−
−
−
−               (D5). 
The phase diagram plotting the loci ΔC = 0 and Δb = 0 can be depicted as follows. 
Ct 
bt 
b  ΔC=0 
Δb=0 
Q 
R 
P 
C  
 
Q is an equilibrium point where all endogenous variables are at a steady state.  There are both stable 
paths leading to the steady state (e.g., PQ and RQ) and unstable paths leading to an explosion.  Hence, 
this equilibrium is a saddle point. 
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Solutions for linearized difference equations 
• Equation (D3) can be rewritten as  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
bb
CC
1ab
c1
bb
CC
1t
1t
t
t                (D6). 
• Let ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
bb
CC
X
t
t
t and . Equation (D6) can be denoted as  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= 1ab
c1
A
1tt XAX −⋅=                   (D7). 
• If A has distinct eigenvalues, these exists a nonsingular matrix E such that   and 
hence 
1EWEA −⋅⋅=
1t
1
t XEWEX −
−⋅⋅=                   (D8), 
where  E = eigenvector matrix with elements , ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
11
ee 21
W = eigenvalue matrix with elements , ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
2
1
ω0
0ω
E-1 = the inverse of eigenvector matrix with elements =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ji
hg
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−−
−
−
−
−
21
1
21
21
2
21
ee
e
ee
1
ee
e
ee
1
. 
• Since ,  2t11t XEWEX −−− ⋅⋅=
             (D9). 0
1t
2t
12
2t
11
t XEWEXEWE)XEW(EEWEX
−
−
−
−
−− ⋅⋅=⋅⋅=⋅⋅⋅⋅=
• General solutions for two linearized difference equations are 
)]b(bj)C(C[iωe)]b(bh)C(C[gωeCC 00
t
2200
t
11t −⋅+−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+−⋅⋅⋅=−          (D10), 
)]b(bj)C(C[iω)]b(bh)C(C[gωbb 00
t
200
t
1t −⋅+−⋅⋅+−⋅+−⋅⋅=−          (D11). 
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• If both eigenvalues (ω1, ω2) are less than 1 (greater than 1), the equilibrium is stable (unstable).  
However, if one of the eigenvalues is greater than 1 while the other is less than 1 (say, ω1 >1 and 
ω2<1), the equilibrium is a saddle point where it is stable in some directions, but unstable in 
others.  When the equilibrium is a saddle point, unstable paths (the path with ω1>1) can be ruled 
out by setting an additional condition so that the term containing the unstable eigenvalue 
[ )b(bh)C(Cg 00 −⋅+−⋅  in equations (D10) and (D11)] is equal to zero, i.e., 
)b(be)b(bh/g)C(C 0200 −⋅=−⋅−=−                 (D12). 
      Hence, the solutions to difference equations, which lead to stable paths, are 
   )b(beCC 020 −=−                (D13), 
    )b(bω)b(bωbb 1t20
t
2t −=−=− −              (D14), 
     )b(be)b(bωeCC t20
t
22t −=−⋅⋅=−              (D15). 
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APPENDIX E 
Equilibrium Conditions in the Form of First Difference Equations 
)LKLA(KYY α12t
α
2t
α1
1t
α
1t1tt
−
−−
−
−−− −=−                (E1), 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1t1M1tMt01tt I1InvK d)(1KInv =I I −−− ⋅−+−−⋅−              (E2), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+=−
−
−
−
1t
1t
t
tl
1t
l
t NPL1
ξr
NPL1
ξrrr                 (E3), 
( 1tt1w 1twt01tt bbψ)i(iψrr −−− −+−=− )                       (E4), 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+−+
+−+++−−
⋅−−⋅−
=−
−−
−
−
−−−−
−
1t
t
t
1t
t
1tt
t1tttt
D
1t1t1t1tt
t
t
1tt
b
P
εr
P
MM
Cη)dK(1ηX)Sη)(Y(1
)Kcap(Kηr)Kd(I
P
ε
1bb       if tβFRP
ε
1t
t
t ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−         (E5_i), 
     
( )
( ) ⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−⋅−−
+−+
+−+++−−
⋅−−⋅−
−
−−
−
−
−−−−
β
R
P
εFφ)(1inv1
b
P
εr
P
MM
Cη)dK(1ηX)Sη)(Y(1
)Kcap(KηrKdI
P
ε
1
1t
t
tD
t0
1t
t
t
1t
t
1tt
t1tttt
D
1t1t1t1tt
t
t
      if t1t
t
t βFR
P
ε <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−        (E5_ii), 
1t
MA
1t
1tt C1δ1
r1CC −−− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+
+=−                  (E6), 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+=−
−
−−
−
−
MA
1t
MA
1t1t
MA
t
MA
tt
1t
1t
t
t
i
)i(1C
i
)i(1C
χ
P
M
P
M
                (E7), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++
+=−
−
−
−
−
−
−
1t
1t
ε
w
1t
1t
1t
1t
t
t
P
ε1
)P)(1i(1
r1
P
ε
P
ε                 (E8), 
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where   
α1
1
MA
t
MD
t
M
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             0    from the start to the end of the bailout plan (bailout period) since there will  
                   be a series of transfers of the remaining Ft to the government to clean up the  
                   banking system, 
MA
tr  = Eleven-year moving average of monthly real deposit rates, 
MA
ti  = Eleven-year moving average of monthly nominal deposit rates, 
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−
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APPENDIX F 
Descriptions and Data Sources of Variables Used as Instruments 
Variable Description Source 
Change in the world 
interest rate 
Change in the 3-month US certificate 
of deposit (secondary market) interest 
rate 
Monthly 3-month US 
certificate of deposit 
(secondary market) interest 
rate from the IMF-IFS 
Change in the world 
inflation rate 
Change in the US inflation rate 
(US inflation rate = Change in US 
consumer price index (CPI) from the 
same month of the previous year) 
Monthly change in US CPI 
from Datastream 
Percentage change in 
the world industrial 
production index 
Percentage change in the US 
industrial production index 
Monthly seasonally-adjusted 
US industrial production 
index (2000 = 1000) from 
Datastream 
Log return on the spot 
JPY/USD exchange rate 
Change in the natural log of the spot 
JPY/USD exchange rate 
Monthly spot JPY/USD 
exchange rate from 
Datastream 
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APPENDIX G 
Steps to Calculate Partial-Sample GMM Estimators and Wald Statistics 
Step 1: Estimate parameter values for each sub-period (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
periods) simultaneously using two-step GMM 
Step 1.1: Form 3 sets of moment conditions for 3 sub-periods, i.e., m(Wt, β1, δ), m(Wt, β2, δ), and  
m(Wt, β3, δ), and arrange them in the following way. 
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where Tπ1 is the first breakpoint, 
Tπ2 is the second breakpoint (0 ≤ π1 ≤ π2 ≤ 1), 
( ) qppp321 RRRR ΔBBBδ,β,β,βθ ×××⊂×××∈= , 
β = Parameters of interest, which are assumed to be different across sub-periods  
      (i.e., β1 for pre-crisis period, β2 for crisis period, and β3 for post-crisis period), 
δ = Other parameters, which are assumed be constant throughout the whole sample  
       period, 
),,m( ⋅⋅⋅  is a function from , υR toΔBW ××
Wt are observed sample and . kRW ⊂
Step 1.2: First stage GMM 
1.2.1 Use a sub-optimal weighting matrix  where Z is the vector of instruments (This is 
equivalent to applying non-linear two-stage least squares) to estimate the initial values of parameters 
(β1, β2, β3, δ) 
1'Z)Z(I −⊗
)]δ,β,β,βby[denoted 321
~~~~( . 
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1.2.2 Use the estimated initial values of those parameters from step 1.2.1 )δ,β,β,β( 321
~~~~  to calculate the 
optimal weighting matrix for the second stage GMM.  The estimation of the optimal 
weighting matrix involves the following additional steps. 
)π,(πγ 21ˆ
1.2.2.1 Calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix 
estimators for each sub-period.   
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where   k(.) = kernel,23
l(n) = bandwidth parameter, 
n = number of observations. 
1.2.2.2 Multiply each by the proportion of sample for each sub-period and arrange 
them in block diagonal form to be used as the optimal weighting matrix in step 1.3 as follows. 
)π,(πS 21ˆ
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
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−−−
12
21
1
2
12
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1
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1
21
1
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21 ππ1
)π,(πS,
ππ
)π,(πS,
π
)π,(πSDiag)π,(πγ
ˆˆˆ
ˆ . 
                                                
23There are several choices of kernel functions, e.g., Bartlett, Parzen, and Quadratic Spectral.  Newey-West 
(Bartlett) kernel is used in this estimation. 
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δ),β,β,(β 321
)]δ,β,β,βθby[denoted 321 ˆˆˆˆ(ˆ =
Step 3: Critical values 
Step 2: Calculate Wald statistics 
    
In the case where breakpoints (π1 and π2) are known, WT (π1, π2) has a chi-square distribution with p 
degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis, where p is the number of restrictions. 
Step 1.3: Second stage GMM  
Minimize the following objective function using the moment conditions from step 1.1 and the optimal 
weighting matrix from step 1.2.2.2 to obtain the partial sample GMM estimators of  
. 
)π,π,(θm)π,(πγ)π,π,(θminf)π,π),π,(πθ()π,(πγ)π,π),π,(πθ( 21T2121TΘθ2121212121T ˆ
ˆˆˆ ′=′ ∈m . 
)π,(πθH)H)π,(πΩ(H(πθ 21
1
2121
ˆˆˆ −′′′
)π,(π 21ˆ
)π,(πΩ 21ˆ )π,(π 21ˆ
H)π,)π,(πW 21T = , 
where   θ  = Parameter vector, 
           [
           [
= Estimated covariance matrix of parameter vector θ , 
[ ]0:I:0:IH pp −= 3ββ ˆˆ =
 
 for HO: , 1
]0:0:I:I pp − 21 βˆˆ =    for HO: β , 
]0:I:I:0 pp − 32 βˆˆ =    for HO: β . 
Figure 1: Time-Series Patterns of Variables 
 
 
 
This figure shows monthly time-series of macroeconomic, financial market, and bank variables of Thailand as well as the world interest rate from January 1993 to June 2007.  
Panels A to C plot the annualized real traded output, the real net capital stock of the private sector, and the annualized real private investment in traded sectors.  Panels D to F plot 
the annualized real private consumption, the real monetary aggregate, and the banks’ net foreign borrowing.  Panels G to I show monthly time-series of the real exchange rate, the 
annualized domestic nominal deposit rate, and the annualized domestic real deposit rate.  Panels J to L plot the annualized domestic real lending rate, the employed labor, and the 
banks’ non-performing loans to total loans ratio.  Panels M, N and P plot the international reserves net of the Bank of Thailand’s forward position, the annualized world nominal 
interest rate, and the annualized domestic inflation rate, respectively.  The details about how these variables are obtained or computed are described in table 1.   
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G. Real Exchange Rate (ε/P)
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Table 1: Descriptions and Data Sources of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Y = Real Traded 
Output  
(Real Output) 
Y = Predicted monthly real output  
    = ay + by * monthly manufacturing production index 
• Estimate ay and by by regressing the actual 
quarterly real output divided by 3 on the 
average monthly manufacturing production 
index for each quarter. 
• Predicted monthly real output = ay + by * 
monthly manufacturing production index. 
• If sum of the predicted monthly real output 
within a quarter is not equal to the actual 
quarterly real output, the difference is divided 
by 3 and equally adjusted to the predicted 
value of monthly real output. 
• Monthly seasonally 
adjusted (SA) 
manufacturing production 
index from the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT) 
• Quarterly SA GDP at 1988 
prices from the Office of 
National Economic and 
Social Development Board 
(NESDB) 
(Traded output = Total 
GDP subtracted by the 
GDP from (1) financial 
intermediations and (2) 
real estate, renting and 
business activities) 
I = Real Private 
Investment in 
Traded Sectors 
(Real Investment) 
I = Predicted monthly real investment 
  = aI + bI * monthly investment index 
• Construct a new investment index without the 
real estate component by taking out 
residential construction area and domestic 
cement sales components from the private 
investment index obtained from the BOT. 
• Derive annual real investment for year y (Iy) 
from the following equation. 
                   Iy= Ky - Ky-1 + Deprey 
Ky = Real net capital stock at the end of year y  
Ky-1= Real net capital stock at the end of year y-1 
Deprey = Annual capital depreciation for year y 
• Estimate aI and bI by regressing the actual Iy 
divided by12 on the average monthly new 
investment index for year y 
• Monthly private 
investment index from 
1995 to 2007 and the index 
components from 1993 to 
2007 from the BOT  
• Annual SA net capital 
stock and annual capital 
depreciation of the private 
sector at 1988 prices 
(excluding the banking, 
insurance, and real estate 
sectors) from the NESDB  
 115
Variable Description Source 
• Predicted monthly real investment (Im)  
= aI + bI * monthly new investment index  
• If sum of Im within a year is not equal to Iy, 
the difference is divided by 12 and equally 
adjusted to the predicted value of Im 
K = Real Net 
Capital Stock of 
the Private Sector 
(Real Net Capital 
Stock) 
K = Predicted real net capital stock at the end of each 
month according to the following equation 
Kmy= Kmy-1 + Imy  - Deprey/12 
Kmy  = Real net capital stock at the end of month m  
           of year y 
Kmy-1= Real net capital stock at the end of month m-1 
            of year y 
Imy    = Predicted monthly real investment for 
           month m of year y 
Deprey = Annual capital depreciation for year y 
Annual SA net capital stock 
and annual capital 
depreciation of the private 
sector at 1988 prices 
(excluding the banking, 
insurance, and real estate 
sectors) from the NESDB 
C = Real Private 
Consumption 
(Real 
Consumption) 
C = Predicted monthly real consumption  
    = ac + bc * monthly consumption index 
• Estimate ac and bc by regressing the actual 
quarterly real consumption (Cq) divided by 3 
on the average monthly consumption index 
for each quarter 
• Predicted monthly real consumption (Cm)  
= ac + bc * monthly consumption index  
• If sum of Cm within a quarter is not equal to 
Cq, the difference is divided by 3 and equally 
adjusted to the predicted value of Cm 
 
• Monthly private 
consumption index from 
1995 to 2007 and the index 
components from 1993 to 
2007 from the BOT.   
This series is extended 
backwards to 1993 using 
the predicted value of the 
index based on the 
regression of the index on 
its own components. 
• Quarterly SA private 
consumption at 1988 
prices from the NESDB. 
M = Nominal 
Monetary 
Aggregate  
M = Seasonally adjusted M1  Monthly M1 from 1993 to 
2006 from the International 
Financial Statistics of the 
IMF (IMF-IFS).  The series 
is extended forwards to 2007 
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Variable Description Source 
using the predicted value of 
M1 based on the regression 
of M1 on narrow money (a 
new measure replacing M1). 
b = Aggregate 
Banks’ Net 
Foreign 
Borrowing  
b = Net foreign liabilities (Foreign liabilities – Foreign 
assets) of all banks and finance companies 
(This is equivalent to the stock of net international 
capital flows via the banking sector) 
Aggregate foreign liabilities 
and aggregate foreign assets 
of all banks and finance 
companies from the BOT.   
ε  = Nominal 
Exchange Rate  
ε = Spot THB/USD exchange rate  Monthly spot THB/USD 
exchange rate (end of 
period) from Datastream 
i = Domestic 
Nominal Deposit 
Rate 
i = 3-month Thai baht deposit rate  Monthly data from the IMF-
IFS 
il = Domestic 
Nominal Lending 
Rate 
il = 3-month Thai baht lending rate  Monthly data from the IMF-
IFS 
L = Employed 
Labor 
L = Monthly employed labor linearly interpolated 
from semi-annual, quarterly, and monthly data and 
seasonally adjusted using X-11 methodology. 
Semiannual (1993-1997), 
quarterly (1998-2000), and 
monthly (2001-2007) data 
from the BOT 
NPL = Banks’ 
Non-Performing 
Loans to Total 
Loans Ratio  
NPL from 1998 to 2007= Actual non-performing 
loans to total loans ratio of all banks and finance 
companies 
NPL before 1998 = Predicted monthly NPL using 
coincident economic index as an explanatory variable 
• Monthly NPL data from 
1998 to 2007 from the 
BOT 
• Monthly coincident 
economic index from  
1993 to 2007 from the 
BOT 
R = International 
Reserves 
R = International reserves, net of forward positions by 
the BOT 
 
Monthly data from the BOT  
iw = World 
Nominal Interest 
Rate 
iw = 3-month US certificate of deposit (secondary 
market) interest rate  
Monthly data from the IMF-
IFS 
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Variable Description Source 
π = Domestic 
Inflation Rate 
π = Change in consumer price index (CPI) from the 
same month of the previous year  
Monthly change in CPI from 
Datastream  
(Source: Ministry of 
Commerce) 
P = Price Level  P = CPI/ CPI at 1988 prices Monthly CPI from 
Datastream  
(Source: Ministry of 
Commerce) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample Period 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the parameter estimation and the simulation exercises for 
the whole sample period from January 1993 to June 2007.  Panel A presents the mean, the standard deviation, the median, 
the maximum, and the minimum of each variable in levels.  Panel B exhibits those statistics of each variable in changes. 
Panel A: Levels 
Variable Description Unit Mean Standard Deviation Median Maximum Minimum
Y* Real Output (million baht) 2,930,432 468,344 2,816,136 3,924,875 2,078,155
K Real Net Capital Stock (million baht) 6,248,742 753,548 6,466,197 7,322,852 4,182,282
I* Real Investment (million baht) 591,512 207,115 600,036 1,018,086 275,733
C* Real Consumption (million baht) 1,740,724 248,830 1,687,258 2,235,394 1,319,913
M/P Real Monetary Aggregate (million baht) 309,940 78,423 278,239 446,168 189,954
b Banks' Net Foreign Borrowing (million USD) 8,870 20,185 1,888 51,472 -23,402
ε/P Real FX rate (baht/USD) 20.72 2.84 20.91 32.27 15.94
i* Nominal Deposit Rate (%) 5.69 3.93 4.50 14.00 1.00
r*, ** Real Deposit Rate (%) 2.05 2.71 1.88 6.90 -3.57
rl *, ** Real Lending Rate (%) 5.70 2.28 6.11 9.90 0.
L Employed Labor (million) 32.30 2.04 31.35 36.64 29.17
NPL Banks' NPL (% of total loans) 21.98 11.53 21.43 48.00 7.47
R International Reserves (million USD) 36,227 16,279 31,523 82,521 1,144
iw* World Nominal Interest Rate (%) 4.25 1.74 5.08 6.73 1.04
π* Inflation Rate (%) 3.63 2.46 3.41 10.64 -1.14
Panel B: Changes
Variable Description Unit Mean Standard Deviation Median Maximum Minimum
ΔY* ΔReal Output (million baht) 10,429 52,022 8,905 150,061 -137,586
ΔI* ΔReal Investment (million baht) -823 26,640 1,369 118,245 -164,403
ΔC* ΔReal Consumption (million baht) 5,292 35,307 5,168 109,962 -120,367
ΔM/P ΔReal Monetary Aggregate (million baht) 1,430 8,959 1,253 37,820 -34,627
Δb ΔBanks' Net Foreign Borrowing (million USD) -169 1,380 -47 2,724 -8,229
Δε/P ΔReal FX rate (baht/USD) -0.023 0.860 -0.070 4.711 -6.098
Δi* ΔNominal Deposit Rate (%) -0.042 0.516 0 2.250 -3.250
Δr*,** ΔReal Deposit Rate (%) -0.033 0.638 -0.050 2.619 -2.543
Δrl *,** ΔReal Lending Rate (%) -0.017 0.526 -0.010 1.858 -1.723
ΔL ΔEmployed Labor (million) 0.035 0.309 0.026 1.113 -1.330
ΔNPL ΔBanks' NPL (% of total loans) -0.161 1.534 0 5.000 -9.000
ΔR ΔInternational Reserves (million USD) 350 1,937 367 5,431 -18,268
Δiw* ΔWorld Nominal Interest Rate (%) 0.013 0.183 0 0.630 -0.830
Δπ* ΔInflation Rate (%) -0.009 0.545 0 1.720 -2.360
* These varialbles are annualized from monthly data.
** Real deposit rate (r) = (1+i)/(1+π) -1 and real lending rate (rl) = (1+il)/(1+π) -1.
01
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Each Sub-Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Levels
Variable Description Unit Sub-Period Mean Standard Deviation Median Maximum Minimum
Y* Real Output (million baht) Pre-Crisis 2,524,669 236,439 2,588,763 2,838,823 2,078,155
Crisis 2,669,713 135,030 2,707,662 2,863,668 2,403,981
Post-Crisis 3,349,872 340,025 3,371,901 3,924,875 2,815,521
K Real Net Capital Stock (million baht) Pre-Crisis 5,322,520 693,119 5,308,036 6,443,335 4,182,282
Crisis 6,495,547 48,144 6,481,420 6,575,735 6,440,882
Post-Crisis 6,742,037 281,202 6,653,367 7,322,852 6,456,754
I* Real Investment (million baht) Pre-Crisis 845,628 82,764 831,881 1,018,086 703,275
Crisis 376,953 116,766 335,412 711,975 275,733
Post-Crisis 537,127 105,657 560,409 692,539 359,808
C* Real Consumption (million baht) Pre-Crisis 1,556,517 130,188 1,570,712 1,761,090 1,319,913
Crisis 1,563,775 83,022 1,566,666 1,726,461 1,416,017
Post-Crisis 1,963,438 181,158 1,996,415 2,235,394 1,657,491
M/P Real Monetary (million baht) Pre-Crisis 243,053 27,999 247,872 283,140 189,954
Aggregate Crisis 257,994 19,814 257,425 310,238 228,450
Post-Crisis 384,026 54,110 408,582 446,168 281,681
b Banks' Net Foreign (million USD) Pre-Crisis 28,776 15,025 30,964 51,472 5,775
Borrowing Crisis 16,082 15,071 11,684 48,322 -2,927
Post-Crisis -8,631 5,203 -6,402 -4,457 -23,402
ε/P Real FX rate (baht/USD) Pre-Crisis 18.15 1.20 17.82 20.23 15.94
Crisis 22.75 2.56 22.10 32.27 16.51
Post-Crisis 21.35 2.52 21.44 25.29 16.06
i* Nominal Deposit Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 9.73 1.55 9.75 12.00 6.50
Crisis 6.88 3.79 5.00 14.00 3.00
Post-Crisis 2.28 1.21 2.00 4.75 1.00
r*, ** Real Deposit Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 4.74 1.29 4.81 6.90 1.76
Crisis 3.10 1.55 2.78 6.58 0.61
Post-Crisis -0.35 1.63 -0.27 2.18 -3.57
rl*,** Real Lending Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 7.27 1.11 7.52 8.94 4.85
Crisis 7.11 1.37 7.10 9.90 4.57
Post-Crisis 3.86 1.91 4.13 6.90 0.01
L Employed Labor (million) Pre-Crisis 30.66 0.58 30.69 32.24 29.53
Crisis 30.77 0.58 30.76 31.89 29.17
Post-Crisis 34.25 1.39 34.50 36.64 31.15
NPL Banks' NPL (% of total Pre-Crisis 26.29 4.68 25.21 35.69 19.94
 loans) Crisis 36.00 8.33 36.00 48.00 17.00
Post-Crisis 11.32 2.88 10.71 17.00 7.47
R International Reserves (million USD) Pre-Crisis 30,306 6,932 29,906 39,903 5,297
Crisis 21,242 9,598 25,317 30,526 1,144
Post-Crisis 48,512 14,500 48,661 82,521 29,450
iw* World Nominal (%) Pre-Crisis 4.90 1.09 5.39 6.29 3.09
Interest Rate Crisis 5.74 0.56 5.60 6.73 4.88
Post-Crisis 2.99 1.63 2.53 5.46 1.04
π* Inflation Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 4.97 1.24 4.87 7.49 2.56
Crisis 3.78 3.71 2.08 10.64 -1.14
Post-Crisis 2.64 1.68 2.24 6.24 0.10
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the parameter estimation and the simulation exercises for 
each sub-period: (1) pre-crisis period from January 1993 to May 1997, (2) crisis (and reform) period from June 1997 to 
December 2000, and (3) post-crisis period from January 2001 to June 2007.  Panel A presents the mean, the standard 
deviation, the median, the maximum, and the minimum of each variable in levels.  Panel B exhibits those statistics of each 
variable in changes. 
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Panel B: Changes
Variable Description Unit Sub-Period Mean Standard Deviation Median Maximum Minimum
ΔY* ΔReal Output (million baht) Pre-Crisis 14,022 41,170 14,396 150,061 -60,848
Crisis 378 58,661 5,936 139,690 -137,586
Post-Crisis 13,575 54,503 8,682 138,547 -105,965
ΔI* ΔReal Investment (million baht) Pre-Crisis -1,364 38,107 -1,902 118,245 -164,403
Crisis -6,705 24,535 -1,424 21,900 -122,659
Post-Crisis 2,779 16,202 3,749 48,212 -67,192
ΔC* ΔReal Consumption (million baht) Pre-Crisis 8,402 32,217 7,327 109,962 -69,845
Crisis -1,954 41,441 -154 100,662 -120,367
Post-Crisis 7,213 33,479 5,020 74,466 -71,223
ΔM/P ΔReal Monetary (million baht) Pre-Crisis 1,537 6,139 1,415 24,320 -13,113
Aggregate Crisis 211 12,711 556 37,820 -34,627
Post-Crisis 2,030 8,063 1,709 30,342 -31,436
Δb ΔBanks' Net Foreign (million USD) Pre-Crisis 876 881 826 2,724 -818
Borrowing Crisis -1,265 1,465 -1,004 894 -8,229
Post-Crisis -262 1,073 -65 1,603 -4,661
Δε/P ΔReal FX rate (baht/USD) Pre-Crisis -0.082 0.133 -0.074 0.129 -0.829
Crisis 0.192 1.647 0.135 4.711 -6.098
Post-Crisis -0.102 0.356 -0.099 1.046 -1.127
Δi* ΔNominal Deposit Rate (%) Pre-Crisis -0.005 0.518 0 1.500 -2.000
Crisis -0.145 0.804 0 2.250 -3.250
Post-Crisis -0.010 0.229 0 0.750 -0.750
Δr*,** ΔReal Deposit Rate (%) Pre-Crisis -0.028 0.652 -0.100 1.513 -1.394
Crisis -0.073 0.840 -0.200 2.619 -2.543
Post-Crisis -0.015 0.492 0 1.443 -1.511
Δrl*,** ΔReal Lending Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 0.006 0.528 -0.075 1.516 -1.090
Crisis -0.050 0.611 -0.189 1.858 -1.723
Post-Crisis -0.013 0.479 0 1.447 -1.614
ΔL ΔEmployed Labor (million) Pre-Crisis 0.033 0.193 0.019 0.432 -0.377
Crisis -0.033 0.228 -0.017 0.433 -0.491
Post-Crisis 0.072 0.396 0.083 1.113 -1.330
ΔNPL ΔBanks' NPL (% of total Pre-Crisis -0.275 1.304 -0.218 2.211 -3.272
loans) Crisis -0.102 2.458 0 4.799 -9.000
Post-Crisis -0.117 0.906 0 5.000 -5.000
ΔR ΔInternational Reserves (million USD) Pre-Crisis -320 2,945 240 1,686 -18,268
Crisis 587 1,003 353 3,747 -2,458
Post-Crisis 667 1,285 523 5,431 -2,167
Δiw* ΔWorld Nominal (%) Pre-Crisis 0.049 0.167 -0.005 0.500 -0.240
Interest Rate Crisis -0.001 0.202 0.010 0.630 -0.830
Post-Crisis -0.004 0.182 0 0.260 -0.610
Δπ* ΔInflation Rate (%) Pre-Crisis 0.023 0.492 0.090 0.980 -1.510
Crisis -0.072 0.720 0.110 1.720 -2.360
Post-Crisis 0.005 0.465 0 1.520 -1.450
* These varialbles are annualized from monthly data.
** Real deposit rate (r) = (1+i)/(1+π) -1 and real lending rate (rl) = (1+il)/(1+π) -1.
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Table 4: Preliminary Correlation Analysis 
 
 
 
 
\ 
 
 
 
This table reports the correlations between the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side (RHS) variables of the 
equilibrium conditions derived from the model over January 1993 to June 2007.  In this table, Y = Real output, K = Real 
net capital stock, I = Real investment, C = Real consumption, M/P = Real monetary aggregate, ε/P = Real exchange rate, 
b = Banks’ net foreign borrowing, L = Employed labor, NPL = Non-performing loans to total loans ratio, rl = Real lending 
rate, r = Real deposit rate, i = Nominal deposit rate, and iw = World nominal interest rate. 
Equilibrium Condition LHS Variable 
RHS 
Variable
Expected 
Sign Correlation
Real Output 
Yt Kt-1 + 0.7813
Lt-1 + 0.9542
Real Net Capital Stock
Kt rt - -0.6042
-0.6734
-0.1462
                                               
              if no sudden stop
                                                                                     
             during a sudden stop
Real Investment
It rt - rt-1 - 0.0373
Real Lending Rate
rlt rt + 0.9161
NPLt + 0.6609
Real Deposit Rate
rt iwt + 0.5072
bt + 0.7168
Growth Rate of Real Consumption
Ct/Ct-1 rt-1 + -0.0009
Real Monetary Aggregate
Mt/Pt Ct + 0.9759
it -
Growth Rate of Real Exchange Rate
rt-1 + 0.1241
iwt-1 - 0.0890
Change in Banks' Net Foreign Borrowing
bt-bt-1 It + 0.4105
Yt -
                                                                                          Ct + -0.0931
Mt/Pt - Mt-1/Pt-1 + 0.0451
                     if no sudden stop Kt-1 -
rt-1 + 0.1296
εt/Pt -
bt-1 + 0.0746
                                                                                                 
                    during a sudden stop
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Table 5: Correlations between Selected Macroeconomic Variables and 
Relevant Interest Rates 
 
This table compares the correlations between the selected macroeconomic variables and the relevant interest rates over 
January 1993 to June 2007 when using one-period interest rates versus eleven-year moving averages of interest rates.   
    
Expected 
Sign 
One-Period 
Interest 
Rates 
Eleven-Year 
Moving Averages 
of Interest Rates
Real Net Capital Stock (Kt) vs. Real Deposit Rate (rt) - -0.6042 -0.8742 
Real Investment (It) vs.
Change in Real 
Deposit Rate (rt-rt-1)
- 0.0373 -0.2742 
Growth Rate of  Real 
Consumption (Ct/Ct-1)
vs.
Lagged Real Deposit 
Rate (rt-1)
+ -0.0009 0.0138
Real Monetary Aggregate 
(Mt/Pt)
vs.
Nominal Deposit 
Rate (it)
- -0.6734 -0.9795 
 Variables
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Table 6: Exogenously-Determined Parameters 
 
Parameter Value Calculation/Source 
α 0.31238 The average income share of capital over 1993-2005. 
Source: Jetin (2007) 
A 168 Solve for the value of A that makes the long-run relation α1αLKAY −=  hold. 
cap 0.48 
1 – The average ratio of bank loans to total external finance over 1993- 2007. 
[Total external finance =  Sum of bank loans, stock market capitalization, and 
outstanding of domestic bonds] 
Source: Akrasanee (2008) 
d 0.0051 
The average yearly capital depreciation rate of the private sector over  
1993- 2007 divided by 12. 
Source: The Office of National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) 
bˆ  0 
Assumed to be zero, i.e., when the aggregate level of banks’ net foreign 
borrowing is zero, the interest rate applied to banks’ foreign lending and 
borrowing transactions is exactly equal to the world interest rate. 
ξ 0.002 Solve for the value of ξ that makes the long-run relation ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
+=
LPN1
ξrr l  hold. 
χ 0.01 
Solve for the value of χ that makes the long-run relation 
1)π)(1r(1
)π)(1r(1Cχ
P
M
−++
++=  hold. 
δ 0.0017 Use the value of δ that makes the long-run relation rδ =  hold. 
β 1 This is the worst case scenario in which foreign creditors expect the country’s 
international reserves to cover the full amount of banks’ cumulative NPL losses. 
η 9.79% 
The weighted average personal income tax rate from a survey in 1992. 
Source: Poapongsakorn, Charnvitayapong, Laovakul & Suksiriserekul, Dahlby 
(2000) 
φ 0 
This is the worst case scenario in which the government provides the least 
support to banks during a sudden stop.  The government support during a 
sudden stop however does not include the transfers of the remaining cumulative 
NPL losses to the government to clean up the banking system during the bailout 
period. 
This table presents the values of exogenously-determined parameters and describes how they are derived.  Those 
parameter values are generally obtained from related studies or calibrated using long-run data relations. 
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates from Partial-Sample GMM Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the estimated values of the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems and the related 
parameters for each sub-period from the partial-sample GMM estimation.  The loan loss provisioning ratio (υ) indicates the 
degree of the moral hazard problem at the bank level.  The level of government subsidies (if positive) or taxes (if negative) 
(n) measures the severity of the moral hazard problem at the corporate level.  The interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate 
level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) and the expected exchange rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) measure the degree of the moral hazard problems at the international level.  The related parameters, which may 
change over time, include the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate (ψ0), the weight given to contemporary 
investment predicted by the model (Inv0), and the weight given to lagged investment in the investment equation (Inv1).  The 
approximate standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, as well as the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions test are also 
reported.   
Parameter Sub-Period Approx. Std. Err. T-Statistic
Approx. 
P-Value
Loan Loss Provisioning Pre-Crisis (υsub1) 0.5215 *** 0.0763 6.84 <.0001
Ratio (υ) Crisis (υsub2) 0 + -            . .
Post-Crisis (υsub3) 1           + -            . .
Government Subsidies or Pre-Crisis (nsub1) -3.84 *** 0.85 -4.49 <.0001
Taxes (n) Crisis (nsub2) -13.01 *** 1.67 -7.78 <.0001
Post-Crisis (nsub3) -29.02 *** 1.24 -23.37 <.0001
Interest Rate Sensitivity to Pre-Crisis (ψ0,sub1) 1.1797 *** 0.2370 4.98 <.0001
the World Interest Rate (ψ0) Crisis (ψ0,sub2) -0.1645  0.1114 -1.48 0.1416
Post-Crisis (ψ0,sub3) 0.0585  0.1135 0.52 0.6071
Interest Rate Sensitivity to Pre-Crisis (ψ1,sub1) -0.1500  0.5460 -0.27 0.7890
the Aggregate Level of Banks' Crisis (ψ1,sub2) 0.8360 ** 0.3540 2.36 0.0193
Net Foreign Borrowing  (ψ1) Post-Crisis (ψ1,sub3) 1.4610 ** 0.6860 2.13 0.0347
Expected FX Rate Deviation  Pre-Crisis (Pε,sub1) 0.0044 *** 0.0004 10.62 <.0001
from the Uncovered Interest Crisis (Pε,sub2) -0.0095 *** 0.0023 -4.12 <.0001
Rate Parity  (Pε) Post-Crisis (Pε,sub3) 0.0014  0.0011 1.37 0.1714
Weight Given to Pre-Crisis (Inv0,sub1) 0.0682 ** 0.0269 2.53 0.0122
Contemporary Investment Crisis (Inv0,sub2) 0.0267 ** 0.0132 2.02 0.0450
Predicted by the Model (Inv0) Post-Crisis (Inv0,sub3) 0.0796 *** 0.0269 2.96 0.0035
Weight Given to Pre-Crisis (Inv1,sub1) 0.9508 *** 0.0187 50.85 <.0001
Lagged Investment (Inv1) Crisis (Inv1,sub2) 0.9460 *** 0.0184 51.39 <.0001
Post-Crisis (Inv1,sub3) 0.8742 *** 0.0441 19.82 <.0001
66.9335
0.9458
sub1, sub2, sub3    denote pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, respectively.
***, **, *               indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
+                            The estimated value is below (above) the lower (upper) bound. Hence, the lower (upper)
                               bound value is assigned to this parameter.  The standard error is not reported.
Estimate
J-Statistic for the test of overidentifying restrictions:
 P-value of chi-square with 108 - 21 = 87 degrees of freedom :
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Test P-Value
nsub1 = nsub3
ψ0,sub1 = ψ0,sub3
ψ1,sub1 = ψ1,sub3
Pε,sub1 = Pε,sub3
Inv0,sub1 = Inv0,sub3
Inv1,sub1 = Inv1,sub3
All parameterssub1 = All parame
nsub1 = nsub2
ψ0,sub1 = ψ0,sub2
ψ1,sub1 = ψ1,sub2
Pε,sub1 = Pε,sub2
Inv0,sub1 = Inv0,sub2
Inv1,sub1 = Inv1,sub2
All parameterssub1 = All parame
nsub2 = nsub3
ψ0,sub2 = ψ0,sub3
ψ1,sub2 = ψ1,sub3
Pε,sub2 = Pε,sub3
Inv0,sub2 = Inv0,sub3
Inv1,sub2 = Inv1,sub3
All parameterssub2 = All parame
sub1, sub2, sub3    denote pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, respectively.
***, **, *               indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
Wald Statictic
Pre-Crisi
Table 8: Wald Statistics for Structural Break Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the Wald statistics and the p-values for the structural break tests.  Particularly, the tests for the differences 
in the values of the parameters measuring the severity of moral hazard problems are conducted for pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods, pre-crisis and crisis periods, as well as crisis and post-crisis periods.  The tests are also undertaken for each 
parameter as well as all parameters in combination.  The level of government subsidies (if positive) or taxes (if negative) 
(n) measures the severity of the moral hazard problem at the corporate level.  The interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate 
level of banks’ net foreign borrowing (ψ1) and the expected exchange rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) measure the degree of the moral hazard problems at the international level.  The related parameters, which may 
change over time, include the interest rate sensitivity to the world interest rate (ψ0), the weight given to contemporary 
investment predicted by the model (Inv0), and the weight given to lagged investment in the investment equation (Inv1).  The 
tests for the differences in the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ), which measures the severity of the moral hazard problem at 
the bank level, cannot be conducted since the lower bound and upper bound values are assigned to the loan loss 
provisioning ratios for the crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
279.19 *** <.0001
18.21 *** <.0001
3.36 * 0.0669
6.80 *** 0.0091
0.09  0.7641
2.56  0.1097
terssub3 313.56 *** <.0001
23.42 *** <.0001
26.35 *** <.0001
2.28  0.1312
35.12 *** <.0001
1.92  0.1663
0.03  0.8549
terssub2 128.01 *** <.0001
59.12 *** <.0001
1.97  0.1609
0.66  0.4181
18.66 *** <.0001
3.12 * 0.0774
2.26  0.1328
terssub3 120.67 *** <.0001
Crisis VS. Post-Crisis Periods
s VS. Post-Crisis Periods
Pre-Crisis VS. Crisis Periods
 
Table 9: Simulation Scenarios 
 
 
This table describes the scenarios used in the simulation exercises to assess the impact of changes in the quality of institutions and domestic policies to reduce moral hazard problems on the 
direct and indirect costs or benefits of international capital flows to an open economy like Thailand.  The base scenario serves as the benchmark case where all estimated parameter values are 
set at the pre-crisis levels.  In group A scenarios, only one aspect of the moral hazard problems is adjusted to the post-crisis level.  In group B scenarios, the loan loss provisioning ratio (υ), 
which measures the severity of the moral hazard problem at the bank level, and another aspect of the moral hazard problems are concurrently adjusted to the post-crisis levels.  Scenario C1 
uses different parameter values (as derived from the partial-sample GMM estimation) for each sub-period.   
Scenario Description
υ n Ψ0 Ψ1 Pε Inv0 Inv1
Base All parameters at the pre-crisis values 0.5215 -3.84 1.1797 0 0.0044 0.0682 0.9508
A1 ↑ Loan loss provisioning ratio (υsub1 is increased to υsub3 ) 1 -3.84 1.1797 0 0.0044 0.0682 0.9508
A2 ↓ Government subsidies or ↑ taxes (nsub1 is reduced to nsub3) 0.5215 -29.02 1.1797 0 0.004398 0.0682 0.9508
A3
↑ Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks' net foreign borrowing                 
(Ψ1,sub1 is increased to Ψ1,sub3, and Ψ0,sub1 is decreased to Ψ0,sub3 )
0.5215 -3.84 0 1.4610 0.004398 0.0682 0.9508
A4 ↓ FX rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity (Pε,sub1 is reduced to Pε,sub3) 0.5215 -3.84 1.1797 0 0 0.0682 0.9508
B1 Scenario A1 + A2 1 -29.02 1.1797 0 0.004398 0.0682 0.9508
B2 Scenario A1 + A3 1 -3.84 0 1.4610 0.004398 0.0682 0.9508
B3 Scenario A1 + A4 1 -3.84 1.1797 0 0 0.0682 0.9508
C1 Different parameter values for each sub-period
- Pre-crisis period 0.5215 -3.84 1.1797 0 0.0044 0.0682 0.9508
- Crisis period 0 -13.01 0 0.8360 -0.0095 0.0267 0.9460
- Post-crisis period 1 -29.02 0 1.4610 0 0.0796 0.8742
Parameter Value Used
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Table 10: Direct and Indirect Costs in Comparison with the Actual Data 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the estimated direct and indirect costs or benefits of international capital flows under different moral hazard scenarios as described in table 9.  The actual direct and indirect 
costs or benefits to Thailand during January 1993 to June 2007 are also reported for comparison.  The estimated direct costs are the sum of banks’ NPL losses transferred to the government 
while the actual direct costs are the sum of actual government lending to the Financial Institutions Development Funds (FIDF).  The indirect costs or benefits are the effect of international 
capital flows and moral hazard problems on both the level and growth of output.  The average annual output and the average annual output growth rate are annualized from monthly output 
and monthly output growth rate, respectively.  % of output is based on the output of June 2007.  'No Time Value' means that the time value of money is not taken into account while 'Future 
Value' means that the amount in each period t is multiplied by (1+ average real deposit rate)^(T-t) to account for the time value of money, where T-t is the number of periods between period t 
and June 2007. 
Unit: Million Baht
Scenario
No Time Value Future Value No Time Value Future Value No Time Value Future Value
Base: All parameters at the pre-crisis values 460,209          551,283       11.79% 14.12% 3,098,466       3,562,214    3.21%
A1. ↑ Loan loss provisioning ratio -                  -               0% 0% 3,098,663       3,562,448    3.21%
A2. ↓ Government subsidies or ↑ taxes 427,912          512,985       11.64% 13.95% 2,988,725       3,441,424    2.79%
A3. ↑ Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks' net foreign borrowing 197,656          238,267       5.06% 6.11% 3,102,801       3,567,176    3.21%
A4. ↓ FX rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity 461,023          552,054       11.81% 14.14% 3,098,473       3,562,222    3.21%
B1. Scenario A1 + A2 -                  -               0% 0% 2,988,930       3,441,666    2.79%
B2. Scenario A1 + A3 -                  -               0% 0% 3,102,585       3,566,944    3.21%
B3. Scenario A1 + A4 -                  -               0% 0% 3,098,663       3,562,448    3.21%
C1. Different parameter values for each sub-period 596,703          714,076       18.02% 21.56% 2,919,919       3,372,412    2.06%
Actual Data 1,274,561       1,433,792    32.69% 36.78% 2,935,264       3,369,606    4.40%
Direct Costs Indirect Costs
Amount % of Output Avg Output Avg Output 
Growth 
Rate (%)
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Unit: Million Baht
Scenario
No Time Value Future Value No Time Value Future Value No Time Value Future Value
A1. ↑ Loan loss provisioning ratio 460,209           551,283           2,843               3,375               463,052           554,659           
A2. ↓ Government subsidies or ↑ taxes 32,296             38,298             (1,582,088)       (1,741,385)       (1,549,792)       (1,703,087)       
A3. ↑ Interest rate sensitivity to the aggregate level of banks' net foreign borrowing 262,552           313,016           62,497             71,533             325,049           384,550           
A4. ↓ FX rate deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity (814)                 (771)                 101                  121                  (713)                 (649)                 
B1. Scenario A1 + A2 460,209           551,283           (1,579,146)       (1,737,893)       (1,118,937)       (1,186,610)       
B2. Scenario A1 + A3 460,209           551,283           59,383             68,194             519,592           619,477           
B3. Scenario A1 + A4 460,209           551,283           2,843               3,375               463,052           554,659           
C1. Different parameter values for each sub-period (136,495)          (162,792)          (2,574,049)       (2,736,305)       (2,710,544)       (2,899,097)       
Direct Costs Indirect Costs Total Costs
Benefits(+) or Costs(-) Relative to the Base Case
 
 
Table 11: Direct, Indirect and Total Costs Relative to the Base Scenario 
 
 
This table reports the estimated direct, indirect, and total costs or benefits of international capital flows under different moral hazard scenarios relative to the base scenario.  The relative direct 
costs are the difference between the sum of the bailout costs in each scenario and the sum of the bailout costs in the base scenario.  The relative indirect costs (-) or benefits (+) are the 
difference between the sum of the output in each scenario and the sum of the output in the base scenario.  The sum of the output ≈ The average annual output in table 10 * 173 periods /12.  
The relative total costs are the sum of the relative direct costs and the relative indirect costs.  'No Time Value' means that the time value of money is not taken into account while 'Future 
Value' means that the amount in each period t is multiplied by (1+ average real deposit rate)^(T-t) to account for the time value of money, where T-t is the number of periods between period t 
and June 2007. 
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